APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves the termination of a biological father’s parental rights to a young child. The trial court granted the mother and step-father’s petition to terminate the father’s rights and to allow the step-father to adopt the child. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The evidence is clear and convincing that (1) the father abandoned the child by failing to visit and failing to support her for four months preceding the filing of the petition and (2) it is in the child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, the City of Waynesboro. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on May 5, 2006, alleging that acts and/or omissions of the City caused injury to them on May 6, 2003, when a creek near their home flooded and damaged their property. The City moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that the material facts were not in dispute and that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was time-barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act’s statute of limitations. Moreover, the trial court found that the City was immune from liability for the claims. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. After thoroughly reviewing the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Action under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for injuries sustained in a slip and fall at a school operated by the Shelby County Board of Education. In a bench trial, the court held the school board 60% liable and plaintiff 40% liable and awarded plaintiffs damages totaling $29,400. The Board of Education appeals the holdings that it was negligent, that its immunity was removed, and that the plaintiff was less than 50% at fault for her injury. While the evidence does not preponderate against the finding that plaintiff fell on water in the school hallway, there is no evidence that the Board had notice of the water; consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case.

In this post-divorce action, Mother appealed from the trial court’s decision to change the designation of primary residential parent to Father. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred based on the child’s recent athletic development and its impact on his social development. The trial court also found that making Father the primary residential parent was in the best interests of the child. In making the best interests determination, the trial court made particular note that the parties’ fifteen-year-old son preferred to live with Father. Mother appealed, arguing that there was no material change in circumstances and that the trial court erred by failing to consider the importance of continuity and by allowing the preference of the child to control the outcome of the best interests determination. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that there is no error in the trial court’s conclusions, we affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of a Mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. We affirm the trial court's finding that grounds for termination exist due to abandonment by willful failure to visit, and we also affirm the trial court's finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. We vacate the trial court‟s finding of abandonment by willful failure to support but otherwise affirm the order terminating Mother‟s parental rights as modified.

Father appeals the trial court’s determination that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate father’s parental rights. We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the decision of the trial court.

The parties executed an arbitration agreement to submit disputes arising from their franchise agreement to binding arbitration. The trial court held that, under the arbitration agreement, the individual Defendants were liable, in their personal and corporate capacities, for amounts awarded to Plaintiffs by the arbitrators. Additionally, the trial court denied Defendants‟ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, in which Defendants contended that the arbitrators‟ decision was invalid as a matter of law. We affirm and remand.

This appeal arises out of Mother’s and Father’s opposing motions to modify a parenting plan. Both of the parties and the court agreed that there had been a material change in circumstance warranting a modification of the plan. After a hearing, the court largely adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan and reduced Father’s residential parenting time. The court also denied Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees. Shortly after the new parenting plan was entered, Mother filed a motion for a one-time modification of the plan to allow the child to attend a school trip that coincided with both parties’ parenting time. After a hearing, the court granted Mother’s motion. Father appealed the new parenting plan and the one-time modification. We find the modification issue moot and, therefore, dismiss that portion of Father’s appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. 

This case is before us on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. Appellee/Employee filed suit against Appellant/Employer for discrimination. Appellee later filed a separate suit for retaliation and malicious harassment. The two lawsuits were consolidated in the trial court. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Appellant on the retaliation claim. The jury awarded Appellant $3,000,000 in compensatory damages. In Ferguson v. Middle Tennessee State University, No. M2012-00890-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1304490 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 2013), we reversed the jury verdict, finding that Appellant had failed to prove the knowledge element of his retaliation claim. In Ferguson v. Middle Tennessee State University, ___S.W.3d ___, No. M2012-00890-SC-R11-CV, 2014 WL 5463941 (Tenn. Oct. 29, 2014), the Supreme Court reversed this Court and remanded the case to us for the sole purpose of reviewing the award of damages. Because there is material evidence on which a reasonable jury could conclude that Appellant was entitled to $3,000,000 in compensatory damages, we affirm and remand.

This appeal stems from an environmental dispute involving the Appellant, StarLink Logistics Inc. (“StarLink”), the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (“TDEC”), and Appellee ACC, LLC (“ACC”). StarLink appeals the trial court’s affirmance of an order of the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board (“Board”), which had adopted a consent order entered into between TDEC and ACC. We affirm in part, and remand the case to the trial court for further remand to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

This is a case alleging negligence by the defendants which resulted in injury to a patient, Dennis Smith. Following hernia surgery, Mr. Smith was fitted for a wound vacuum because an infection had developed at the surgical site. A sponge was placed to absorb the infection. The defendants removed the wound vacuum when the infection dissipated, but they failed to remove the sponge, which later caused the wound to burst. Mr. Smith filed suit, and the defendants asserted that dismissal was appropriate because Mr. Smith had not complied with the filing requirements of the health care liability statute. Mr. Smith 1 responded that his complaint sounded in ordinary negligence, not health care liability. The trial court agreed and denied the motions but also granted permission for the defendants to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the application for permission to appeal and now reverse the decision of the trial court.

