APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a health care liability action appeal. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant physicians. The trial court excluded the testimony of one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses on the applicable standard of care after finding that he was not qualified under the locality rule. The plaintiff appealed to this Court arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in its application of the locality rule. We hold that it was error for the trial court to exclude the witness, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. We therefore affirm.

A subcontractor filed this breach of contract action to recover damages against a general contractor for two types of damages: work performed but unpaid and damages resulting from delays caused bythe general contractor.The plaintiff alleged the general contractor breached the contract by failing to make the appropriate progress payments and otherwise withholding payments without cause. It further alleged that the general contractor failed to properly supervise the project and failed to maintain proper working conditions on the job site which caused the construction to drag on for nine months beyond the agreed-upon completion date. While suit was pending, the general contractor was terminated by the owner and a different contractor was hired to complete the project; the new contractor hired the plaintiff to complete the job. The plaintiff completed its work for which it was paid more than the balance owing on the subcontract.Following a bench trial,the courtfound the former general contractor had breached the subcontract but the plaintiff had failed to prove damages flowing from these breaches. The trial court specifically determined that the subcontractor recouped its damages for work performed but unpaid through the completion subcontract, and that it did not prove damages flowing from the delay of construction. The plaintiff appeals. Having determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

After the death of David Rose, his two putative non-marital sons became involved in three separate lawsuits related to the proper distribution of his property. When Mr. Rose’s Executrix filed to probate his Will in solemn form, the putative sons, who were named residuary beneficiaries, objected, but later withdrew their objection. They then filed suit to set aside a 2006 Trust Agreement in order to reinstate prior trusts, the assets of which were to be distributed to Mr. Rose’s issue at his death. They also filed a separate lawsuit to establish Mr. Rose as their biological father. Their attempts to obtain some of their father’s assets were all unsuccessful. In all three cases, the trial court held that they were barred from establishing a father-son relationship because their attempts were time barred. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the sons’ petition to establish paternity filed in the probate case two years after the order admitting the will to probate. However, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint challenging the validity of the 2006 Trust Agreement because they have standing to attempt to establish that they are “issue” of Mr. Rose. The deadline imposed by the trial court applied only “for purposes of intestate succession,” and the trust case did not involve inheritance through the statute regarding heirs of a person dying without a will. Mr. Rose had a will, which was probated. Any assets to be distributed to Mr. Locke and Mr. Avian from the preexisting trust(s) would be pursuant to the terms of the trust document(s), not pursuant to intestate succession. For the purpose of establishing their interest in the prior trust(s), the purported children were entitled to present proof that they were the children of Mr. Rose and were not time barred.

This is the second appeal of an action to recover, under either the theoryof unjust enrichment or a resulting trust, the value of improvements paid by the plaintiff for a house constructed on her son’s property. The plaintiff paid the construction costs to build a new home on her son’s land for both of them to reside. This action was commenced when the son refused to put his mother’s name on the deed after the house was constructed. Following the first trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff never intended to convey an inter vivos gift to her son, and, after considering the plaintiff’s alternative claims for relief, the court established a resulting trust in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $417,000. In the first appeal, we ruled that a resulting trust was not an available remedy and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court awarded the estate a judgment against the son based on unjust enrichment. The son appeals again, this time contending the estate waived its unjust enrichment claim in the first appeal and that the estate did not prove the value of the improvements. We affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs are not time barred to establish that they have standing to contest David Rose’s 2006 Trust Agreement. I fully concur with the affirmance of the dismissal of the other underlying cases.

This is the second appeal in this divorce action. Husband appealed from the Final Decree of Divorce in 2012, and we affirmed the trial court in all respects in an opinion filed by this court on May 30, 2013. While the appeal was pending, the parties filed several motions in the trial court regarding a variety of financial obligations arising from the Final Decree of Divorce. Following one hearing, the trial court modified the division of the marital property; however, in our opinion which was filed a week earlier, we affirmed the division of the marital estate. Wife now appeals that ruling, and she raises several issues regarding, inter alia, the division of marital property, alimony, attorney’s fees, and civil contempt. Finding the trial court erred in modifying the division of the marital estate after we had affirmed that decision, we reverse that modification. As for all other issues raised, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Transportation’s decision to deny the petitioner’s applications for billboard permits. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial.

