APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant/Church appeals the trial court’s entry of default judgment against it and the trial court’s award of damages for breach of contract in favor of Appellee, an architectural and design firm. Appellee served its complaint for breach of contract on Appellant’s registered agent at an address other than the one listed with the Secretary of State. The trial court found that service was proper and entered default judgment against Appellant for failure to appear. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellee for the alleged balance on the contract price, lost profits, and interest. We conclude that the default judgment was proper. However, as to the type and measure of damages, we vacate and remand.

This is the second appeal of this case. In the first appeal, the Husband appealed the trial court’s valuation of the marital assets and its overall distribution of the marital estate. Appellant Husband now appeals the trial court’s adoption of Appellee Wife’s property survey dividing certain real property. Husband also appeals the trial court’s valuation of a tractor and attachments, which were awarded to Wife in the final decree of divorce. Because Wife’s survey does not comport with the division of real property as set out in the final decree of divorce, the trial court abused its discretion in adopting it. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to the adoption of Wife’s survey. As to the value of the tractor, we conclude that the trial court’s valuation is within the range of values represented by the evidence and affirm this portion of the trial court’s order. Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint to quiet title. Appellant claimed that Appellee’s title was procured by fraud. The trial court denied relief. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings and conclusions of law
as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the order and remand.

Decedent’s sister was appointed as executor of the estate and subsequently filed a will contest complaint regarding a single bequest in the will. The trial court removed sister as executor and appointed an administrator pendente lite. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed sister’s will contest on the basis that the sister was estopped from attacking the will after her appointment as executor. Sister appeals. We affirm the trial court’s ruling with regard to sister’s standing to contest the will. However, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of sister’s will contest on the basis of estoppel and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

This appeal arises from an adjudication of dependency and neglect against the father of a child born out of wedlock and a denial of an intervening petition for custody filed by the father’s relatives. The father and intervening petitioners appeal the circuit court’s decision. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action filed by a prisoner to challenge the Tennessee Department of Correction’s manner of applying sentence reduction credits to his consecutive sentences. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department of Correction upon concluding that it properly calculated the petitioner’s sentences and credits. We affirm. 

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her four children by two different fathers. Mother contested the termination, but the fathers ultimately did not. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interests of the Children. The mother appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's finding that Mother abandoned her children by failing to provide a suitable home. We also reverse the trial court's finding that Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of her permanency plans. However, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the other grounds for termination relied upon by the trial court and that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interest.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clauses of the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clauses of the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court‟s decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clauses of the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions.. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clauses of the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot “under the Takings Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions.” The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding. As the majority notes, a charge against an inmate be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, defined at TDOC Policy No. 502.01(IV)(I) as “[t]he degree of proof which best accords with reason and probability and is more probable than not.” As the majority also notes, the evidence upon which Mr. Hanley’s conviction rested consisted of the two knives and Corporal Story’s statement, the salient portion of which is quoted in the majority opinion. Corporal Story did not testify and the only live witnesses were Mr. Hanley, who denied that the knives were his, and Duane Brooks, an inmate who testified in support of Mr. Hanley’s contention that the knives were left by a previous occupant of the cell.    

In this appeal arising from the parties’ divorce, the husband challenges the trial court’s valuation of his interest in a limited partnership, division of the marital estate, awards of transitional alimony and alimony in solido, child support order, and adoption of the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan. The husband also appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a restraining order. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s valuation of the husband’s interest in the limited partnership. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Husband’s motion for a restraining order. However, because the trial court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are unable to effectively review the remainder of the issues raised by the husband on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with regard to these remaining issues and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

This case arises out of a workplace injury. The injured worker and her husband filed this lawsuit asserting various causes of action against numerous defendants. The trial court dismissed one of the defendants upon finding that the defendant was entitled to workers’ compensation immunity. The trial court certified its order of dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Plaintiffs appeal, claiming that the defendant waived the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation immunity, that the trial court applied the wrong standard for a motion to dismiss, and that the particular claims asserted are not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation law. We affirm.  

I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Gabriella D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights.

I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Chance D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights

A thirteen year-old child slipped off bleacher seats at a middle school and injured his leg when he was using the seats as steps in July 2012.  The child and his parents sued the school for negligence, and the school asserted the defense of comparative negligence.  The trial court applied the Rule of Sevens, concluded the school rebutted the presumption of no capacity for negligence, and determined that the child was solely responsible for his injury.  The trial court also determined that the school was not liable for negligent supervision of the child.  The parents and child appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of a father's parental rights. The father is currently serving an eight-year sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of attempted child rape, with the victims being the child at issue and her older half-sister. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We vacate the trial court's findings as to three grounds but affirm the trial court's findings regarding the remaining three grounds and affirm the best interest finding. We accordingly affirm the trial court's order as modified and uphold the termination of the father's parental rights.

This appeal arises from the change in the designation of the primary residential parent and the modification of a residential parenting schedule. Mother appeals, contending that certain factual findings made by the court are unsupported by the record and that the court erred in restricting her parenting time. The court’s findings are supported by the record and did not abuse its discretion in reducing Mother’s parenting time; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.