APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-101, et seq. The claims arose out of the purchase of asset-backed securities that were later deemed unmarketable, causing a significant financial loss to Plaintiff. Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02(6), arguing that the claims were untimely, that Plaintiff failed to plead its claims with particularity, and that the losses were caused by general market conditions. Nonresident Defendants also objected to the court’s personal jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal to this court, and we affirmed the
dismissal against Nonresident Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction but reversed the dismissal for failure to state a claim as to the remaining defendants. In so holding, this court found that consideration of matters outside the pleadings pertaining to the running of the statute of limitations converted the motions to dismiss into one for summary judgment, thereby requiring remand of the entire case for further discovery. The remaining defendants filed an application for permission to appeal. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case for “consideration of the trial court’s alternative basis of dismissal of [the] complaint, i.e., the failure to state a cause of action or state a claim for which relief can be granted (other than on the basis of the running of the applicable statutes
of limitations or repose).” Upon remand, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves the execution of documents in furtherance of the property division in a divorce decree. The parties were divorced many years ago. To carry out the property division, the final decree of divorce ordered the parties to execute copyright assignments. Twenty-five years later, the ex-husband filed this action to compel the ex-wife to execute the copyright assignments. The ex-wife argued that the action was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations applicable to an action on a judgment. Relying on Jordan v. Jordan, 147 S.W.3d 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), the trial court held that execution of the documents was a ministerial act to effectuate the property division in the divorce decree and was not execution on a judgment, so the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. After the ex-wife still failed to execute the copyright assignment documents, the trial court designated the clerk of the court to act for the ex-wife to execute them, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 70. The ex-wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The parties in this case are competitors. The defendant company opened a branch in Nashville and began competing with the plaintiff; the defendant company hired employees away from the plaintiff and it allegedly worked with a now-former employee of the plaintiff to obtain plaintiff’s confidential information.  The plaintiff filed suit alleging, among other things, breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by unlawfully recruiting, aiding and abetting such breach,and conspiracyto unlawfully recruit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,finding the plaintiff’s claims preempted by the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”). We affirm in part and reverse in part and we remand for further proceedings. Specifically, we find preempted by TUTSA, Ram Tool’s common law breach of fiduciary duty/loyalty claim–and its derivative claims–insofar as they are based upon the misappropriation of trade secrets. However, we find Ram Tool’s common law breach of fiduciary duty/loyalty claim–and its derivative claims–insofar as they are not grounded in the misappropriation of trade secrets, are not preempted by TUTSA; summary judgment was improperly granted as to these claims.

Juvenile court entered a default order against mother of minor child declaring the parentage of father and ordering a permanent parenting plan. We have determined that this order is void due to improper notice. We have further determined that the juvenile court erred in ordering the attachment of the minor child, who was living with mother in California.

This dispute concerns a contract for the sale of real property. Believing the seller was impairing the buyer’s ability to close on time in order to sell the property under contract to someone else, the buyer filed this action to enjoin the seller from transferring the property to another and to require the seller to provide documentation necessary to close. The buyer also asserted claims for specific performance of the contract, breach of contract, and conspiracy against the seller, as well as claims for tortious interference with the contract and conspiracy against another defendant. The trial court found that the seller’s discussions with another potential buyer were merely to have a “back-up plan” in the event the buyer did not close; nevertheless, the court granted injunctive relief by extending the deadline to close the sale by thirty days and enjoined the seller from selling the property to another in the interim. One week later, the sale closed. The plaintiff then amended its complaint to limit its claims to breach of contract against the seller, and tortious interference with a contract and conspiracy against the seller and the party alleged to have tortiously interfered with the contract. The defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court found that the seller did not breach the contract because the property was conveyed to the plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the contract and the delay in closing was not a breach of the contract. The court dismissed all other claims but for the conspiracy claims and declared the order a final appealable judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 54.02. The plaintiff appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a post-judgment discovery dispute. While the plaintiff’s prior appeal from the trial court’s judgment was pending in this court, the plaintiff made a discovery request in the trial court seeking to obtain alleged ex parte communications pertaining to the plaintiff’s attorney, the plaintiff, or the case. The trial court conducted a hearing and entered an order denying the discovery request; this appeal followed.  We have determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiff’s discovery requests; therefore, the order at issue in this appeal is void. Further, this court’s ruling in the prior appeal, which resolved all issues in the underlying case, is now a final judgment. The underlying case is concluded and, thus, no further proceedings are available other than the assessment and collection of costs.