This action arose over the sale of improved real property (“the Property”), consisting of approximately twenty-five acres located in Morgan County, Tennessee. Co-plaintiffs, James E. and Karen M. Whalen, entered into an agreement to purchase the Property from the defendant, Quint Bourgeois. The Whalens subsequently entered into an agreement with coplaintiffs, Alan and Kathleen Bone, to borrow the purchase price of the Property in return for an executed promissory note, secured by a deed of trust. The parties closed the purchase and sale of the Property on January 19, 2012, at the Roane County office of US Title of Tennessee, Inc. (“US Title”). On January 20, 2012, Mr. Bourgeois, upset that he had not received $900.00 in rent he believed the Whalens owed him, returned to the US Title office and convinced staff there to accept his uncashed check from the sale and give him the unrecorded deed. The plaintiffs filed this action against Mr. Bourgeois, ultimately amending their complaint to allege breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contractual relations. Following a bench 1 trial, the trial court found that Mr. Bourgeois had committed the tort of intentional interference with the
contractual relationship between the Whalens and the Bones. The court further found that because the purchase and sales contract between the plaintiffs and Mr. Bourgeois had been completed at closing, Mr. Bourgeois did not breach that contract but did intentionally commit egregious acts by, inter alia, demanding the deed from the title company. The court awarded the Whalens $110,000.00 in compensatory damages, $14,736.99 in prejudgment interest, and $55,000.00 in punitive damages. The court awarded the Bones $76,733.50 in compensatory damages and $40,000.00 in punitive damages.

This appeal arises from a trial court’s judgment granting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and Agent Thomas Harry Jones’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Barricks’ action for negligence and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Barricks held automobile insurance coverage through State Farm, with Thomas Jones as their agent, from 1985 until 2009, and their coverage limits remained the same throughout this period. The Barricks sued, claiming State Farm and Jones had a duty of care to advise the Barricks of their need for increased coverage. The Barricks now appeal, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing their claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment regarding the negligence claim. We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on the assumption of duty, which the trial court did not directly address, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims, since State Farm and Mr. Jones cannot meet their burden under Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008), in these claims. We also reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of State Farm for vicarious liability and failure to supervise in regard to the alleged assumption of duty by the agent.

Father appeals the modification of the primary residential plan and specifically the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’five-year-old daughter. In 2010, Father was designated as the primary residential parent of their two-year old child and the parents were awarded equal and shared parenting time based on an alternating weekly schedule. Over the next two years, the employment and marital status of each parent changed and Mother had three additional children. Based on these changes, Mother filed a petition in July 2012 to modify the primary residential plan requesting that she be designated as the primary residential parent. Finding, inter alia, that Mother was no longer employed, that she worked in the home caring for the parties’ child as well as her three younger children who were born after the initial plan went into effect, and that she had been acting as the de facto primary residential parent, the court granted Mother’s petition and designated her as the primary residential parent. We affirm.

This case presents issues regarding the propriety of the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary issues as well as a motion for directed verdict. The plaintiff sustained damages when his personalty, which was stored in a warehouse owned by the defendant, was subjected to water damage after the roof of the warehouse collapsed. The plaintiff filed the instant action seeking compensatory damages for the value of his damaged property. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could present evidence that the defendant also filed a claim with respect to his own damaged property stored in the warehouse. The trial court ruled, however, that the defendant would not be allowed to present evidence regarding the profitability of the plaintiff’s business. During the three-day trial, the defendant made a motion for directed verdict that was denied by the trial court. Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict, finding the defendant to be 100% liable for the plaintiff’s loss and awarding damages to the plaintiff of $325,000. The defendant filed a renewed motion for directed verdict, a motion for new trial, and a motion for remittitur. All of the post-trial motions were denied by the trial court. The defendant appeals. Having determined that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the plaintiff to present prejudicial evidence regarding the defendant’s own claim for damages, we vacate the jury’s award and remand for a new trial.

