APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court entered a final decree in a contentious divorce. Based on the proof at trial, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital estate. It also awarded the wife alimony in solido to equalize the division, alimony in futuro, and attorney’s fees. Both parties raise issues on appeal. Upon review, we conclude the court erred in omitting two marital assets from the division and in calculating a marital debt, which skewed the division in the husband’s favor. Because the court expressly intended to make an equal division, we modify the court’s equalization award. Otherwise, we affirm.

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to her child based on three statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This matter concerns criminal contempt and an order of protection. Jolene Renee (Scholl) Bauer (“Wife”) and Michael Ray Scholl (“Husband”) divorced in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). Husband was ordered not to go around Wife’s work or residence. Wife later filed a motion for criminal contempt against Husband alleging that he went around her residence, the parties’ former marital residence, in violation of the court’s order. She also sought an order of protection, citing Husband’s history of violence toward her. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Wife an order of protection. The Trial Court found Husband guilty on two counts of criminal contempt for texting Wife’s neighbor to ask what was happening with Wife and the house. Husband appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s granting Wife an order of protection. However, we find that Husband did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him and that the evidence is insufficient to support the criminal contempt findings by the Trial Court of Husband’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse the findings of criminal contempt against Husband. We therefore affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of her motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a detainer action. Mekey Adem, Said Moammed, and Adem Homes, LLC (“Adem”) (“Landlords,” collectively) sought to evict Alexandria Hart (“Tenant”) for non-payment of rent. The General Sessions Court for Shelby County (“the General Sessions Court”) ruled against Tenant, who then appealed to the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Circuit Court”). Tenant attempted to post her birth certificate as the possessory bond to allow her to remain on the premises while her appeal was pending. The Circuit Court rejected this and granted Adem a writ of possession. Ultimately, Tenant was ordered to pay rent she owed plus reasonable attorney’s fees. Tenant appeals. We affirm. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Adem is entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, the amount of which the Circuit Court is to determine on remand.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody of the children. Because the record shows that Father’s failure to visit was not willful, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

In this divorce action, a husband challenges the trial court’s finding that the parties’ jointly owned real property transmuted into marital property during a nine-year marriage. The husband also asserts that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt of the final decree before the decree became a final order. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court as to the finding that the parties’ home became marital property during the marriage. We reverse, however, the finding of contempt against the husband.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child, the Cannon County Chancery Court (“trial court”) determined that clear and convincing evidence supported termination as to five statutory grounds: substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan, persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the parents’ custody, severe child abuse, incarceration of a parent for more than ten years when the child is under eight years of age, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court further determined that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Upon review, we vacate the trial court’s determination concerning the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan. In all other respects, we affirm.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee/Father’s post-divorce petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan and for contempt. The trial court changed the children’s primary residential parent from Mother to Father. Although the trial court made a change in custody, it applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(C), which addresses modification of a residential schedule. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), which addresses modifications of custody, is the applicable statute. The trial court also charged Mother with one child’s tuition. In doing so, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of the Child Support Guidelines. As such, we vacate the order: (1) modifying the permanent parenting plan; (2) modifying the Child Support Worksheet, and (3) charging Mother with the child’s private school tuition. The trial court also charged Mother with retroactive child support, found her guilty of three counts of civil contempt for alleged violations of the permanent parenting plan, and ordered her to pay Father’s attorney’s fees as punishment for the contempt. Because the record does not support the trial court’s findings of contempt, we reverse the contempt holdings and the award of attorney’s fees to Father. Because there is no basis for an award of retroactive child support, we also reverse that holding.

Appellants purchased a home without first personally viewing the property. Following the sale, Appellants discovered defects that they claim should have been disclosed to them prior to the sale. The trial court granted motions for summary judgment in favor of the sellers of the house and the licensed home inspector. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed the appellant’s appeal from general sessions court on the basis that his notice of appeal was untimely. We affirm.

In this case involving the sale of a life insurance policy, the trial court conducted a hearing on the same day regarding the four defendants’ various motions to dismiss and the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  The court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Concerning three defendants, including the appellant, the court partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to liability upon finding that those defendants had failed to respond to the summary judgment motion.  Following a subsequent bench trial, the trial court found that the defendants had breached an agreement with the plaintiffs to sell the life insurance policy directly to the plaintiffs, selling it to a separate trust instead, and that the defendants had done so through a “scheme to defraud” the plaintiffs.  Upon the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the trial court also found that the defendants had violated the Tennessee Viatical Settlement Act of 2009, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-50-101, et seq.  Finding the defendants to be jointly and severally liable, the trial court awarded to the plaintiffs a judgment in the amount of $418,450.87 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of $252,867.19.  One of the defendants has appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment with the correction of one mathematical error.  Pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement, we grant the plaintiffs’ request for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal.  We remand this case to the trial court for enforcement of the modified judgment and for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.  

