APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a dispute over vacation benefits. Richard Michelhaugh and John Williams (“Plaintiffs”), employees of Y-12 in Oak Ridge, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) against the contractor, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (“CNS”), running their work site. Plaintiffs alleged that CNS deprived them of earned vacation time by changing the vacation policy mid work-year. CNS filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were deprived of earned vacation time, that Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to withstand CNS’s motion to dismiss, and that, therefore, the Trial Court erred in granting CNS’s motion to dismiss. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Christopher Dylan Thompson ingested several doses of a liquid form of a drug, which he says was estazolam, before reporting to work for his employer, defendant Best Buy Stores, L.P. At work, he appeared tired and slow, and a manager told him to clock out and end his shift early. On his way home, plaintiff was involved in a car accident. He brought this negligent entrustment action, alleging that defendant breached a duty by not stopping him from leaving his place of employment in his own vehicle. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding defendant “had no duty to prevent [plaintiff] from leaving the premises driving his own vehicle,” and relying on Lett v. Collis Foods, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), a factually similar case decided by this Court. We affirm.

At issue is whether a taxpayer’s sales are properly classified as “retail sales” or “wholesale sales” under the Business Tax Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-4-701 to -730, and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1320-04-05-.47. Following an audit, the Tennessee Department of Revenue determined that the taxpayer misclassified its sales as “wholesale sales,” when they should have been classified as “retail sales,” and assessed the taxpayer with $74,088.10 in tax liability. After paying the assessment, the taxpayer filed suit seeking a refund. The chancery court held that the sales in question were “retail sales” within the context of the statute and denied the request for a refund. We conclude that the business activities were properly classified as retail sales; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

This appeal arises from the juvenile court's termination of a biological father's parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination and that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the grounds for terminating parental rights set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9) and relied upon by the juvenile court were inapplicable to the father in this case. Nevertheless, because there was clear and convincing evidence of two grounds for termination of the father's parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the child, we affirm.

This appeal requires us to interpret a version of a juvenile court statute effective prior to July 1, 2016. A juvenile court magistrate held a hearing on competing petitions to modify a parenting plan filed by a child’s parents. The magistrate announced her ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing but did not enter a written order until several days later. Mother, dissatisfied with the magistrate’s ruling, filed a request for a rehearing before a juvenile court judge. Mother filed her request within five days of the entry of the magistrate’s order but ten days after the hearing before the magistrate. The juvenile court concluded that mother’s request for rehearing was untimely and confirmed the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as an order of the juvenile court. Because we conclude that the time for requesting a rehearing ran from the entry of the magistrate’s written order, mother’s request for rehearing was timely. Therefore, we reverse.   

The Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father to their three children. The father was incarcerated in Georgia when the children were determined to be dependent and neglected, and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs and had illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia in her home when the children were removed. DCS developed three permanency plans over the course of eighteen months, with responsibilities set out for each parent. When it appeared that neither parent was in substantial compliance with the third plan, DCS filed a petition to terminate their rights. The trial court found the evidence clearly and convincingly supported the grounds DCS alleged for terminating the parents' rights and determined it was in the children's best interest that their parents' rights be terminated. Both the mother and father appeal the termination. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

This case concerns a constitutional challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-12-119(c). When the trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 20-12-119(c) provides for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the dismissed party. In this case, the trial court granted Appellees the statutory maximum of $10,000 in attorneys' fees. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The trial court rejected Appellant's challenge, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c) is remedial in nature and does not violate Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution. Discerning no error, we affirm

In this parental relocation case, the trial court erred in finding that the mother did not have a reasonable purpose in relocating to another state for her employment. Furthermore, mother's purpose in relocating was not vindictive. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s entry of a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff bank filed a complaint seeking a judgment against the defendant on a sworn account. After several attempts, the plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service of process on the defendant and attempted to obtain service of process by mail. The plaintiff’s process server sent the summons by certified mail to the defendant’s residential address, and the mailing was returned marked “unclaimed.” The plaintiff filed proof of service, indicating that service had been properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11), and filed a motion for default judgment. A copy of the motion for default judgment was sent by mail to the defendant at the same residential address. The defendant filed a response “by special appearance” opposing the bank’s motion for default judgment based on insufficiency of service of process. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court entered a default judgment in violation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(10), which expressly provides, “Service by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing personal acceptance by the defendant[.]” We therefore vacate the trial court’s order entering a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remand this matter for further proceedings.  

This appeal concerns termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Autumn N. (“Mother”) to her minor child, Dillon E. (“the Child”). The central issue of this parental rights case is Mother’s alleged prescription drug abuse. After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that four grounds were proven against Mother sufficient to terminate her parental rights to the Child, and that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. DCS argues that the Juvenile Court erred in declining to find one additional ground for termination. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

Wife challenges the trial court's decision authorizing the Department of Human Services to take her husband into protective custody pursuant to the Adult Protection Act. Because, after the trial court's decision, the adult taken into protective custody was released from DHS custody and later died, we have determined that this appeal is moot.