This appeal concerns a garnishment. Newgate Recovery, LLC (“Newgate”) brought a garnishment action in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”) against Manreet Singh (“Singh”) through Singh’s former employer R & R Group, Inc., d/b/a The Deerfield Inn (“Garnishee”). After Garnishee failed to respond to the garnishment, the Trial Court entered judgment against Garnishee in the amount of $1,283,066. Garnishee moved for relief from the judgment on the basis of insufficient service. The Trial Court granted Garnishee’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion and set aside the final judgment on the basis of excusable negligence and ineffective service of process. Newgate appeals, arguing, among other things, that Garnishee waived the issue of service of process and that Garnishee’s employees had colluded to avoid a valid judgment. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Garnishee’s motion for relief from judgment. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court.

This post-divorce matter presents the primary issue of whether the trial court properly calculated, for child support purposes, the obligor parent’s income from self-employment. The trial court held that mortgage payments made by the obligor’s business with respect to a commercial building solely owned by the obligor should not be added to the obligor’s other income for the purpose of calculating child support. The obligee parent appeals that ruling to this Court. We affirm on that issue, concluding that such payments were already included in the obligor parent’s income calculation. We reverse the trial court’s finding concerning the obligor’s income, however, due to insufficient evidence regarding the nature of the depreciation deduction taken with respect to the commercial building. We remand for further proof regarding the depreciation deduction. The obligee parent also appeals the trial court’s failure to award attorney’s fees. Having concluded that the trial court must reconsider its determination of the obligor’s income, we also remand for the trial court to determine whether an award of attorney’s fees to the obligee parent is appropriate. We conclude that this is not an appropriate case for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

Plaintiffs brought this action against Rutherford County when the county prohibited them from building a home on undeveloped property because the property was below the Base Flood Elevation requirements established by the county. Plaintiffs contend the county had an affirmative duty under Article XIX, Section 19, of the Rutherford County Zoning Resolution to notify them, prior to their purchase of the property, that the property was below the Base Flood Elevation requirements, and the county breached that duty. In response to the complaint, the county filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the immunity provisions under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205(1), (3)-(4). The trial court granted the county’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on governmental immunity. Having determined that the county’s alleged acts or omissions were discretionary, not operational, the county has immunity; thus, we affirm the dismissal of this action.

Landowner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, seeking review of the City of Memphis City Council’s decision to deny the landowner’s petition to subdivide his Belle Meade Subdivision lot into two lots. The trial court reversed the City Council’s decision, finding that the landowner had satisfied the requirements for subdivision under the Uniform Development Code, and remanded the case for rehearing before the City Council. On remand, the City Council’s review was limited to the record established at the previous hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm in part and vacate in part, and remand to the trial court with instructions to remand to the City Council for reconsideration.

This case arises from a personal injury lawsuit in which a plaintiff sought damages for injuries she sustained in a car accident. The defendant driver requested documents from plaintiff’s healthcare provider. The healthcare provider failed to produce all of the requested documents and was held in civil contempt. As sanctions, the trial court, inter alia, discharged the healthcare provider’s fees for medical services charged to the plaintiff and held the provider in violation of certain chiropractic regulations.  On appeal, the healthcare provider asserts that the trial court lacks authority to discharge the healthcare provider’s fees or to find it in violation of the chiropractic regulations. We agree that the trial court erred, and we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order discharging the fees for medical services and finding a violation of the chiropractic regulations.

