APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an award of retroactive child support. The child‘s father is in the military and was deployed overseas during part of the relevant time period. The trial court initially set the child support obligation based on the number of days the father would have had with the child pursuant to the parties‘ mediated agreement, regardless of the fact that he did not exercise all of that time due to his deployment. After considering a post-trial motion filed by the mother, the trial court altered the award to set the child support obligation based on the number of days the father actually spent with the child, not the number of days he was provided under the mediated agreement. The father appeals, challenging substantive and procedural aspects of the court‘s decision. We affirm.

This case involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his seven children. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. Because the grounds for termination are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the minor children at issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm.

Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm.

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The children were removed from their parents’ home because of drug exposure and domestic violence. A court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected about six months after their removal. Nearly two years later, the Department of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that two statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s rights— substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions. The court found that three grounds existed to terminate Father’s rights—abandonment for failure to visit, substantial noncompliance, and persistent conditions. The court also concluded that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals the court’s determination that there were statutory grounds to terminate her rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Father also appeals the court’s best interest determination, but he appeals the court’s decision on only two of the three statutory grounds to terminate his rights. We affirm.  

Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm.

The dispute central to this interlocutory appeal involves a failed real estate transaction and alleged breach of a real estate agent‘s fiduciary duty to her client. The plaintiff buyer entered into an agreement to purchase improved real property from the seller but failed to obtain financing to complete the purchase. In a previous action brought by the seller against the buyer, the trial court found that the buyer‘s attempted termination of the contract was ineffective and that he therefore breached the contract. On appeal, this Court affirmed that judgment in favor of the seller. The buyer subsequently brought the instant action against the defendant real estate agent, alleging breach of fiduciary duty based on the agent‘s failure to confirm delivery of the buyer‘s credit declination letter to the seller. The agent filed a motion for summary judgment, averring that the buyer had filed this action outside the time parameters of the applicable statute of limitations. Following a hearing, the trial court applied the discovery rule to find that knowledge of the agent‘s alleged failure to terminate the contract could not be imputed to the buyer before April 22, 2010, when the seller‘s counsel had raised the issue during trial in the original action.

In this termination of parental rights case, the father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his son on the grounds of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to father’s incarceration. The father also asserts the court erred in finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the decision of the trial court and affirm the judgment in all respects.

This appeal involves the interpretation of an insurance policy in order to determine whether the policy provided coverage for damage caused by arson. The insurer and the insured filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on this issue. The trial court found the policy ambiguous and construed it in favor of coverage, holding that arson was covered under the policy. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insured and denied the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insurer. The insurer appeals. We affirm.

Appellants appeal the dismissal of their products liability cases.  The trial court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to a prior forum non conveniens dismissal.  The trial court reasoned that, at the time of the prior forum non conveniens dismissal, Appellant should have foreseen that the foreign forum would be unavailable to them and that issue should have been raised in previous proceedings.  Because we conclude that an alternative exception to the application of collateral estoppel may apply, we reverse.

This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Connie Raby (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Micah Noelle Lewellen, individually, and, Cale Ryan Lewellen, a minor by Micah Noelle Lewellen (“Plaintiffs”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiffs' claims. We affirm the Trial Court.

The trial court denied the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action on the ground that the plaintiff had substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122, despite the fact that her certificate of good faith did not contain a statement that the executing party had no prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. This Court granted an interlocutory appeal. While this appeal was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Davis v. Ibach, No. W2013-02514-SC-R11-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2015 WL 3451613 (Tenn. May 29, 2015), ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122 does not require a party executing a certificate of good faith to note the absence of any prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. Based on Davis, we conclude that plaintiff’s certificate of good faith was fully compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122. Accordingly, although we rely on different grounds, we affirm the trial court’s ruling denying the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss.

This is a healthcare liability action, arising from alleged injuries to Appellant, Melba Hughes. Mrs. Hughes' husband, Robert Hughes, filed this action against Appellee, Henry County Medical Center (“HCMC”), and Dr. Donald Gold, who is not a party to this appeal. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121. Specifically, Appellee challenged whether the medical authorization provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). An error in the medical authorization form provided to HCMC did not permit HCMC to obtain medical records from Dr. Gold. However, Dr. Gold saw the patient only at HCMC, and he had no records independent of the hospital's records. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the action without prejudice. Mr. and Mrs. Hughes timely filed their appeal. We reverse and remand the matter to the trial court.

This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Mary Ridenour, individually, and, Jacob Ross Ridenour, a minor by Mary Ridenour (“Plaintiffs”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiffs' claims. We affirm the Trial Court.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the statutory ground of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Father appealed. We reverse because when Father engaged in the conduct at issue, in fact, Father did not know of his parentage. A father cannot exercise wanton disregard for the welfare of a child if he does not know the child exists.

This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Michael Phillips (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Keith Gillis (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. Although Appellant was represented by counsel at oral argument, she filed her initial appellate brief and reply brief to this Court pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief prevent this Court from reaching the merits of the appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action where the trial court upheld the Knoxville City Council's ruling in favor of the respondents. The Knoxville City Council found that a proposed expansion project involving the construction of a crematory for incinerating human bodies was permitted as an accessory use for the existing funeral home. The trial court found that the Knoxville City Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support its decision. The petitioners appeal. We affirm.

This matter concerns the circuit court’s resolution of the appellant’s appeal from Chattanooga’s City Court of two violations of the municipal code. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal decision.

Plaintiff who purchased a used automobile sued the dealership for damages asserting various statutory and common law causes of action arising out of the sale, financing, repossession and subsequent resale of the automobile. Following a trial in which the jury found in Plaintiff’s favor on a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and on several common law claims, Plaintiff moved the court for an award of attorney’s fees; the court awarded $10,000.00 of the requested $72,909.00 sought. Plaintiff appeals. Because the trial court did not state the factual or legal basis for the award of fees, this court cannot properly perform its review function; accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for reconsideration and entry of an order setting forth the factual and legal basis of the award.

Mother appeals the trial court’s modification of the parties’ parenting plan and designation of Father as the Primary Residential Parent. We affirm. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against an individual and an insurance company. This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute in favor of the individual defendant. Summary judgment was granted to the defendant insurance company, and the order was certified as final. In addition, the trial court denied a motion to amend the complaint to add allegations against a different insurance company. Approximately one year later, a trial occurred against the individual defendant; plaintiff failed to appear. The trial court subsequently granted the individual defendant an involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute. More than thirty days later, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the final judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and plaintiff appealed. Because plaintiff’s claims against the defendant insurance companies became final prior to the filing of the notice of appeal, we have no jurisdiction to consider any alleged errors relative to them. Accordingly, plaintiff’s appeal against the insurance companies at issue is dismissed. We affirm the trial court’s ruling denying plaintiff’s motion to set aside the final judgment of dismissal.

This is an appeal from an order entered in a post-divorce modification proceeding. Because the order appealed from does not resolve all the claims, rights, and liabilities of the parties, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.