APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the manager and owner of an apartment complex. The trial court concluded that the defendants owed no duty to a security guard, who was fatally shot while working at the apartment complex. Although a premises owner generally owes a duty to provide independent contractors with a safe workplace, under the facts of this case, we conclude that the defendants owed no duty to protect the security guard from the criminal acts that resulted in the loss of his life. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Additionally, we affirm the award of discretionary costs to the defendants.

This is an appeal of a post-divorce order reinstating Father’s alimony obligation and denying Father’s petition to terminate child support. Father brought a petition to terminate his alimony and child support obligations after discovering that his ex-wife was living with a third party. Additionally, he argued that his twenty-one year old daughter was not severely disabled and his child support obligation should be terminated. The trial court suspended Father’s alimony obligation for the duration of his ex-wife’s cohabitation but reinstated the alimony obligation as the cohabitation had ceased by the time of trial. The trial court also determined that the child was severely disabled and ordered child support to continue. Father appealed. We affirm.

I concur in the result reached by the majority Opinion with regard to whether the Epstein Entities owed a duty to Mr. Cunningham, but I write separately to address a concern with how the majority reaches this conclusion. I also concur with the majority Opinion‘s holding that the Service Agreement cannot be relied upon by Ms. Cunningham in this case, albeit for a different reason. Thus, I respectfully file this concurrence and will address each of my concerns in turn.

Tenn. R. App. P. 12 petition for review of the decision of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to revoke Tennessee Wastewater Systems, Inc.’s Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. Determining that the revocation of the CCN satisfies the requirements of law, is supported by substantial and material evidence, and is an appropriate and reasonable exercise of the TRA’s authority and discretion, we affirm the decision.

In this divorce action, Tyler David Mashburn (Father) argues that the trial court erred by including certain provisions in the permanent parenting plan, i.e., (1) a requirement that his residential parenting time with the parties’ son be supervised; (2) a provision prohibiting Father’s girlfriend from staying overnight during Father’s parenting time; (3) a provision that Father shall have no additional residential parenting time for holidays or vacations unless Victoria Hope Mashburn (Mother) agrees; and (4) a provision that all major decisions regarding the child shall be made exclusively by Mother. We modify the plan by deleting all of these provisions. Furthermore, we reverse the trial court’s decision to award Mother attorney’s fees of $5,000.

This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify a permanent parenting plan. The father filed a petition to modify child support and subsequently amended his petition to include a request to modify the residential parenting schedule. The mother filed a counter-petition, seeking to limit the father to supervised visitation. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the father’s petition to modify the residential parenting schedule because the father failed to prove a material change of circumstance. The court, however, found that the mother did prove a material change of circumstance and that modification of the residential parenting schedule to restrict the father to supervised visitation was in the best interest of the child. The trial court also modified child support and awarded the Mother one-half of her attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal the trial court’s decision. The father appeals the trial court’s findings with regard to material changes of circumstance, child support, and the award of attorney’s fees. The father also appeals the trial court’s decision to limit his pretrial discovery. The mother appeals the trial court’s award of only half of her attorney’s fees and decision to divide the costs of supervised visitation between the parties. Upon reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand this case for a determination of the amount of Mother’s reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal.

This case originated when six retail wine and liquor stores filed suit against the City of Morristown seeking a refund of a portion of inspection fees that had been erroneously calculated by the City. The fees were assessed by the City on the purchases at wholesale of alcoholic beverages. The City failed to use the correct percentage mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-3-501 (2013). It is undisputed that the plaintiffs overpaid the City; since the plaintiffs were understandably unaware of the error, they failed to state that they were paying the fees under protest. The City moved to dismiss the case, citing the plaintiffs' failure to pay “under protest.”

