APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, the trial court allowed the Tennessee Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the State of Tennessee (“the State”). However, instead of allowing intervention for the limited purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality, the trial court ordered that the State be made a party defendant in the action, thereby invoking the requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-18-101(a) that a three-judge panel be appointed. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24, we vacate the trial court’s order directing the State’s intervention as a party defendant. We remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether the State is a necessary party or whether the State should be allowed to intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-312.

This is a Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) case, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., alleging negligent operation of a street sweeper by a city employee. The trial court denied the city’s claims of immunity and entered judgment after a nonjury trial, apportioning 51 percent fault to the city’s employee who was driving the street sweeper and 49 percent fault to the driver of the pickup truck that was involved in a collision with the sweeper. The city appealed. We affirm.

Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of their three younger children. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Mother and Father committed severe abuse against a child and that the children’s best interests are served by termination, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the trial judge. After carefully reviewing the limited record provided by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion.

This appeal arises out of a local planning commission’s approval of a development plan application. The Plaintiff sought to appeal the planning commission’s approval of the application to the local board of zoning appeals; however, a local zoning ordinance permitted the plan applicant to opt out of the appeal before the board of zoning appeals, which he did. The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court, challenging the planning commission’s approval of the application and the dismissal of his appeal by the board of zoning appeals. The plaintiff claimed that the opt-out provision violates his constitutional right; thus, by applying the opt-out provision, the board of zoning appeals acted illegally. The circuit court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaintiff impermissibly combined an original action with a petition for certiorari review. The circuit court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim regarding the planning commission’s actions because the plaintiff did not sufficiently verify his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

Following an automobile accident allegedly involving a State of Tennessee employee, claimant sought damages against the State based on alleged injuries arising from the accident. The Division of Claims and Risk Management denied the claim, and claimant appealed to the Claims Commission. Because claimant’s appeal was not filed within the ninety-day statutory time limit, the Claims Commission dismissed it. Finding no error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Appellant initiated a contempt action against Appellee for failure to make two alimony payments, as required under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). After Appellee remitted payment, the sole issue to be tried was the amount of attorney’s fees Appellant expended enforcing the MDA. Appellant sought $14,289.50 in attorney’s fees and $396.36 in expenses. The trial court awarded her $2,500.00. Because the trial court made limited findings and failed to consider Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, we vacate its award of attorney’s fees. On remand, the trial court is instructed to reconsider Appellant’s attorney’s fee award in view of the Rule 1.5(a) factors and to make written findings consistent with these factors. Husband’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

An employee discharged in a reduction-in-force claimed her employer discriminated against her. The trial court determined that the employee was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and granted summary judgment to the employer. We affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Father seeks to appeal the denial of his motion to recuse the trial court judge. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

In this constitutional challenge involving a non-judicial foreclosure, the trial court determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-5-106 is not unconstitutional as applied because the City of Chattanooga acted in a proprietary capacity when it conducted a non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. Thus, only private conduct is at issue and constitutional rights are not implicated. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B by the defendant, Keith Dessinger, concerning his motion seeking recusal of the trial court judge. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Mr. Dessinger, we determine it to be fatally deficient. We therefore dismiss the appeal.

This is a post-divorce civil contempt action stemming from a divorce that was finalized in 2014. At the hearing on the contempt petition in February 2024, the husband moved the trial court to dismiss the petition because the parties’ marital dissolution agreement was not in the record. The trial court granted this motion but later, upon motion by the wife, set aside the 2014 final decree pursuant to Rule 60.01. The trial court re-entered the final decree, nunc pro tunc, with the marital dissolution agreement attached. From this order, the husband timely appeals to this Court. We reverse.

In the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”), Gayla Henry filed a motion to vacate two 2019 judgments entered by the General Sessions Court for Washington County (“the General Sessions Court”) in favor of Jesse Street and Property Listing and Rental Agency (“Property Listing”) and to re-open a case dismissed by the Trial Court in 2020. She named Mr. Street; Property Listing; Robert Stacy, sole proprietor of Property Listing; and Kristi Shepard, a real estate agent employed by Property Listing (“Defendants”) as defendants in her motion. She alleged that the 2019 judgments had been procured through fraud by opposing counsel. The Trial Court denied the motion to vacate. Ms. Henry appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm and grant Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

A husband and wife disputed the value of the husband’s business for purposes of equitably dividing the marital estate in their divorce. The trial court adopted a value proposed by the wife’s expert. Because we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

In 2020, a local board of education adopted changes to its student code of conduct requiring, among other things, that teachers participate in a student discipline policy and engage in social and emotional learning support. The local teachers’ association filed suit, arguing that the board of education was required to engage in collaborative conferencing with the teachers’ association before adopting the changes because they constituted “working conditions” under the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011, Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-608(a). The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the teachers’ association. We reverse.

