APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother and Father divorced and Mother was given custody of their child. Mother remarried and eventually she and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights and allow Stepfather to adopt the child. The trial court found that Father had not visited the child within four months of the filing of the petition and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.

This case concerns the validity of a county resolution prohibiting quarries and rock crushers “within five thousand (5,000) feet of a residence, school, licensed daycare facility, park, recreation center, church, retail, commercial, professional or industrial establishment.” The plaintiff landowners argued that the county failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee’s county zoning statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to -115. In the alternative, they argued that state law expressly preempted local regulation of quarries. However, the county argued that it was exercising its authority to protect its citizens’ health, safety, and welfare under the county powers statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-118. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county on the ground that it had no comprehensive zoning plan. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This case concerns a “Declaration of Additional Restrictive Covenants” applicable to an unimproved tract in a residential subdivision. In relevant part, the Declaration provides that, if a construction agreement could not be reached, the buyer is required to either (1) obtain a waiver of the exclusive builder provision, or (2) re-convey the property to seller at the original purchase price, excluding fees and costs. Here, Appellant/seller and Appellees/buyers could not agree on the building costs. The trial court determined that Appellant breached the Declaration and waived the right to enforce it when he failed to grant Appellees’ request for waiver of the exclusive builder provision and also refused to re-purchase the lot. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The mother in this action filed for divorce and sought to relocate to North Carolina with the parties’ son. Following settlement of all issues aside from the matters of parenting time and child support, the trial court designated the mother primary residential parent and allowed her to move back to her home state. The father appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed this declaratory judgment action against his sister, seeking to enforce a contract concerning property owned by the siblings’ parents at their deaths. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the contract was unenforceable, as there was no meeting of the minds due to a mutual mistake of fact. The trial court further found that a conveyance of real property was barred by the statute of frauds. Because Appellant has failed to supply this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence presented at trial, we must affirm the trial court’s finding that there was no meeting of the minds due to a mutual mistake.

This is an appeal from two orders entered by the trial court in this post-divorce action. In
the first order, the trial court found the mother guilty on three counts of criminal contempt,
upon a petition filed by the father, for scheduling and taking the parties’ minor child to two
doctor’s appointments and a walk-in clinic in violation of the parties’ permanent parenting
plan. The parenting plan granted to the father exclusive decision-making authority over all
non-emergency medical decisions for the children. In the second order, the trial court sua
sponte modified the parties’ parenting plan, granting the father “tie-breaking authority” to
schedule non-school-related extracurricular activities during the mother’s co-parenting
time on the condition that if the mother did not agree to a particular activity, the father
would pay for and provide transportation to the activities. Neither party had filed a petition
seeking to modify the parenting plan. The mother appeals this modification on the grounds
that no material change in circumstance existed to justify modification of the parenting
plan and argues further that the modification was not in the best interest of the children
because it would likely create more disputes between the parties going forward. With
regard to the criminal contempt determinations, the mother argues on appeal that her
actions in scheduling the two doctor’s visits were not “willful” as required for a finding of
criminal contempt and that her action in taking the child to the walk-in clinic was
precipitated by a medical emergency, a situation over which the parenting plan did not
grant the father exclusive control. Upon thorough review, we discern no reversible error
in the trial court’s determination that the mother was guilty of three counts of criminal
contempt for violating the permanent parenting plan and accordingly affirm that order in
its entirety. Regarding the second order, we find as a threshold matter that the trial court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the parties’ parenting plan in the absence
of a petition to modify or motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the
trial court’s order modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan.

An employer terminated an employee after she requested unpaid commissions pursuant to
her contract. The employee sued her former employer claiming breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, retaliatory discharge, and intentional misrepresentation. She also sought
punitive damages. The jury found in the employee’s favor on all claims and awarded
damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and retaliatory discharge as well as
awarding punitive damages. The former employer sought post-trial relief, arguing the
jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and that the jury’s punitive damages award was in error
and excessive. The trial court concluded the verdicts were consistent but did reduce, while
not eliminating, the punitive damages award. The former employer appeals, challenging
the compensatory and punitive damage awards. We affirm.

