APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint in a negligence case. After Appellant’s case was dismissed, he filed a notice of appeal pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief on appeal prevent this Court from reaching any substantive issues. We therefore affirm.

Appellee commenced a lawsuit in the Shelby County Chancery Court seeking to invalidate a writ of possession that previously had been filed pursuant to an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the Chancery Court entered an order granting Appellee her request for relief. Because we conclude that Appellee’s lawsuit constituted a collateral attack of the Circuit Court judgment, and there is nothing in the record indicating that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, the Chancery Court’s order is hereby vacated. We remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order dismissing Appellee’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment as a City of Clarksville police officer in August 2010. The trial court affirmed, and Plaintiff appealed. We determined that the City had failed to follow its disciplinary procedures when it terminated Plaintiff’s employment, vacated the termination, and remanded the matter. Upon remand, the City upheld termination of Plaintiff, and the trial court again affirmed. We affirm.

In this divorce case, Robert Allan Inman, Jr. (Husband) appeals the trial court's decision awarding Glenna Randolph Inman (Wife) alimony in futuro of $1,900 per month. We hold that the court's decision is supported by a number of relevant statutory factors, including the twenty-nine year duration of the marriage, Wife's age, sixty-three at the time of trial, her poor physical condition, Husband's good physical condition, his higher earning capacity, Wife's demonstrated need, and Husband's ability to pay. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, J.L.B., Jr. (Father), appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor daughter, T.L.G. (the Child). The Department of Children's Services (DCS) removed the Child from the home of her mother, G.M.G. (Mother) after Mother was arrested for domestic violence. DCS took temporary custody and placed the Child in foster care. The Child was subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected. Some eight months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate each of the parents' rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition.1 The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) multiple grounds for termination exist, and (2) termination is in the Child's best interest. Father challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but does not question the court's decision that termination is in the Child's best interest. We affirm.

An employee of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”) fell while at work and suffered injuries; pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-101, et seq., she began receiving medical treatment. She subsequently relocated to Minnesota and made a request to Goodyear that she be provided a second panel of physicians in order to continue her treatment; Goodyear denied the request. At the employee’s request a workers’ compensation specialist from the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development ordered Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians. Goodyear requested and received an administrative review of the specialist’s order; the Department affirmed the order. Thereafter, Goodyear filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Chancery Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 asserting that the Department exceeded its authority by ordering Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians and a physician outside of Tennessee. The Department moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the court denied the motion and considered the merits of the petition. The court held that the Department did not exceed its authority in ordering the panel of physicians; Goodyear appeals. The Department of Labor also appeals the holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to review its decision. Concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the court and dismiss the petition.  

Borla Performance Industries, Inc. (Borla) entered into two contracts with Universal Tool and Engineering, Inc. (UTE), by the terms of which UTE was to repair and refurbish six of Borla's pipe bending machines, which machines are used in Borla's business of designing and manufacturing automobile exhaust systems. Borla later sued UTE for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Borla alleged that as a result of UTE's failure to timely repair and deliver the machines, which are also known as “benders,” Borla incurred lost profits in the amount of $486,166. After a four-day bench trial, the court dismissed Borla's negligent misrepresentation and TCPA claims; the court did grant Borla a judgment for $11,839.98 on its breach of contract claim. The trial court held that Borla failed to prove that it incurred lost profits as a result of a breach of contract by UTE. Borla appeals the trial court's judgment denying its claims for lost profits. Borla also appeals the court's judgment dismissing the TCPA claim. UTE appeals the judgment against it for breach of contract. We affirm.

Wife appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of transitional alimony in this divorce action. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further findings and proceedings, consistent with this Opinion.

This is a post-divorce case concerning the enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree. The marital dissolution agreement required Appellant to pay Appellee’s monthly rent. Appellant made two or three payments, then stopped. The Appellee filed several petitions and complaints seeking to enforce the marital dissolution agreement. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure rule 52.01, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to issue sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Dontavis K.W. (“Defendant”) appeals the order of the Criminal Court for Hamilton County (“the Criminal Court”) committing him to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) for an indefinite term based upon findings of delinquency and violation of probation. We find and hold that pursuant to Tenn. R. Juv. P. 35 and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-131(a)(4) and 37-1-137(a)(1)(A) the Criminal Court did not err in the probation revocation proceeding when it ordered a disposition which would have been permissible in the original delinquency proceeding. We, therefore, affirm.

This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights proceeding. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Ashley L. (“Mother”) and Aaron B. (“Father”) to their minor child Autumn L. (“the Child”) in the Juvenile Court for Claiborne County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child on a number of grounds. Mother and Father appeal to this Court. In addition to challenging the termination of their parental rights to the Child, Mother and Father argue that the case should be remanded to the Juvenile Court because the Juvenile Court did not enter an order within 30 days of the hearing as required by statute. We hold, inter alia, that remand is not an appropriate remedy for this noncompliance with statute and would serve no purpose. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in all respects.

