APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two of her minor children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the children. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on all grounds. We also conclude that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests and affirm the trial court’s ultimate ruling.

In this legal-malpractice case, the trial court granted Appellees’/Attorneys’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Appellant/Client appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is an appeal of a divorce case. Although we affirm in part and reverse in part, we also vacate several aspects of the trial court’s judgment for the reasons stated herein and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

A plaintiff sued a grocery store for premises liability, and the case was tried by a jury in June of 2023. The jury
found the defendant store liable but awarded the plaintiff no damages. The plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
However, because the plaintiff has failed to substantially comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure
regarding briefing, any issues purportedly raised by the plaintiff are waived, and the appeal is dismissed.

The trial court granted Appellee/Father’s petition to change his son’s surname from Appellant/Mother’s surname to Father’s. Mother appeals. Because Father did not carry his burden of proof to demonstrate that changing the child’s name is in the child’s best interest, we reverse and remand.

Following the Decedent’s death, no original will could be found. One of his daughters filed a petition to administer a copy of a lost will, which the trial court granted. We reverse, concluding the evidence does not overcome the strong presumption in favor of revocation of the lost will.

The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for extension of an order of protection against
Appellant. Appellant argues that her due process rights were violated insofar as she was
denied the opportunity to confront witnesses and offer testimony. Based on the statement
of the evidence, we agree. Vacated and remanded.

This appeal arises from a business relationship that deteriorated. F.W. White & Associates, LLC (“FWA”), through Fenton W. White, Jr. (“White”) (“Appellees,” collectively), sued John R. Chilton (“Chilton”), Centennial
Village Apartments, LLC, and Centennial Village Development, LLC (“Appellants,” collectively) in the Chancery
Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract and quantum meruit. Appellants, in turn,
sued Appellees for slander of title based on Appellees’ having recorded a document asserting an interest in the
real property at issue. Appellants also sued FWA’s attorney Gregory Pratt (“Pratt”), who recorded the document. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Pratt based on the litigation privilege. Following a
bench trial, the Trial Court awarded FWA judgment against Appellants in the amount of $125,000.00 for money
owed under a May 2008 consulting agreement (“the 2008 Agreement”). Regarding Appellants’ slander of title
claim, the Trial Court found that White believed he was owed money and did not act maliciously. Appellants
raise several issues on appeal. Meanwhile, Appellees contend that the Trial Court erred in declining to award
FWA its attorney’s fees and costs under the 2008 Agreement. We affirm the Trial Court. On remand, the Trial
Court is to determine and award to FWA its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal related to
the enforcement of the 2008 Agreement.

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property and
its ruling regarding dissipation of the marital estate. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

A tenured teacher sought judicial review of her reprimand and one-day suspension. The chancery court modified the discipline imposed by the director of schools. Because we conclude that the teacher did not timely petition for judicial review, we vacate the judgment with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Loring Justice (“Justice”) filed a complaint against Kim Nelson (“Nelson”); David Valone (“Valone”) and the Law
Office of David Valone (collectively, “Valone Defendants”); and Martha Meares (“Meares”), and Meares and
Associates and/or Meares and Dillard (collectively, “Meares Defendants”), (collectively, “Defendants”) in the
Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Justice alleged, inter alia, wrongful execution of judgment and
abuse of process. Nelson filed a motion to classify Justice’s action as an abusive civil action (“ACA”) pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101, et seq. The Trial Court granted Nelson’s ACA motion, and Justice appealed. Having
reviewed the evidence, we affirm, albeit for somewhat different reasons than provided by the Trial Court.

This case involves a dispute over recovery under the Tennessee uninsured/underinsured motorist statutory scheme. The plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against the defendant driver and served notice on their own insurance carrier. The plaintiffs also served notice on the insurance carrier covering the borrowed vehicle that the plaintiffs had been utilizing when the accident occurred. The plaintiffs’ insurer entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs for $50,000 each, an amount that equaled the policy limit of the uninsured motorist coverage provided in the policy covering the borrowed vehicle. The defendant driver’s insurer also entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs, paying them $30,000 each. The uninsured motorist carrier covering the borrowed vehicle filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance carrier upon concluding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1201(b)(3)(D) and the policy covering the borrowed vehicle limited the plaintiffs’ recovery via judgment to an amount no greater than the policy providing the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiffs have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this parental termination case, the paternal grandparents filed a petition to terminate the
mother’s parental rights to her four children, alleging several grounds for termination. The
trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of
the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings,
the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals. We affirm the trial
court’s finding that the termination ground of abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv)(c) has been proven and that
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Accordingly,
we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The plaintiff filed a health care liability action without a certificate of good faith. When the defendant moved to dismiss, the plaintiff asserted that the certificate was unnecessary because the common knowledge exception applied. He also contended that his noncompliance should be excused based on the defendant’s failure to timely provide medical records and/or for extraordinary cause. The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and dismissed the action with prejudice. We affirm.

