APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this divorce action, Father appeals the rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido awarded to Mother, the amount of parenting time he received, the designation of Mother as sole decision-maker and the failure of the trial court to find that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. We affirm the award of rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido and the designation of Mother as primary residential parent; we vacate and remand for further consideration the residential parenting schedule,the allocation of decision-making authority, and the determination of Mother’s income.

In this detainer action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the loan servicing company. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the modification of Father’s parenting time and the juvenile court’s allocation of child support obligations. Father petitioned to modify custody or, alternatively, the residential parenting schedule. The juvenile court found that there had been no material change in circumstance and did not modify the primary residential parent designation. However, the court decreased Father’s parenting time and increased his child support obligation. Father appeals the juvenile court’s finding of no materialchange in circumstance, the modification of his parenting time, and the juvenile court’s failure to apply a credit for transportation costs against his child support obligation. Because we find the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and failed to comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Defendant in wrongful death action appeals the grant of a default judgment entered against him on the ground that he did not receive a copy of the motion prior to the hearing and, consequently, could not present a defense. Upon consideration of the entire record, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

An individual employed by Claiborne County as Director of Schools was terminated over two years earlier than the employment term set forth in the parties’ contract. The county and the individual entered into another contract (“modified contract”) whereby the individual agreed to work as Safety Coordinator for five months and be compensated in an amount equal to the amount he would have been paid had the prior contract not been terminated. This resulted in a salary increase of nearly $40,000 per month for each of the five months the individual was employed as Safety Coordinator. The modified contract provided that the employee would be paid whether he performed any work or not, and the employee agreed to waive and release any claims he might have against the county. When the employee applied for retirement benefits,the agencyin charge of calculating the amount of benefits did not treat the nearly $40,000 increase in compensation as “earnable compensation” because the additional compensation was not for “services rendered,” as required by the statute. The employee contested this decision, and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of the agency, granting the agency’s motion for summary judgment. The employee filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The employee appeals the trial court’s judgment to this Court, and we affirm.

This litigation is a dispute between the boards of education of the cities of Athens and Etowah (“the City School Boards”) on the one hand and McMinn County (“the County”) over the distribution of tax revenues among the various school systems within the county. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-315(a) (2013) mandates that “[a]ll school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes collected by any county . . . shall be apportioned by the county trustee” among the local education agencies in the county based upon average daily school attendance. Over the years spanning from 1996 to 2011, the County apportioned funds in the account designated “general purpose school fund” to the City School Boards, but did not apportion funds from the County’s “educational capital projects fund.” The County argues that funds appropriated for and spent on school capital projects are not “school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes” under the language of the statute. The trial court agreed and granted the County summary judgment. It dismissed the complaint of the City School Boards. We affirm.

Plaintiff in suit to recover damages for injuries allegedly suffered in the course of his arrest appeals the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed on behalf of the City and Police Chief and the grant of summary judgment to the police officers who participated in his arrest. In responding to the motions, plaintiff acknowledged that the claims against City, Police Chief and two of the officers should be dismissed; we affirm the dismissal of those claims and parties. The order granting summary judgment to the remaining officer does not state the legal ground therefor or make findings of fact relative thereto; consequently, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. We reverse the denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend to substitute one of the officers for the defendant named John Doe.

At an earlier time, in 2011, Betty Graham had filed a lawsuit arising out of a failed real estate transaction against (1) her real estate agent, Ginny Hall; (2) Crye-Leike Realty Corporation; (3) S&J Southeast Investments, LLC, the potential buyer of her condominium with whom she had unsuccessfully negotiated a contract; and (4) attorney Ellie Hill, her trial court appointed guardian ad litem. The trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Graham appealed, but later voluntarily dismissed her appeal. Following her dismissal, our mandate, see Tenn. R. App. P. 42, 43, was issued on January 4, 2013. On April 26, 2013, Graham, acting pro se, “refiled” a lawsuit that is functionally identical to her first complaint. In her second suit, she relied upon the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) (2000). The trial court dismissed her second complaint on the ground of res judicata. We affirm that dismissal. Furthermore, we conclude that Graham’s suit is frivolous. Hence, this case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the defendants’ reasonable fees and expenses associated with this appeal.

This is a breach of contract and promissory estoppel action in which Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for failure to fulfill an oral modification of leases for several pieces of earthmoving equipment. Defendant denied wrongdoing and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, and dismissed the promissory estoppel claim. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the breach of contract claim, but the jury failed to render a verdict. The court declared a mistrial, and Defendant filed a renewed motion for a directed verdict. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case brought by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on the grounds of severe child abuse and wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Parents appeal. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds of wanton disregard with respect to both parents and severe child abuse with regard to the father. However, we do not find that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the ground of severe child abuse with regard to the mother. There is clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parents’ rights is in the child’s best interest. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

This case involves the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.  The  trial court found multiple statutory grounds for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s  rights.  The court also found termination of the parents’ rights to be in the children’s best interest.  The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mother  and  Father  abandoned their  children  by willfully failing  to  support them. Because the parents appealed fewer than all of the multiple grounds relied upon by the trial  court for  termination,  the trial court’s decision  as  to the  other  grounds  is final.   Because a finding of only one statutory ground is necessary for termination, we affirm  the decision of the trial court.

