APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The minor child at the center of this appeal was born on April 3, 2012, in El Paso, Texas. Mother and child moved to Nashville, Tennessee, three months later. Father subsequently moved to Delaware. While living in Delaware, Father pled guilty to two counts of rape and was sentenced to concurrent twenty-five year sentences beginning June of 2013. Mother married Stepfather in late 2013, and in October 2014, Stepfather and Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights and to allow Stepfather to adopt the child. The petition, as amended, alleged abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit or support in the four months prior to Father’s incarceration, and Father’s incarceration under a sentence of ten or more years with the child being under eight years of age as grounds for termination. Following a trial at which Father, who was incarcerated, participated by telephone, the court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and upon a finding that termination was in the child’s best interest; the petition for adoption was also granted. Father appeals the termination of his rights, stating that the court erred in denying a motion to continue so he could appear in person and in determining that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. 

This appeal arises from a two-car accident. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained irreparable damage and that Defendant, the driver of the other vehicle, was 100% at fault. Prior to the commencement of this action, the automobile insurance carrier for Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, paid the lien-holder of Plaintiff’s vehicle $7,852.57, the amount Allstate believed to be the fair market value of the vehicle. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant to recover the balance of the fair market value of her car and damages for loss of use. She also asserted a direct action against Allstate, alleging that Allstate reached a settlement with her lien-holder before exploring the full extent of her damages. The trial court dismissed the direct action against Allstate for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), because Tennessee law does not permit a direct action against an insured’s insurance carrier “without first establishing that the insured . . . has become ‘legally obligated’ to pay damages.” Ferguson v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 42, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Seymour v. Sierra, 98 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). Following the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Allstate, the trial court summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant upon the finding that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the fair market value was more than Allstate paid on behalf of Defendant. The court also summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for the loss of use of her car, because it could not be repaired and she never sought to rent a replacement vehicle. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

In this dispute among competing battery distribution companies, the plaintiff companies appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and its employees. The plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim on jurisdictional grounds. Having determined that the trial court granted summary judgment without stating the legal basis for its decision prior to instructing the defendants' counsel to prepare a template for the court's order, we conclude that the trial court failed to fully comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. We therefore vacate the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. We affirm the trial court‟s denial of the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the defendants' motion for summary judgment in compliance with Rule 56.04 and of the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery.

This appeal involves an in rem forfeiture proceeding which was initiated after the appellant’s property was seized as proceeds of illegal drug sales. The appellant did not file a claim in the forfeiture proceedings. On appeal, she asserts that she was denied due process because she did not receive notice of the forfeiture proceedings. The record does not support the appellant’s assertion that she was not afforded adequate notice. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court forfeiting the appellant’s interest in the seized property.

This appeal pertains to an effort to set aside a default judgment. M.V. (Mother) filed a petition seeking a restraining order against M.A.G. (Father) and modification of their permanent parenting plan. Father was served with Mother’s petition. He did not file a response. Mother later filed a motion for a default judgment and mailed the same to Father. He did not respond or attend the noticed hearing. At the hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s proffered permanent parenting plan and awarded her attorney’s fees. The court mailed the final judgment to Father. Father then moved to set aside the judgment, claiming, in part, that he had not received Mother’s motion for default. The trial court denied his request after finding that the motion for default was mailed to Father’s address on file with the court and that Father had not asserted just cause as to why the final judgment should be set aside. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

This case arises from the sale of the assets of a small cable television system. DirecTV program channels constituted the majority of the system’s programming. Three years after the sale, DirecTV stopped providing its programming signal to the cable system, claiming the signal had been obtained illegally. The buyer of the cable system filed suit against DirecTV for breach of contract and defamation. After reaching a settlement with DirecTV, the buyer filed this action against the seller of the cable system, seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud and a declaratory judgment that the promissory note the buyer had executed as part of the purchase was not yet due and payable. The seller filed a counterclaim, seeking payment of the promissory note. After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the buyer’s claims against the seller. The court also dismissed the seller’s counterclaim under the doctrine of unclean hands. After a review of the record, we conclude that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the doctrine of unclean hands barred the seller’s counterclaim. Accordingly, we affirm.

Father appeals the modification of a parenting plan, which changed the designation of primary residential parent to Mother and decreased Father’s parenting time. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of factual findings in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.

This appeal arises from a will contest. The witnesses to the will failed to sign the body of the will, but they signed the self-proving affidavit in the presence of the testator. After the will was admitted to probate in common form, the contestants filed a complaint challenging the validity of the will. The contestants later filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the decedent did not comply with the execution requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, because the witnesses did not sign the body of the will. The trial court granted the motion based on In re Estate of Bill Morris, No. M2014-00874-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 557970 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015), holding that a will is not validly executed if the witnesses sign only the self-proving affidavit. The executor appealed. While this appeal was pending, the General Assembly passed an amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, which states that wills executed prior to July 1, 2006, satisfy Tennessee’s due execution requirements if the witnesses to the will signed the self-proving affidavit. In this appeal, both parties ask this Court to determine whether the newly enacted amendment applies and, if so, whether it comports with Tennessee’s constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws. But for a few exceptions, we will not consider issues the parties did not present to the trial court. Because the General Assembly enacted this amendment while this appeal was pending, the trial court has not had the opportunity to consider these issues. In order to afford the trial court that opportunity, we vacate the judgment declaring the will invalid. Further, we remand to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the petition to admit the will to probate and to reinstate the amended complaint challenging the will, which will give the parties the opportunity to present these issues to the trial court.