Father appeals the denial of his petition in opposition to a proposed relocation by Mother
and his petition to change custody of the children. After considering the testimony of over
ten witnesses, the trial court ruled that the children’s best interests were served by allowing
Mother to relocate and by her remaining the children’s primary residential parent. The trial
court also awarded Mother considerable attorney’s fees, including fees incurred in
defending against a dependency and neglect action that had eventually been dismissed,
with the related visitation and custody issues transferred to the trial court. Discerning no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decisions, we affirm. We deny, however, Mother’s
request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found
by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven and that
termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appealed. On appeal, the
Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” three of the grounds that the trial
court concluded were established. We reverse these three grounds. Of the three remaining
grounds, which DCS maintains were sufficiently proven, we conclude that the ground of
substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was proven by clear and convincing
evidence. We further find that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
children. However, due to insufficiencies in the trial court’s findings, we vacate the
grounds of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility against the mother. We reverse in part, with respect to three grounds for termination, and vacate in part, with respect to two grounds for termination, but otherwise we affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse.
An attorney negotiated a settlement on behalf of a client in litigation over the
administration of an estate. The same attorney subsequently assisted his client in the prior
litigation in filing a related suit in which the party obtained default judgment. The Plaintiff
in the present case is seeking to set aside that default judgment and to obtain other relief,
asserting the Defendant acted unscrupulously in filing a suit on matters which had
previously been settled. The trial judge reported the attorney, who is no longer the attorney
representing the Defendant, to the Board of Professional Responsibility based on the filing
of the suit which resulted in the default judgment. The Defendant seeks recusal of the trial
judge, asserting that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The judge
denied the motion for recusal, finding that he could be fair and impartial, had not prejudged
any matters, and that a person of ordinary prudence would find no reasonable basis
for questioning his impartiality. We affirm.

This appeal concerns a suit brought by a homeowner’s association to enforce a property
restriction contained in its declarations against a resident subject to the declarations. After
the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the homeowner’s association, the
trial court granted it relief and entered an injunction against the homeowner. The
homeowner appealed. We conclude that the trial court properly granted the homeowner’s
association’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellants Matthew Swilley ("Swilley") and Samuel Barr ("Barr") entered into two agreements to purchase mobile home parks from William Thomas ("Thomas"). The buyers had not secured financing in order to close on the originally agreed upon closing date. The seller granted the buyers a number of extensions of the closing date; however, the buyers were ultimately unable to obtain financing in time to close by any of the dates demanded by the seller. As a result, the seller rescinded the agreements and shortly thereafter sold the properties to unrelated third parties for a higher price than provided for in the agreements with Swilley and Barr. Swilley, Barr, and their purported assignee, SB Capital LLC ("SB Capital" or, together with Swilley and Barr,"Plaintiffs"), brought suit against the seller for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment as to the proper disbursement of the earnest monies held in escrow. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, finding that Plaintiffs were the first to materially breach the agreements. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal concerning the trial court’s distribution of the divorcing parties’ marital property.  Following a prior appeal, this matter was remanded to the trial court to, inter alia, value and equitably divide the assets and debts contained in the parties’ marital estate.  The trial court appointed a special master to complete these tasks.  At the beginning of the special master’s hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation agreement concerning the values of certain marital properties, including their associated debts.  Upon the conclusion of the special master’s hearing, the parties stipulated to the special master’s findings.  The trial court subsequently conducted an additional hearing and entered its own findings, which it relied upon to formulate an equitable division of the marital estate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c).  The husband has appealed the trial court’s division of the marital estate, arguing that the court’s mathematical and other errors rendered the division of the marital estate inequitable.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified herein.  We decline to award attorney’s fees to the wife on appeal.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal

The Chancery Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court") found in this divorce action that Michael Bryant Sexton ("Husband") was the sole owner of Furious Properties, LLC and that he had purchased two Knox County real properties and deeded thern to Furious Properties, LLC. The Trial Court accordingly found that the entire interest in Furious Properties, LLC constituted marital property subject to equitable division and awarded
the two Knox County properties to Louise Ann Sexton ("Wife"). The Trial Court ordered Husband or a representative of Furious Properties, LLC to convey the entire interest in the Knox County properties by quitclaim deed to Wife within thirty days of the entry of the judgment. Husband's issues relate primarily to the property division. To the extent the Trial Court awarded property of a non-party LLC to Wife, we reverse and remand for the Trial Court to clarify its award, while acknowledging that the Trial Court may have intended to award Husband's interest in Furious Properties, LLC, rather than the LLC's properties themselves, to Wife. We further modify the Trial Court's judgment to reflect that the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and to remove language granting the parties a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. We affirm the balance of the judgment. We deny Wife's request for attorney's fees on appeal.

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of
Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Gibson County (“the
Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Kristie C. (“Mother”), Jose O.
(“Father”), Jose H., and Giovani C. to the minor children D.V., G.V., J.C., H.V., K.O.,
A.V., C.O., and R.V. (“the Children,” collectively). After a hearing, the Trial Court
entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children based
on the ground of severe child abuse. The Trial Court found further that termination of
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father
appeal. While conceding the ground of severe child abuse, they argue that the Trial Court
erred in its best interest analysis, which they say was inadequate. We find, as did the Trial
Court, that the ground of severe child abuse was proven against Mother and Father by clear
and convincing evidence. In addition, we find that the Trial Court’s findings of fact were
sufficient to underpin its best interest analysis, and that the evidence is clear and convincing
that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest.
We affirm.

This is a divorce action in which the trial court awarded the wife a divorce based on the husband’s inappropriate marital conduct, divided the marital estate and awarded the wife, inter alia, child support as well as transitional alimony of $2,000 per month for four years, followed by $1,500 per month for two years, then $1,000 per month for two years, and $500 per month for two years. The court also awarded the wife alimony in solido of $50,000 as necessary spousal support and an additional $75,000 to defray the cost of most of her attorney’s fees. The husband appeals. We have determined that the record contains an inconsistency concerning the amount of the work-related childcare expenses the husband is required to pay, and it appears that the trial court failed to consider the husband’s obligation to pay work-related childcare costs in setting transitional alimony at $2,000 per month during the first four years, which additional expense appears to impair the husband’s ability to pay that amount. Accordingly, we vacate the award of child support and that portion of the transitional alimony award and remand these issues for reconsideration, taking into account, inter alia, the allocation of childcare expenses, the wife’s need, and the husband’s ability to pay. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. Both parties seek to recover the attorney’s fees and costs each incurred in this appeal. Exercising our discretion, we deny both requests.

The mother of a high school student involved in an altercation with the opposing basketball
team’s coach appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the coach and the
county board of education. Because the video footage of the altercation is open to more
than one interpretation, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to the intention behind
the coach’s contact with the student and summary judgment is reversed as to the state law
assault and battery claims against the coach. The grant of summary judgment as to the
remaining claims against both the coach and the board is affirmed.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B,
filed by the ward’s son, Paul Milem, seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having
reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Mr. Milem, and finding no error, we
affirm.

This appeal arises from a will contest. The circuit court entered summary judgment
upholding the will, finding no genuine issue of material fact existed as to its validity. The
contestant appeals. We affirm and remand to the probate court for further probate
proceedings.

This appeal arises from an order granting, among other discovery sanctions, a default judgment against Husband in a divorce proceeding. Husband questions whether the trial court abused its discretion in entering sanctions against him. Because the trial court did not engage in the necessary analysis regarding its reasoning for granting the discovery sanctions, we vacate the sanctions order, as well as the subsequent orders that followed, including the order granting the parties’ divorce. This disposition pretermits inquiry into issues Husband has raised on appeal with respect to trial court determinations that followed the sanctions. Moreover, as to a remaining matter raised by Husband on appeal, we conclude that the issue is waived due to Husband’s failure to comply with applicable briefing requirements.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The Claims Commissioner dismissed the claimant’s claim due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, and on its finding that
termination was in the child’s best interest. The trial court also terminated Father’s rights
on the additional ground that he was sentenced to incarceration for more than ten years
when the child was under eight years of age. Mother and Father appeal. Discerning no
error, we affirm.