An officer with the Davidson County Sheriff’s Department was terminated for dishonesty and related charges after he filed official reports alleging that he had been attacked by another officer and lost consciousness during training exercises. The Department investigated the officer’s claims and found that they were exaggerated and that his dealings with claims representatives and other personnel were hostile and dishonest. After a disciplinary hearing, the Department decided to terminate the officer. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that the officer should be reinstated with only a ten-day suspension. The Civil Service Commission adopted the ALJ’s initial order as its final order with a few changes. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) filed a petition for review in chancery court, and the court held that the decision of the Civil Service Commission that the officer had not committed the conduct at issue was not supported by substantial and material evidence. The chancery court reversed the decision of the Commission as to the officer committing the misconduct and remanded to the Commission for a determination of the appropriate disciplinary sanction. We affirm the decision of the chancery court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent, setting visitation, and requiring the child to be returned to Tennessee. The juvenile court found that Mother failed to comply with Tennessee’s parental relocation statute, and after conducting a best interest analysis, ordered that the child be returned to Tennessee. Mother appealed both the court’s application of the relocation statute and its determination of the child’s best interests. We vacate in part and affirm in part.      

In this divorce action, the trial court awarded alimony in futuro to Husband in the amount of $1,450.00 per month. Wife appeals, contending that the findings that Husband had a need for alimony and Wife had the ability to pay, as well as the nature, amount, and duration of the award, are not supported by the record. In making the award, the court did not find that rehabilitative, transitional, or short term alimony was inappropriate, and the findings of fact do not otherwise allow for a review of the award. We vacate the award and remand the case for further consideration of the nature, amount, and duration of the award of alimony.  

This case arises from a contract dispute. The parties orally contracted for Appellees to perform grading and other work on Appellant's property for the price of $2,500.00. After Appellees began the work, Appellant requested additional work. The parties did not discuss any additional payment for this work. After the work was complete, Appellees sent Appellant an invoice for $9,073.00. Appellant told Appellees he would not pay that amount and sent them a cashier's check marked “pd in full” for $1,500.00, which was the balance due on the original $2,500.00 price. Appellees marked through the “pd in full” notation on the check, cashed the check, and then notified Appellant that they considered the check to be a credit against the total amount owed.

In this post-divorce action, the mother sought modification of the father’s child support obligation due to a material change of circumstances. The trial court increased the father’s child support obligation but declined to order such modification effective as of the date the mother filed her petition to modify. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred in failing to modify the father’s child support obligation effective as of the date of the petition’s filing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in that regard and remand for entry of a modified judgment retroactive to the date the mother filed the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The wife challenges several of the trial court’s rulings regarding the grounds for the divorce, the division of marital property, the parenting plan, the calculation of child support and educational expenses, and attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.     

This is a post-foreclosure action in which the lender seeks to recover a deficiency judgment, interest, and the costs of collection. In their answer, the borrowers asserted that the loan was a nonrecourse debt; thus, they were not liable for the deficiency. Alternatively, they asserted that the property sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than its fair market value. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the loan was a full recourse debt as to both borrowers. This determination was based on the finding, inter alia, that all parties intended the borrowers to be personally liable. The trial court also concluded that the lender was entitled to a deficiency judgment, finding that the borrowers failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the foreclosure sale price was equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118. The trial court awarded the lender a judgment of $640,783.41, plus interest and attorney’s fees, against the borrowers jointly and severally. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm.

In this post-divorce action, Vanessa Young Colley (“Mother”) filed a petition for modification of the Permanent Parenting Plan (“Parenting Plan”) entered in connection with the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) seeking to change the decision-making authority with regard to educational decisions for the parties’ minor children. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Davisdon County (“the Trial Court”), inter alia, modified the Parenting Plan to change joint decision-making with regard to education to Mother having sole decision-making authority with regard to education. John S. Colley, III (“Father”) appeals the decision of the Trial Court raising issues with regard to the change in decision-making authority, the denial of Father’s petition for recusal, and the award to Mother of attorney’s fees, among other things. We find and hold that some of Father’s issues seek an advisory opinion, and we refuse to address those issues. With regard to the issue of recusal, we find no error in the Trial Court’s resolution of this issue. We further find and hold that Mother proved a material change in circumstances justifying a change in decision-making authority with regard to education and further proved that it was in the children’s best interest for Mother to have sole decision-making authority with regard to education. We, therefore, affirm.

Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to enforce two offers of judgment offered serially by the defendant. Because the trial court improperly certified its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  

In this probate action, the executrix proposed to distribute the decedent’s real and personal property in a manner that she claimed was in accordance with the decedent’s Last Will and Testament (“Will”). One beneficiary, one of the decedent’s three adult children, objected, claiming that the decedent had granted her an option to purchase one parcel of real property owned by the decedent. The trial court determined that the real property in question was an asset of the probate estate and that the executrix could administer it in accordance with the decedent’s Will. The trial court also determined that a settlement agreement executed by the decedent’s three children precluded the claim of an option to purchase. The beneficiary appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-301, we vacate the trial court’s denial of the beneficiary’s requests for an inventory and accountings and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal arises from an age discrimination lawsuit brought under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). Paul M. Martin ("Martin") sued his former employer Perma-Chink Systems, Inc. ("Perma-Chink") in the Circuit Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court"). Martin alleged that he had been fired as a sales representative for Perma-Chink because of his age, then 60. The matter was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Martin. Perma-Chink filed an appeal to this Court, and Martin raises his own issues on appeal. Perma-Chink argues, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in admitting a chart ("the Chart") containing raw data of employee ages at their date of termination, and that Martin failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination. We, inter alia, affirm the age discrimination judgment for Martin.

This case involves a purportedly forged deed. Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to set aside a quit claim deed that was allegedly executed in favor of Appellant by his now deceased grandfather. The trial court found the signature on the deed was forged and not that of the grandfather. In so ruling, the trial court applied the preponderance of evidence standard. Because the correct standard is clear and convincing evidence, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

This is a negligence case involving the alleged sexual assault of a six-year-old boy by another six-year-old boy in the bathroom of an elementary school. The trial court determined that the Appellee school district was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the assault was not foreseeable. We conclude that there are disputes of material fact, which preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

This appeal involves a visitor to a county courthouse who slipped and fell on ice in the parking area. Because the portion of the parking area where the visitor fell was owned by the city, the visitor filed suit against the city under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the city did not breach a duty of care to the visitor. The trial court also found that, even if there had been a breach of duty, the visitor was more than fifty percent at fault for his injuries. The visitor appeals, claiming that the trial court’s written order does not accurately reflect its oral ruling, that the city breached a duty of care by creating a dangerous condition that it did not remedy in a reasonable manner and time, and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s factual finding that he was more than fifty percent at fault. We affirm.  

This appeal concerns several issues relative to a divorce. We agree with the trial court that Mother is a candidate for rehabilitative alimony. We reverse the trial court as to the duration of the award, however, reducing the award to eight years. We also vacate the trial court’s ruling with regard to the amount of the alimony award and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of Father’s ability to pay alimony consistent with his other obligations. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees anticipated to be incurred on appeal and vacate the trial court’s award of all of Mother’s requested attorney’s fees, instead remanding to the trial court for a determination of only those fees attributable to child custody and child support. All other issues are affirmed. 

This case arises from the dismissal after trial of a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and father. The juvenile court concluded that, although the Department of Children's Services had proven grounds for terminating the parents' rights, termination was not in the best interest of the children. On appeal, we find the Department of Children's Services did not prove by clear and convincing evidence statutory grounds for termination of the father's rights. We further find clear and convincing evidence supports only two statutory grounds for terminating the mother's rights. Because clear and convincing evidence does not support a finding that termination would be in the children's best interest, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights.

Employee brought action against former Employer alleging wrongful termination under the Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103; the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101–102; impermissible disclosure of medical information in violation of the TDA; breach of contract; and misrepresentation in violation of the Tennessee Employment Security Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-711. The trial court granted the Employer’s motion to dismiss all claims, and the Employee appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.