Husband appeals the trial court’s judgment in his divorce action on the sole issue of whether the trial judge should have recused himself because the judge’s comments and conduct at the trial establish that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Applying the objective standard, we find no basis for the trial judge’s recusal and affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this automobile collision case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the defendant challenges several rulings related to the admission and testimony of the plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert. Because the defendant failed to file a motion for new trial raising these challenges, we conclude that they are waived, and so we affirm the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. We award the plaintiffs their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

Following an incident in an operating room allegedly involving aggressive actions by a doctor toward a scrub tech, the scrub tech made oral and written statements about the incident to her employer, the police, and a state administrative body. In response, the doctor filed suit for defamation and intentional interference with a business relationship. The scrub tech filed a Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA) petition to dismiss, which the trial court granted after it found that the statements were within the ambit of the TPPA and that the doctor could not establish a prima facie case for all of the essential elements of his claims. The doctor appeals. We affirm.

Father was held in criminal contempt for willful failure to provide Mother with the current address where he and their child resided. The court fined him $50 and sentenced him to serve 10 days incarcerated, though it suspended the incarceration upon good behavior and continued compliance with court orders. The trial court also granted Mother attorney’s fees related to the prosecution of that count of contempt. Father appeals. We affirm and remand for a determination of Mother’s attorney’s fees on appeal.

The appellant has filed a notice of appeal as of right from interlocutory orders entered by the trial court.  Due to the lack of a final judgment, this Court does not maintain subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the portion of this Court’s prior order directing that the matter be scheduled for the next oral argument docket is vacated.   

The trial court terminated Mother/Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of severe child
abuse and on its finding that termination of her rights is in the children’s best interests.
Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellee filed this action, as next of kin of Decedent, against Appellant nursing facility alleging that Appellant was negligent in its care of Decedent.  Appellee also asserted a wrongful death claim.  Appellant filed a motion to compel arbitration on its allegation that Decedent signed a binding arbitration agreement before being admitted into its facility.  The trial court found that Appellant failed to authenticate the alleged arbitration agreement and concluded that there was no evidence of a binding arbitration agreement between Appellant and Decedent.  As such, the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother to two of her three children. The juvenile court found that three grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Appellants filed a motion to recuse the trial judge on the basis that the judge lives in the same neighborhood as a possible expert witness. The trial judge denied the motion. We affirm.

A grandmother made a series of loans to her grandson totaling $147,000 to help with his
restaurant business. After personal attempts to collect on the loan failed, the grandmother
filed a complaint for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. A default judgment against
the grandson was granted in 2012, and the grandmother made several unsuccessful attempts
to collect on the judgment. After the grandmother’s death, her trustee motioned for
substitution as the judgment creditor and for an extension of the judgment, which was
granted, and the trustee then began collection efforts, none of which were successful. Only
after the trustee filed a charging order against the grandson and his businesses did the
grandson respond to the suit, more than ten years after the original default judgment had
been granted. The grandson filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the substitution and
extension order, and when that was denied, he appealed to this court. While on appeal, the
grandson motioned this court for a remand to the trial court to file a Rule 60.02 motion to
set aside the default judgment, which we granted. The trial court denied the motion to set
aside the default judgment, and the grandson appealed that decision to this court. Finding
that the motion for substitution and extension was timely filed, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of the grandson’s motion to set aside order of substitution and extension. We also
affirm the trial court’s determination that the default judgment is valid and binding and
affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside default judgment.

This appeal arises from the alleged mismanagement of two dissolved trusts established for the benefit of Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr. (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the defendant-trustees violated the trusts’ terms by regularly encroaching on the trusts’ corpus for unauthorized purposes, thereby exhausting the trusts’ assets. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the applicable statutes of limitations, and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform plumbing work on a condominium construction project. After completing the first phase of the work, the general contractor paid a portion of the total contract amount to the subcontractor. The general contractor then separately hired the subcontractor to do some excavation work on the project, though no contract was created for this aspect of the work, and no payment amount was discussed. After completion of the excavation work, a dispute arose over the amount charged to the general contractor by the subcontractor. The general contractor refused to pay what it believed to be too high a fee. The subcontractor insisted that the amount charged was reasonable. The general contractor then asserted that the subcontractor had materially breached the plumbing contract during the first phase. The general contractor eventually terminated the contract. The subcontractor filed suit. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the general contractor breached the parties’ contract, awarding lost profits and attorney’s fees to the subcontractor pursuant to the plumbing contract. The trial court also awarded damages to the subcontractor for the excavation work under a quantum meruit theory. The general contractor appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute between a local church and a denominational organization regarding the ownership of church property. We have concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the local church’s motion to recuse and, further, that the trial court properly dismissed all of the local church’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.