This appeal concerns service of process. Vernon Lowe (“Plaintiff”) sued Elisha Harvey (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. Defendant lives out of state. Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant via the Tennessee Secretary of State. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting insufficient service of process. The attempted service on Defendant occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the signature requirement for return receipt mail was suspended by the postal service. The signature space on the proof of delivery shows “E Harvey” handwritten with “MRC1C19” underneath. Plaintiff does not argue that this represents Defendant’s signature. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his service upon the Secretary of State was sufficient in itself. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

After the death of Calvin Leroy Whitehead, his daughter, Regina Whitehead, petitioned to probate the decedent’s December 2015 will and for permission to sell the decedent’s residence. The probate court admitted the will to probate and letters testamentary were issued to Ms. Whitehead as the executrix. The court also granted permission to sell the residence. Thereafter, the decedent’s step-niece, Elizabeth Otto, filed an intervening petition to probate a purportedly more recent will, from March 2016. The estate answered the petition, alleging fraud and, in its amended answer, requested attorney’s fees in defending the petition. The estate then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the proffered will was a copy, with no explanation as to the absence of the original, that the post-death affidavits were not valid. The day before her scheduled deposition, Ms. Otto filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit of her petition. The estate responded by moving for an assessment of attorney’s fees and costs against Ms. Otto. The trial court then issued an order that dismissed Ms. Otto’s petition and denied the estate’s motion for attorney’s fees in defending the intervening petition. The estate appeals, arguing that the request for attorney’s fees in its motion to dismiss is a claim for affirmative relief that survives the dismissal. The estate also requests attorney’s fees under alternative legal grounds. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the intervening petition and, finding no abuse of discretion, affirm the denial of attorney’s fees. We also deny the estate’s post-appeal Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 motion for sanctions, as well as Ms. Otto’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

To facilitate the sale of two closely held companies, an employee signed a restrictive covenant agreement containing a release provision. After the sale, the employee filed suit against the buyer, the seller, and others involved in the sale, alleging that he had been defrauded out of his ownership interest in the companies. Later, the employee dismissed the corporate defendants and filed an amended complaint reasserting claims against his alleged former co-owners for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the release provision. Concluding that the language of the release was broad enough to encompass the claims in the amended complaint, the court granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm.

This Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”) dispute concerns emails and documents (the “Materials”) requested by Kathleen Marquardt (“Ms. Marquardt”) from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UTK”). Ms. Marquardt argued that the Materials, which include emails pertaining to an article authored by a part-time UTK employee that was published in the Huffington Post, were public records because they were created as a part of the official business of the university in furtherance of its goal of becoming a top-25 university. Following an in camera review of the Materials by the trial court only and a show-cause hearing, the trial court ruled in UTK’s favor, holding that “the requested records do not meet the definition of the [TPRA] statute; that these records were made or received pursuant to law or ordinance, or in [connection] with the transaction of official business by any governmental entity.” Ms. Marquardt challenges this ruling as well as other rulings including the denial of her motion for “an attorney’s eyes only” review of the Materials and the denial of her discovery requests. We affirm.

In the first appeal of this parental termination case, we affirmed the trial court’s findings that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven, but we vacated one ground and the trial court’s best interest determination due to insufficient findings in the termination order. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order containing additional findings. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of parental rights.

This is an appeal of the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her children. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Angela B. (“Mother”) to her two children, Meadow L. and Greyson L. (“the Children”).1 Mother appeals, contesting the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Saad Al Qaragholi (“Petitioner”) filed a petition against the Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee (“Respondent”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) challenging tax assessments against him.  Petitioner opted not to pay the tax before proceeding with his challenge.  However, Petitioner failed to timely sign his petition under penalty of perjury as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1801(b)(2).  Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the oath requirement was jurisdictional and could not be corrected after the 90 days in which to file a petition expired.  The Trial Court denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted Petitioner leave to amend, citing the legal principle that leave to amend is freely granted.  This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed.  We reverse.  

Appellants fail to identify an error of fact or law for our review, and their brief fails to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Appellee’s request for damages for a frivolous appeal is granted.