This is an appeal from a “Final Hearing Order” in a divorce action. That order, however, did not resolve the issue of whether the husband had improperly deducted amounts he expended for moving services and rental of a storage building from his pendente lite alimony obligation due to the wife. Because the order appealed does not resolve all claims presented in the proceedings below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant in an unlawful detainer action filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff. Two days later, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit, but the certificate of service on the notice indicated it was placed in the mail the same day that the counterclaim was filed. Based on the notice of voluntary dismissal, the trial court entered an order dismissing the action without prejudice. Defendant appeals, arguing that he should be permitted to proceed with his counterclaim. We affirm. 

Mother and Father appeal from the trial court‘s finding that clear and convincing evidence exists to establish that the children at issue are dependent and neglected and the victims of severe abuse at both parents‘ hands. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a child custody action involving two minor children. In 2010, the biological parents of the children entered into an agreed order, which provided that the mother would be the primary residential custodian with the father enjoying visitation rights. Thereafter, the mother sent the children to live with their maternal grandfather. In July 2014, the father filed a petition seeking to modify the prior custody order and establish a permanent parenting plan wherein he would be designated the primary residential parent. The mother opposed this change, and the maternal grandfather sought to intervene in the action for the purpose of seeking custody of the children. The trial court awarded primary custody to the maternal grandfather, determining that a risk of substantial harm would result if custody of the children were awarded to the father. The father has appealed. Determining that there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding of a risk of substantial harm, we reverse the custody award to the grandfather. We remand this matter for a hearing regarding whether a material change in circumstance has occurred since the initial custody award and whether modifying the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father is in the children's best interest. We also remand this matter for the trial court to revisit the issue of changing the children's surnames. We affirm the trial court's denial of the grandfather's request for retroactive child support.

Upon petition of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“the Department”), the trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father. Among other things, the trial court concluded that Mother and Father had committed severe child abuse. The trial court also determined that the termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we reverse the trial court's finding that Mother abandoned the children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). Moreover, we reverse the trial court's finding that Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the family permanency plans created in this case. However, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the other grounds for termination relied upon by the trial court, as well as the trial court's finding that the termination of Mother and Father's parental rights is in the children's best interest.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant, who is incarcerated, appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on two statutory grounds: (1) abandonment, and (2) incarceration for more than ten years, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and (6), and on its finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.  

Corporate plaintiff filed an action for possession of real property. An individual claiming to be a partner in a limited partnership with an ownership interest in the real property moved to intervene in the action. The trial court granted plaintiff possession of the real property. The individual appeals the judgment for possession. We conclude that, because he was not aggrieved by the adjudication, the individual lacks standing to appeal. Moreover, because he is not a licensed attorney, he may not represent the limited partnership in this action.

In this divorce action, the trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded her alimony in solido but denied her request for alimony in futuro. The wife appeals. We reverse and grant a divorce without fault to either party. We also modify the judgment to reflect an award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $2,000 per month.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellants appeal from separate orders denying two motions for recusal filed in this case. As to denial of the first motion for recusal, we hold that Appellants failed to file a timely appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. As to the denial of the second recusal motion, we hold that the recusal motion was ineffective because it was not signed by local counsel as required by Rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In the absence of a timely filed appeal from an effective recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal.

The developer of a Nashville subdivision and its surety entered into three performance agreements by which they bound themselves to complete the infrastructure in the subdivision. The Metropolitan Government brought an action to enforce the agreements against both parties when the developer failed to complete the infrastructure. The surety filed an answer as well as a cross claim against the developer and a third-party complaint against a group of investors who had executed a separate agreement to indemnify the surety for any amounts the surety might pay or be held liable. After settling with the Metropolitan Government, the surety sought summary judgment against the developer and investors; the cross and third-party defendants also sought summary judgment asserting that, since the surety did not issue a separate bond, they had no obligation to indemnify the surety. The court granted summary judgment to the surety upon holding that the performance agreement operated as a bond and entitled the surety to indemnification. The developer and investors appeal the grant of the surety’s motion and the denial of their motion. We hold that the surety’s execution of the performance agreements operated as an “undertaking[] or other writing[] obligatory in nature of a bond” as contemplated by the indemnity agreement and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a contract between an electric power distributor and an independent contractor. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the electric power distributor was justified in terminating the contract because the independent contractor materially breached the contract by violating a safety policy and an oral directive from the power distributor. The independent contractor appeals, claiming that the evidence did not support a finding that it violated the safety policy or directive, that such a violation, even if it did occur, did not constitute a material breach of the contract, and that the power distributor was required to give notice and an opportunity to cure any default prior to terminating the contract. We affirm. 

This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari, claiming that the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole acted arbitrarily and without material evidence in denying his request for parole. The trial court granted the petition but ultimately affirmed the denial of parole. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.

Shane L.B. (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child, Knox C. (“the Child”), after finding and holding that grounds for terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the Child's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds were proven to terminate Father's parental rights to the Child and that the termination was in the Child's best interest. We, therefore, affirm.