APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this personal injury and contract reformation case, the plaintiff filed a complaint, seeking damages resulting from a motor vehicle collision and reformation of a release of all claims signed by the plaintiff. As grounds for reformation, the plaintiff claimed that an agent of the defendant company fraudulently induced the plaintiff to sign the release. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff could not establish an essential element of his action because the plaintiff did not act promptly in seeking reformation of the release. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant upon finding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s action was not prompt after discovery of the alleged fraud and that the plaintiff therefore was not entitled to reformation of the release. The plaintiff timely appealed. Having determined that the question of whether the plaintiff’s actions were sufficiently prompt in seeking the equitable relief of reformation presents a genuine issue of material fact, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

Judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Board of Appeals upholding the termination of a trooper with the Tennessee Highway Patrol for his conduct during a traffic pursuit. The trial court upheld the trooper’s termination. On appeal, the trooper asserts that the administrative judge who heard the case erred in disregarding expert testimony and, as a consequence, the Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari. Inmate alleges that the Disciplinary Board violated several policies in finding him guilty of the charge of drug possession. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari and, upon review of the record, granted TDOC’s motion to dismiss. Inmate appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal stems from a divorce proceeding in which Wife was awarded alimony in futuro. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s award of alimony and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court, pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit because she did not comply with certain aspects of the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act incident to the filing of her original complaint. Because we do not construe the allegations in the original complaint as presenting any health care liability claims, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this lawsuit and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This case involves a dispute over the commission earned from a real estate transaction. The parties disagree as to whether the plaintiff, Clay Harris Dalton, is entitled to a part of the commission on the transaction. Jerry Sandifer is a principal real estate broker licensed in Tennessee. He is the sole proprietor of Tennessee Realty Pros, LLC (TRP), a Tennessee limited liability company. Dalton is an affiliate real estate broker licensed in Tennessee. On September 6, 2013, Dalton registered his real estate license with Sandifer and TRP (collectively the Brokerage). On November 1, 2013, TRP secured a commercial exclusive right to sell listing agreement from a seller. The agreement encompasses the real estate sold in the transaction at issue. Eventually, TRP procured a buyer, and on March 23, 2014, the buyer executed a commercial purchase and sales agreement. That agreement listed Dalton as the Buyer's Designated Agent and selling licensee. It listed Sandifer as the Seller's Designated Agent and listing licensee. On September 30, 2014, the real estate closing took place, resulting in a total broker's commission of $97,400. Because only one brokerage was involved in the transaction, the entire commission was paid to TRP. Dalton claims that he is entitled to a share of the commission. He further asserts that he had an agreement with Sandifer that Dalton would be paid a share of the commission on the buyer's side of the transaction. Because the Brokerage refused to disburse any of the commission to Dalton, he filed a complaint seeking his share of the commission. The trial court found that, based on the customary and contractual commission split at TRP, Dalton is entitled to $34,090 for acting as the buyer's agent. The court also found that Dalton was entitled to $2,000 for his efforts in listing real property for the Brokerage. Accordingly, the trial court awarded Dalton a total judgment of $36,090. The Brokerage appeals. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. Glenn V. (“Grandfather”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of his son, Christopher V. (“Father”), and Makara G. (“Mother”) to their minor children, Karissa and Makilee (“the Children”). After a trial, the Trial Court terminated Father’s and Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. The Trial Court also granted Grandfather’s motion for adoption. Father and Mother filed appeals to this Court. We, inter alia, reverse the ground of failure to visit with respect to both parents. We also reverse the ground of failure to support with respect to Mother. However, we affirm the ground of failure to support with respect to Father. We find further that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a negligence action filed by the plaintiff employee in June 2010, pursuant to the Federal Employer Liability Act ("FELA"), see 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2012), against his former employer, the defendant railroad. The employee, who had worked for the railroad for thirty-nine years in a variety of positions, alleged that he suffered bilateral rotator cuff tears as a result of the railroad‘s negligence in failing to provide him with proper equipment while he worked as a foreman flagman from January 2007 through March 2009. In February 2012, the railroad filed a motion for summary judgment based on the three-year statute of limitations provided in 45 U.S.C. § 56. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in April 2012 but stated that it would reconsider if presented with additional evidence. The railroad subsequently filed additional motions for summary judgment in January 2014, reasserting the statute-of-limitations defense and asserting that the employee could not prove his claim due to an alleged lack of expert testimony regarding medical causation and an alleged inability to demonstrate the railroad‘s liability through expert testimony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motions for summary judgment as to the statute of limitations and medical causation. The court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the railroad based on the employee‘s lack of expert testimony regarding liability. The employee has appealed the judgment, and the railroad has raised an issue regarding the statute of limitations. Having determined that under the circumstances of this action, the employee presented evidence that created a material factual dispute as to whether the railroad negligently contributed to his injuries, we reverse the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment. We affirm the trial court‘s judgment in all other respects.