Defendants appeal a jury award in favor of Plaintiff. Finding material evidence to support the verdict, we affirm.

This case involves post-divorce litigation over child support and residential parenting time. In connection with a petition for a decrease in child support, the parties found themselves in a discovery dispute, which resulted in the trial court awarding Mother $10,000 in attorney’s fees.  Later, as a result of his move out of state, Father filed a motion to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. When Father decided not to pursue his motion to modify, Mother filed an emergencymotion for relief to set holiday parenting time. The court ordered that the parenting plan remain in effect for the holiday period and required Father to personally pick up and return the children for visitation. Father appeals the award of attorney’s fees to Mother stemming from the discovery dispute and the order requiring him to personally pick up and return his children when exercising holiday parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. Because we find the issue to be moot, we dismiss Father’s appeal regarding holiday parenting time.

Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for contempt and for child support arrearages in this post-divorce action. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This is a child custody and support case. The order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court.

This case involves the trial court’s grant of a post-judgment motion to clarify conflicting provisions regarding the residential co-parenting schedule in the parties’ agreed permanent parenting plan. The mother filed the motion approximately five weeks after entry of the permanent parenting plan order. Following a hearing at which the trial court considered argument from both parties’ counsel but heard no proof, the court found in favor of the mother’s interpretation of the parties’ intent when the order was submitted. The father now appeals, asserting that the court’s ruling was a modification of the parenting plan made without proof of a material change of circumstance warranting a modification. We determine that the trial court’s order operated as a clarification of an ambiguous and contradictory provision in the permanent parenting plan, rather than a modification of the plan. However, because the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties’ intent at the time the agreed permanent parenting plan was entered, we vacate the judgment and remand for an evidentiary hearing with subsequent clarification of the ambiguous provision at issue.

This is a personal injury case. Appellant slipped and fell in a puddle of water while on Appellee’s premises. Appellant’s attorney filed her complaint one day after the statute of limitations had run on her claim. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant’s suit was time-barred. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant appeals, arguing that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations because all of appellant’s injuries could not be discovered on the same date as the fall. Alternatively, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it did not grant an enlargement of the statute of limitations under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is a divorce action involving issues of marital property valuation and distribution. The parties were married in 1975. The wife, Terri Dunn (“Wife”), filed for divorce from the husband, William M. Dunn, Jr. (“Husband”), on September 12, 2011. Following a somewhat protracted pre-trial history, the trial was conducted over four non- consecutive days in June and July 2013. Thereafter, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion valuing the assets in the marital estate and awarding Wife approximately 60% and Husband approximately 40% of the estate. The trial court also charged against Husband’s share of the marital estate $200,000.00 in dissipated assets. Wife has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over the Appellee, an Indiana corporation. After finding a truck for sale on Appellee’s website, Appellant Carl Wall traveled to Indiana and purchased the truck there. After Mr. Wall brought the truck back to Tennessee, he allegedly discovered that Appellee’s agent had made certain misrepresentations about the vehicle’s condition. Appellants sued Appellee in Circuit Court in Robertson County, Tennessee. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The trial court found Mother to be in contempt for the willful failure to pay child support and awarded Father past due and retroactive child support. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition to modify custody and awarded Father his attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a probate court order denying the request of an estate’s personal administrator to resign and be replaced by his attorney. This matter came to the probate court on remand from the court of appeals for the sole purpose of resolving issues related to an award of attorney’s fees. Before the probate court addressed the issue of attorney’s fees, the personal representative filed a motion seeking to resign as personal representative and have his attorney appointed in his place. The court entered an order denying the motion, and the Estate appealed. We find that the probate court’s denial of the personal representative’s motion to resign was within its discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the probate court.

This is an appeal from a probate court order denying an Estate’s request to enter a writ of scire facias to show cause why a bank acting as trustee of certain funds should not be divested of those funds. The probate court determined in a prior case that the Estate’s claim to the funds was barred by res judicata. The court of appeals affirmed the probate court’s order and remanded the case for the sole purpose of resolving issues related to an award of attorney’s fees to the bank. On remand, the Estate filed its request for a writ of scire facias before the court addressed the issue of attorney’s fees. The probate court denied the Estate’s motion, stating that it raised the same issues that multiple courts determined were barred by res judicata. The Estate appealed. We affirm the judgment of the probate court and award damages for frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

This is an appeal from a probate court’s order admitting a will in solemn form. The appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the order and a motion to set aside the order, contending in both that it initiated a will contest prior to the court’s order admitting the will. The probate court determined that the appellant lacked standing to contest the will and therefore denied the motions. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights.  Shortly after Matthew J.’s birth, his father pled guilty to twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape.  The Department of Children’s Services ultimately filed a petition for the termination of parental rights against Matthew’s parents.  His mother surrendered her parental rights, and the matter proceeded to trial against the father only.  At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights.  The juvenile court concluded that grounds for termination existed because the father had been sentenced to more than ten years at a time when Matthew was under the age of eight.  The trial court also concluded that it was in Matthew’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This consolidated appeal stems from the attempted foreclosure of real property in Tipton and Haywood County. In commencing the present case, Plaintiffs filed complaints in Chancery Court in both Tipton and Haywood County seeking to enjoin foreclosure and to obtain an accounting of the financial transactions between them and Defendants. Both trial judges found that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.