This is a health care liability action involving a physician’s duties when supervising a physician’s assistant. The plaintiff alleged the supervising physician negligently supervised a physician’s assistant which resulted in the eventual amputation of the plaintiff’s leg. The physician moved for summary judgment, contending that he complied with all statutory duties. The plaintiff responded to this motion and simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to allege that the physician was vicariously liable for the negligent actions of the physician’s assistant. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint and granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Father appeals the Juvenile Court’s ruling with regard to custody of his minor child. Because the court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate its judgment and remand the matter for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Father appeals the Juvenile Court’s ruling with regard to custody of his minor child. Because the court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate its judgment and remand the matter for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal involves an alleged breach of a construction contract. The plaintiff general contractor hired the defendant subcontractor to build cabinetry for a new movie theater. The work was to be completed by the time the movie theater opened. At the time of the opening, some items regarding the cabinets remained undone, and the contractor refused to pay until the work was completed. The general contractor filed this lawsuit for breach of contract for failure to complete the project in a timely manner and for defective work, and the defendant subcontractor filed a counterclaim for breach of contract for failure to pay under the contract. The trial court held in favor of the subcontractor and awarded damages. The general contractor now appeals. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

After a default judgment was entered against Appellee and in favor of Appellants on claims of intentional interference with business relationships, common law and statutory inducement to breach a contract and intentional interference with a contract, and breach of contract, a writ of inquiry hearing was held to determine the appropriate amount of damages to which the Appellants were entitled. Therein, the trial court went outside the pleadings to  consider the issue of liability. We conclude that the trial court erred in considering the issue of liability because the well-pled facts contained in the Appellants’ respective complaints were dispositive on that question upon the grant of default judgment. Our review of the complaints leads us to conclude that the Appellants have set forth sufficient facts to prove the prima facie elements of their causes of action. Accordingly, Appellants are entitled to damages, and the trial court erred in denying them. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for a determination of damages. Reversed and remanded.

Father petitioned the trial court to, inter alia, modify the residential parenting schedule set forth in the permanent parenting plan. By a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court found that there was no material change in circumstances that would justify a change in the residential parenting schedule and, accordingly, dismissed Father’s petition. We reverse and remand.

This appeal involves whether an unauthorized alien has standing to bring a retaliatory discharge claim. The appellant employee, an undocumented worker, alleged that the appellee employer terminated his employment as a direct result of the employee asserting a workers’ compensation claim. The employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the employee could not bring a claim for retaliatory discharge because he was not legally authorized to work in Tennessee or capable of performing the job from which he was fired. The trial court granted summary judgment based solely on the illegal status of the employee, concluding he was incapable of employment, and therefore, could not assert a claim for retaliatory discharge. We reverse, holding that the undocumented employee does have standing to bring a retaliatory discharge claim and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal is from a Final Default Judgment entered against the Defendant, Northridge Package Store, LLC (“Northridge”). In the order granting judgment against Northridge, the trial court also accepted the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of all claims filed by the Plaintiff, Timothy W. Hudson (“Hudson”), against the Defendant, Delilah M. Grunloh (“Grunloh”). Because only Grunloh has appealed from the judgment and the judgment is not adverse to her, we grant Hudson’s motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

The father of two minor children appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights upon finding two grounds of abandonment, failure to visit and failure to support, and finding that terminating the father’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

Angela E. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of parental rights to her minor child, Aaron E. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) placed the child in protective custody based upon evidence of physical abuse.  The abuse occurred while the child was in the care of Mother’s boyfriend. The Juvenile Court later made a finding that the child was dependent and neglected and granted temporary custody to DCS. DCS ultimately filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and the father’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court terminated the father’s parental rights at a separate hearing, and the matter proceeded to trial against Mother only. Following the trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order also terminating Mother’s parental rights, relying on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support terminating Mother’s parental rights on one of the two grounds relied upon by the Juvenile Court and to support the court’s conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

I concur with the majority Opinion’s rulings with regard to the procedural issues in this case, as well as its reversal of the trial court’s remittitur of the loss of earning capacity damages. However, because I disagree with the majority’s procedure in further remitting the jury’s verdict with regard to loss of enjoyment of life damages, I must respectfully dissent, in part, from the majority Opinion.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.