This appeal stems from the trial court’s finding that an implied partnership existed between Plaintiff and one of the Defendants with respect to a cattle-raising venture. Despite finding that the parties had already entered into a complete settlement regarding the partnership checking account and remaining partnership cattle, the trial court found that certain partnership assets had not been settled. The trial court’s final decree directed that Plaintiff be paid one- half of the fair market value of these assets, and stated that if no agreement could be reached concerning their value, the items should be sold and the proceeds divided equally. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion.

An accountant appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review of an order of the Tennessee State Board of Accountancy. The trial court dismissed the petition for review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because we find the petition for review was not timely filed, we affirm.

In this grandparent visitation case, the trial court awarded grandparents visitation with the child at issue, finding that there was “some deprivation” of visitation by the child’s mother. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings to determine whether the child’s mother opposed visitation, as that phrase is defined in Huls v. Alford, No. M2008-00408-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4682219 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008).

Betsy Stibler ("Plaintiff") sued The Country Club, Inc. ("Defendant") alleging, among other things, that Defendant had created a nuisance by planting trees on Defendant's real property adjacent to Plaintiff's real property. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing the Chancery Court for Hamblen County ("the Trial Court") granted Defendant summary judgment after finding and holding that Plaintiff could not prove that the trees planted by Defendant constituted a nuisance. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm.

The order appealed is not a final judgment, and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A married couple entered into a business partnership prior to their marriage. This is a consolidated appeal from the parties’ divorce action and their partnership dissolution action. We affirm the trial court’s decision to adjudicate the partnership dissolution action and the divorce action separately, based on Wife’s failure to raise any argument on this issue in the trial court. With regard to the remaining issues, however, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

A subcontractor filed suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien. The subcontractor, which was also a remote contractor, was required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-145(a) to serve a notice of its claim of nonpayment on the owner of the project as well as on the “prime contractor in contractual privity with the remote contractor.” The subcontractor notified the owner, but it did not notify the prime contractor. The subcontractor asserted it was not required to notify the prime contractor because it had no contractual relationship with the prime contractor. The defendants moved to dismiss the subcontractor’s complaint due to its failure to comply with the statute and notify the proper parties. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the subcontractor’s lien claims. The subcontractor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The subcontractor is required by statute to notify both the owner and the prime contractor of the project of nonpayment.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellants/Parents’ parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide suitable housing; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans; and (3) persistence of conditions. Because the grounds for termination of Appellants’ parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the Children, we affirm and remand.

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter. Consequently, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

This is a termination of parental rights case regarding S.C.M. and T.O.J.M. (collectively, the Children), the minor children of H.C. (Mother) and B.M. (Father). After both parents were arrested, the Children’s maternal grandparents, R.R. and T.R. (collectively, the Grandparents) obtained temporary, emergency custody. Nearly three years later, the Grandparents filed a petition seeking to (1) terminate both parents’ rights and (2) adopt the Children. Following a trial, the court terminated both parents’ rights. Father appeals. We affirm.

An attorney, who was representing herself in her divorce action, appeals the trial court’s  finding  that  she  was  in  direct  contempt  of court.  She  insists  her  conduct  was  not  contemptuous and it did not disrupt the orderly progress of the hearing. She also challenges  the procedure bywhich the trial court conducted the summary contempt hearing, asserting it was erroneously held hours after the successful completion of the hearing in which she was  allegedly in contempt of court. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and  contends the trial court erred by basing its finding of contempt on extraneous evidence  instead of relying solely on knowledge the judge obtained through his own senses, his sight  and hearing. A trial court has the authority to punish direct contempt summarily but only in  exceptional circumstances when necessary to“act swiftly and firmly to prevent contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress” of a court proceeding. Danielsv.Grimac,342 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Turner, 914 S.W.2d 951, 956-57 (Tenn.  Crim. App. 1995); Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co., 377 S.W.2d 908, 911-12 (Tenn.  1964). The transcript of thehearingrevealsnoexceptionalcircumstances and no conduct that  obstructed the administration of justice. To the contrary, all issues at the hearing during  which  the  alleged  contemptuous  conduct  occurred  were  ruled  upon, and  the  hearing  concluded hours before the commencement of the summary contempt hearing. Based on  these facts, Plaintiff was entitled to a hearing upon proper notice pursuant to the procedures  of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). See Grimac, 342 S.W.3d at 517-18 (citing Turner,914S.W.2dat 959 n. 11). Therefore, the court erred by conducting a deferred summary contempt hearing.  Furthermore, the trial court found the attorney in contempt, “in willful misbehavior in her  official  transactions  by appearing  in  Court  intoxicated,” based  on  extrinsic  evidence,  urinalysis results, obtained after the hearing in question,not on conduct the court observed in the courtroom. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure42(a),which governs the procedure by which a judge may summarily punish a person for criminal contempt,limits the evidence that may be considered to conduct the judge “saw or heard” in the courtroom. See Wilson v.  Wilson, No. 03A01-9104-CH-00126, 1992 WL 200971, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21,  1992). Because the finding of intoxication was based on extrinsic evidence, the criminal  contempt judgment must be reversed. The record also reveals the extrinsic evidence, thetest results the court relied upon, was unreliable, for it was only designed to test the“presence”of  any alcohol for persons in recovery, not whether a person was “intoxicated.” Therefore, the  judgment of criminal contempt is reversed and the case is dismissed.