The trial court entered a permanent parenting plan in 2014 that governed the parties’ custody arrangement for nine years. In 2022, the child’s father petitioned the juvenile court for a modification of the parenting plan. During the pendency of the modification petition, he also filed a motion for a restraining order to prevent the child’s mother from removing the parties’ daughter from his custody, which was granted. After a hearing on the modification petition, the court found a material change in circumstances had occurred warranting modification and that modification of the custody arrangement was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal concerns a dispute over insurance coverage. After a fire loss, the insured brought a breach of contract claim against her insurer. The insurer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the insured was not entitled to coverage for additional living expenses because she did not have an insurable interest in the property and that the insured’s contents coverage claim was precluded under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The insured appeals. We reverse and remand.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for race discrimination for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

In an appeal from a general sessions court judgment, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages for a misrepresentation by a car dealer, declined to award treble damages, and awarded the plaintiffs only a portion of their attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal. We vacate the denial of treble damages, but otherwise affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this post-divorce dispute over child support, the mother has appealed an order striking her pleadings and granting the father a default judgment as to his counter-petition. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The company holding developer’s rights to a subdivision and the company’s principal member used the developer’s rights to unilaterally remove a board member from the board of the subdivision’s homeowners’ association. The aggrieved board member and his wife filed suit, asking for an injunction allowing the plaintiff to remain a board member. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction and later held that the defendant company lacked the authority to remove the plaintiff as a board member. The trial court reasoned that the bylaw on which the company relied in removing the board member was contrary to state law and improper. Defendants appealed to this Court. We reverse in part and affirm in part, affirming the trial court’s ultimate ruling that the plaintiff is entitled to his seat on the homeowners’ association board.

In this divorce action, the wife contends that the trial court inequitably divided the parties’
marital estate. The trial court awarded the husband the divorce on the ground of
irreconcilable differences, classified the parties’ assets as separate or marital, and then
divided the parties’ marital estate. The court also determined that an award of alimony to
the wife was not appropriate and further denied the wife’s motion for civil contempt. This
appeal by the wife followed. Due to the wife’s failure to file a table that lists “all properties
and debts considered by the trial court, including: (1) all separate property, (2) all marital
property, and (3) all separate and marital debts,” as required by Court of Appeals Rule 7,
along with other deficiencies in the wife’s brief, we conclude that she has waived her issues
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After many years of contentious post-divorce litigation, the trial court ordered the court clerk’s office to distribute property-sale proceeds to the parties. The trial court also ordered that the wife’s portion of the sale proceeds be taxed in an amount sufficient to satisfy a previous sanctions award against the wife and an award of attorney’s fees to the husband. The wife appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Grandmother appeals the denial of her petition for grandparent visitation, arguing that the trial court failed to apply the presumption of irreparable harm contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306(a)(5). Because Grandmother never asked the trial court to apply a rebuttable presumption of harm, we affirm.

This is a child custody matter involving the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-201, et seq. (“the UCCJEA”). Leslie Burke and Melissa Burke (“the Burkes”) received temporary custody pending adoption of the minor child Jane Doe (“the Child”) from an Indiana court (“the Indiana Court”). The Burkes then brought the Child to Tennessee. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) later filed a dependency and neglect action in the Juvenile Court for Greene County (“the Juvenile Court”). DCS alleged that the Child disclosed having been sexually abused in previous adoptive homes, and that the Burkes were not cooperating with individual therapy for the Child. The Juvenile Court ordered the Child’s removal into DCS custody. The Child’s legal parents in Indiana surrendered their parental rights. DCS moved for guardianship of the Child in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Circuit Court”), which the Circuit Court granted. The Burkes sued DCS2 in the Circuit Court challenging the legal parents’ surrender of their parental rights and the Circuit Court’s award of full guardianship to DCS. The Burkes and DCS filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court ruled in favor of DCS, dismissing the Burkes’ complaint. The Burkes appeal, arguing that the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction even though the Indiana Court expressly ceded jurisdiction to Tennessee. We hold, inter alia, that Indiana relinquished its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. We affirm