In this case involving the Last Will and Testament of Sandra Kay Christian, we construe a provision in her will in order to determine the interests of the parties with respect to real property owned by her. The deceased passed away on November 15, 2012. Her will contains a residuary clause. That clause devises two-fifths of the residue of her estate to Phyllis Midgett, Ms. Christian's sister. The will contains a separate provision that permits the deceased's nephews, John Reuben Christian, III and Ashley Paul Christian (the Nephews), to purchase her residence. The will provides that, in the event the Nephews elect to purchase the property, they will pay the deceased's niece, Regina Christian Dykes (the Niece), an amount that would make her share of the estate equal to theirs. The Nephews expressed their intent to purchase the residence. Ms. Midgett brought this action seeking a declaration that she has a two-fifths interest in the residence property. The trial court found the will provision at issue to be unambiguous. Consequently, the court held that Midgett has no interest in the residence property. The court directed Nephews to pay one-third of the value of the property to the Niece. Midgett appeals. We affirm

This appeal concerns a mother’s petition to modify an agreed order granting custody of her two minor children to their maternal grandparents. The trial court determined that the mother was entitled to invoke the doctrine of superior parental rights because it concluded that the previous order was a temporary custody order. The court then awarded the mother custody of her children. The grandparents seek review of the trial court’s decision, first, to deny the grandparent’s request for a continuance to secure new counsel and, second, to allow the mother a presumption of superior parental rights. While we disagree that the presumption of superior parental rights applied, we conclude that Mother still demonstrated a material change in circumstances and that a change in custody was in the children’s best interests. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the grandparents’ motion to continue. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant in a health care liability action. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant hospital for medical malpractice, medical battery, and lack of informed consent. The trial court granted a partial directed verdict in favor of the defendant after the plaintiff presented evidence. At the close of all the proof, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on the remaining issues of medical battery and informed consent. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict, in refusing to adopt the plaintiff’s special jury instructions, and in using a confusing special verdict form. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue on appeal in this case is whether the City of Memphis unlawfully assessed a tax on real property located in a newly annexed area of the city in 2012. The plaintiffs are property owners in the annexed area who argue that the city had no authority to assess property taxes in the area for 2012 because its annexation of the area took effect after January 1, 2012. The trial court concluded that the tax was lawful because the City’s annexation of the area took effect before January 1, 2012 and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, father appeals the trial court’s reduction of his parenting time. We reverse the trial court’s reduction of father’s parenting time because the evidence does not support the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan and reinstate the previous parenting plan.

In 2014, the plaintiffs filed this claim against several defendants pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act due to the recording of a forged deed in 2009. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit based on the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

The trial court entered a protective order under Rule 26.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure while the case was ongoing. After the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, the trial court entered an order confirming the dismissal and extending the protective order ―in perpetuity. The defendant did not appeal the final order, but years later filed a motion to modify the protective order. The trial court denied the motion as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to extend the protective order after plaintiffs nonsuited their case. As an issue of first impression, we conclude that the trial court retained jurisdiction to extend and modify its previously entered protective order notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of the underlying action. We further hold that modification of existing protective orders is authorized by the holding in Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tenn. 1996); accordingly, we vacate the trial court‘s denial of defendant‘s motion to modify and remand for reconsideration in light of our supreme court‘s established precedent.

This is an appeal from a jury trial in a will contest. The jury returned a verdict finding that the contested will was valid. The contestants have appealed, raising numerous issues and arguing that the evidence presented does not support the jury’s verdict. We affirm.    

Because the order appealed does not comply with Rule 58 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the order is not a final judgment. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction and this matter must be dismissed.

This is an appeal from an order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her daughter, of whom the Department of Children’s Services acquired custody following a referral of a drug exposed child and two referrals for medical maltreatment and nutritional neglect. The child’s parents were later adjudicated to have committed severe abuse on the child. The Department subsequently petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents, and the court granted the petition on the ground of severe child abuse and after holding that termination of the parents’ rights was in the best interest of the child. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Employee’s employment was terminated for smoking in a company truck in violation of the employer’s rule. Employee’s initial request for unemployment benefits was denied. The Appeals Tribunal affirmed the denial of benefits, but the Commissioner’s Designee later reversed, finding that employee’s conduct was exempt from the definition of misconduct and concluding that the employee was, therefore, not terminated for workrelated misconduct as defined in the unemployment compensation statutes. On appeal to the chancery court, the trial court concluded that evidence in the record supported the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Husband appeals: (1) the denial of his Rule 60.02 motion on the basis of fraud; and (2) the grant of attorney’s fees to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Husband’s Rule 60.02 motion but reverse the grant of attorney’s fees to Wife. We also decline the award of damages to Wife on appeal. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

This is an appeal from an order terminating a Mother’s parental rights to her son. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to have the child declared dependent and neglected when he was observed with burn marks on his thigh and fingers. He was adjudicated to be dependent and neglected, and custody was given to the Department. A petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights was subsequently filed and, following a trial, the court held that Mother had abandoned the child by failing to visit him and by engaging in behavior which exhibited a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare; the court also determined that termination of Mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals, contending that the court erred in holding that termination of her rights was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.  

Because defendant was charged and found guilty of violating a state statute, rather than a municipal ordinance, we conclude that we are without subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Therefore, we must transfer this case to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in accordance with Rule 17 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for further adjudication.

This case originated when the State, acting on behalf of Tanikia Yolanda Hurt (Mother), filed a petition against William George Bulls, III (Father) seeking to have him held in contempt because of his failure to pay child support. A juvenile court magistrate dismissed the State’s petition, finding that Father had paid all of his arrearage. On the day the court dismissed the petition, Mother filed a new pleading, a motion, again seeking a finding of contempt against Father. She once again alleged unpaid support in addition to other matters. This motion was also dismissed. Mother appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of a firefighter’s employment with the City of Memphis. The firefighter appealed his termination to the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission. He also filed a lawsuit in federal district court asserting various causes of action against the City of Memphis and other defendants. After a six-day jury trial in federal court, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The City of Memphis then sought dismissal of the firefighter’s appeal before the Civil Service Commission based on the principles of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. The Civil Service Commission granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The firefighter then sought review in chancery court, and the chancery court upheld the decision of the Civil Service Commission. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.