This appeal concerns the applicability of an arbitration agreement. The plaintiffs purchased decking product manufactured by the defendant. The product was covered by a limited warranty, which included an arbitration agreement. The limited warranty was never provided to the plaintiffs. Instead, a notice was attached to the product, advising them to retrieve a copy of the limited warranty through the defendant's website. Following installation of the product, the plaintiffs experienced problems with the product. The defendant advised the plaintiffs that the issue was merely cosmetic. The plaintiffs filed suit. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss or to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the parties had not entered into an agreement to arbitrate disputes. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves claims asserted by a beneficiary of various trusts against numerous defendants, including the beneficiary’s sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. Among other things, the beneficiary alleged that the defendant-trustees breached their fiduciary duties by failing to pay the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response to the motion for partial summary judgment, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void because he executed them due to undue influence. In a previous appeal, this Court reversed the entry of partial summary judgment on the issue of undue influence, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The parties engaged in additional discovery on remand, and after lengthy proceedings and numerous evidentiary and other rulings, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant-trustees and denied a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the beneficiary. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees and discretionary costs to the defendants. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns three notes executed by the defendants and made payable to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations for recovery on the notes had passed. The trial court denied the motion for the summary judgment. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendants were estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that they had revived the obligation after the limtiations period ran. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

This appeal concerns a child custody dispute between a child’s Mother and Grandparents. When the child was one year old, Mother signed an order transferring custody of the child to Grandparents. One year later, Mother petitioned to modify custody and have the child returned to her. Grandparents claimed that Mother was addicted to drugs and emotionally unstable. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Mother presented a risk of substantial harm to the child if custody was returned to her. However, the court granted Mother visitation for the majority of each year. Grandparents appealed, claiming the trial court erred by granting more parenting time to Mother than to Grandparents. We affirm.  

This is an appeal from the grant of two motions for directed verdict. Appellants contracted with Appellee chimneysweep company to redesign and reconstruct portions of their fireplace and chimney to address a problem with smoke escaping into the den, upper floors, and attic. More than a year after the construction was completed, Appellants’ home was damaged by a fire, which started when wood flooring joists in close proximity to the firebox ignited. Appellants brought claims for negligence and breach of contract against Appellee. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of Appellants’ proof, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motions for directed verdict on the ground that the Appellants had failed to establish that the Appellee owed them a duty of care to conduct a destructive investigation of the safety of the Appellants’ fireplace and also on the ground that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of repose. We affirm and remand.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to support, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed the instant action on September 28, 2012, alleging claims against the defendant of breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligent construction, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Despite several attempts, the plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service of process upon the defendant. The plaintiff subsequently served process upon the defendant via registered mail pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04, but that mailing was returned “unclaimed.” The plaintiff filed a return of service, indicating that service had been properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11). The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had been properly served with process. The defendant in turn moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied that motion. The defendant has appealed. We affirm the trial court's finding that the defendant was properly served with process. However, we determine that the default judgment was improperly entered in violation of the express language contained in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(10). We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Former Tennessee State University Professor filed a claim for damages, asserting causes of action for breach of contract and negligent deprivation of statutory rights. On the State’s motion to dismiss the claim, the Claims Commission held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the breach of contract claim and that the professor failed to state a claim for negligent deprivation of statutory rights; accordingly, the Commission granted the State’s motion. Professor appeals. We reverse the dismissal of the breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings; in all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order modifying child support and setting arrearage. The trial court’s calculation of child support arrearage includes a set off for credits given the Appellee Father for necessaries provided. The trial court also found that Father was responsible for one-half of the children’s private school tuition for the three year period prior to Appellant Mother filing her petition for reimbursement of those expenses. The trial court further found that the parties had sufficient income to continue sending their children to private school and that each party should be responsible for one-half of the costs of the private school tuition and fees. Mother appeals. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for a fresh determination of child support arrearages from April 2007 forward, and sufficient findings on the issue of wage assignment in accordance with this opinion.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on K.G.S. (the Child), the minor daughter of K.G.S. (Mother).1 The Department of Children’s Services (DCS) took emergency custody of the Child based on allegations of sexual abuse and lack of supervision. The trial court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected. Both parents conceded the factual basis for this holding. After a trial, the court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination were established, and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals and challenges each of these holdings. We affirm.

This action was filed against a surgeon for breach of an employment agreement by his employers, a group owned equally by four optometrists and one non-physician. The trial court found that the group was entitled to recover damages arising from the breach. The surgeon appeals. We affirm.

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the defendant in General Sessions Court for problems related to the remodel of her residence. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to “withdraw” her complaint. The General Sessions Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Approximately one year after the dismissal, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment. The General Sessions Court denied the motion. The plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the Circuit Court.

A developer submitted a final site plan for a mixed-use development in the Green Hills area of Nashville for approval to the Metropolitan Nashville Planning Department; the plan was approved first by the Department’s Executive Director and later by the Metropolitan Planning Commission. A neighborhood association composed of residents in the area, as well as an individual Green Hills resident, filed a petition for certiorari review of the Commission’s approval of the final site plan. Upon review of the administrative record and following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the decision and dismissed the writ with prejudice; Petitioners appeal. We concur with the trial court and affirm the decision of the Commission.

This appeal arises from an action to quiet title to property that was acquired by Plaintiff at a tax sale in 2008. The former owner of the property opposed the petition contending he did not receive proper notice of the tax sale and, therefore, the sale was void. Following discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment contending there were no material facts in dispute and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment quieting title in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appeals contending the court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material facts exist concerning whether the county provided proper notice of the tax sale. He also contends the trial court failed to state the legal grounds upon which it granted the motion as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We have concluded that Plaintiff filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment demonstrating that it acquired title through an order confirming the tax sale, which shifted the burden of production to Defendant to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact exists that precludes summary judgment. However, Defendant failed to carry that burden. As for Rule 56.04, the trial court failed to state the legal grounds upon which the motion was granted; however, we are able to discern from the record the grounds for granting the motion; therefore, this omission constitutes harmless error. There being no dispute of material fact concerning whether the county provided constitutionally sufficient notice of the tax sale, Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.