This is a detainer action in which Fannie Mae was awarded a judgment of possession of Defendant’s property in sessions court. Defendant refused to vacate the property and appealed to the circuit court. Fannie Mae filed a motion for summary judgment, while Defendant sought to void the judgment of possession. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and upheld the foreclosure sale. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a bench trial in a suit over the sale of a used vehicle. The trial court originally ruled in favor of the seller-defendants, finding that the plaintiff-buyer failed to meet his burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of the vehicle. The court found that defendant-sellers had violated one subsection of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, but that plaintiff-buyer had failed to prove any actual damages, so the trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon considering the plaintiff-buyer’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court changed its original decision and found that the defendant-sellers had engaged in fraud, and the court rescinded the sale of the vehicle. Upon considering plaintiffbuyer’s second motion to alter or amend, the trial court clarified its ruling and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff-buyer. Both parties appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate its original ruling, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I concur fully with the result reached in this case and agree with virtually all of the analysis. I write separately only to draw out and emphasize a couple of issues.

Homeowners association brought declaratory judgment action against homeowners to enforce the development’s restrictive covenants. The trial court determined that the homeowners association’s architectural review committee (“ARC”) acted within its discretion in ordering homeowners to remove improvements the ARC found to be inconsistent with other homes in the neighborhood. We affirm.

The jury found that Defendants were liable for damages arising from breach of contract and that Plaintiff was liable for damages arising from negligence. It also found that Defendants were entitled to treble damages under Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-2-503. Plaintiff appeals. Finding material evidence to support the jury verdict, we affirm.

This is a health care liability action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action without prejudice. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal to this court. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Jessica C. (“Mother”) and Jesse W. (“Father”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to the minor child Alexis C. (“the Child”). We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was shown that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and for severe abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102, and that clear and convincing evidence was shown that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Greene County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child.

In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that their easement rights had been interfered with by the defendant property owners. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the defendants, subject to the provisions in the deed at issue, could exclude all others from their property. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the determination of the trial court.

In this appeal from a final divorce decree, Wife takes issue with a number of the trial court’s financial decisions. Specifically, Wife contends the trial court erred in the assessment of spousal support, in classifying marital property as Husband’s separate property, in valuing Husband’s woodworking business, in dividing the marital estate, in finding she dissipated the marital estate, in declining to find that Husband dissipated the estate, in failing to sanction Husband for non-production of documents, and by sanctioning her $100,000 under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02 for abuse of discovery. Finally, Wife alleges error in failing to grant the divorce to both parties and contends the trial court should not have verbatim adopted portions of Husband’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its final judgment. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on these issues. Husband also seeks his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal which we respectfully deny.

Appellants are the parents of three children who were initially placed in foster care due to evidence of drug use in the parents’ home. In the Juvenile Court, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) petitioned to declare the children dependent and neglected and for emergency temporary custody. Following entry of a protective custody order, DCS filed an amended petition to declare the children dependent and neglected based upon additional allegations of severe child abuse. The Juvenile Court found severe abuse and the children to be dependent and neglected. Parents appealed to the Circuit Court, and DCS filed a petition to terminate parental rights. Following a trial, during which neither parent testified or presented evidence, the Circuit Court terminated parental rights as to each of the children. Both parents appeal the Circuit Court’s judgment. We affirm.
 

This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim brought for an alleged wrongful acceleration of a note in default, a cause of action currently unrecognized in Tennessee law. Janet Wynn Snyder (“Snyder”) sued First Tennessee Bank (“the Bank”) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Snyder alleged that the Bank abused its discretion in accelerating her debt when it knew that it held funds of Snyder’s in a trust sufficient to cover her debt to the Bank. The Bank filed a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), which the Trial Court granted. Snyder appeals. We hold that this claimed wrongful acceleration is not an existing cause of action in this state, and we decline the invitation to create such a cause of action. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for failure to support, persistence of conditions, and failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans. On appeal, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in determining that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.
 

In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother filed a petition seeking a modification of Father’s parenting time, recovery of medical expenses incurred on behalf of the parties’ child, and an increase in child support. The trial court modified Father’s parenting time, ordered an upward deviation to Father’s support obligation, and awarded Wife judgment for one-half of the medical expenses and one-half of the attorney fees she incurred in prosecuting the petition;the court issued an order that the judgment for medical expenses, back child support, and attorney fees be enforced by wage assignment. Father appeals the upward deviation, the award forone-half of the child’s medical expenses,and the wage assignment; Mother appeals the award for one-half of her attorney fees. We modify the wage assignment order to exclude the amount of the judgment for attorney fees; in all other respects we affirm the judgment.

This divorce appeal involves the division of marital property. The husband claims the trial court erred in its valuation of the marital assets and in its overall distribution of the marital estate. Discerning no error, we affirm.