A purchaser of property filed a complaint against numerous individuals asserting intentional interference with its business relationships and tortious interference with its contracts based on the individuals' alleged misconduct aimed at preventing the development of the property the purchaser was attempting to acquire. The defendants filed motions to dismiss based on Tennessee Rules of Procedure 10.03 and 12.02(6), which the trial court granted. The trial court also awarded the defendants their attorneys' fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-1003(c). The plaintiff appealed, and we find the plaintiff properly stated a claim for tortious interference with business relationships and civil conspiracy; the plaintiff did not state a claim for tortious interference with contracts; and the defendants are not entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees at this stage of the proceedings.

This is a premises liability case filed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Appellant was walking down a sidewalk when she fell and sustained injuries. She and her husband brought suit alleging that she fell because the sidewalk was in a dangerous and defective condition due to the negligence of the City of Newbern. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the sidewalk in question was in a defective condition and that the upkeep of the sidewalk was the responsibility of the City of Newbern. However, the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that the sidewalk was the cause of the fall. The trial court issued a memorandum opinion and final judgment order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm.

In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the rights of S.J.C.P. (Mother) with respect to her children, S.D.P. and C.D.P. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court held that termination of Mother’s rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

A landowner granted a perpetual easement over a portion of her real property to a telecommunications tower company. According to the contracting parties’ agreement, the landowner agreed to have the property subject to the easement (“Easement Property”) separately assessed for real property taxes so that the tax obligations could be paid by the company. After the landowner’s real property was separately assessed as two tax parcels, the company timely paid all real property taxes due on the Easement Property, but the landowner failed to pay real property taxes on the remainder of the tract. As a result, the larger parcel was sold to the county at a tax sale and later transferred to a third-party purchaser. Said purchaser thereafter refused to allow the telecommunications company access to the Easement Property. The company filed the instant action, seeking to have its easement declared valid and requesting an injunction to prevent the third-party purchaser from interfering with the easement. The company subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, determining that the easement was valid but declaring the third-party purchaser to be the owner of the Easement Property. The third-party purchaser timely appealed. Determining the underlying tax sale to be invalid, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the company and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Father and stepmother petitioned to terminate the parental rights of mother to her two children. We have determined that the petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that mother’s actions prior to her incarceration exhibited wanton disregard for the welfare of the children and that it is in the best interest of the children for mother’s parental rights to be terminated.

The plaintiff filed this health care liability action on behalf of herself and her deceased husband, alleging that his death was caused by the negligent care he received from the defendant hospital and physicians. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims because she failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(D) and (E). The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment of dismissal

This appeal involves the interpretation of a declaration of covenants for a homeowners’ association. Appellant, the homeowners’ association, filed liens on lots owned by Appellee for nonpayment of association fees. Appellee brought suit to quiet title and for damages for slander of title. The trial court dismissed the slander of title claim and interpreted the declaration of covenants to exempt Appellee from the payment of association fees. The trial court removed the liens filed against Appellee’s lots, but assessed no monetary damages against Appellant. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a determination by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Department”) that Concord Enterprises of Knoxville, Inc. (“Concord”), a pet grooming business, misclassified certain employees as independent contractors from 2006 through 2011 and, therefore, was liable for unpaid unemployment taxes from that period. Following a hearing, the Appeals Tribunal concluded that unemployment taxes were due, a decision affirmed by the Commissioner’s Designee. Concord petitioned for judicial review. The Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) affirmed the decision of the Commissioner’s Designee and dismissed Concord’s petition. Concord appeals to this Court. We find, inter alia, that the pet groomers at issue both performed their service at Concord’s place of business and performed pet grooming service that fell squarely within Concord’s course of usual business. Evidence both substantial and material supports the agency’s determination. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an appeal from the denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from judgment. On August 17, 2015, the trial court entered an order allowing Appellants’ counsel to withdraw. The order also provided Appellants thirty days to retain new counsel. Approximately one week after the order was entered, the case came up on a regularly scheduled docket call and was set for trial in November 2015. Although notice of the trial setting was sent to Appellants, they allege they never received it. The trial was held in the absence of Appellants, and a judgment was entered against them. Two months after the judgment was entered, Appellants filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion finding that there was no inadvertence, surprise or mistake that would justify the relief sought. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Kelly D. Bush and Byron V. Bush, DDS (“the Bushes”) appeal the December 7, 2015 order of the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing their suit against Commerce Union Bank d/b/a Reliant Bank (“Reliant”). We find and hold that the doctrine of prior suit pending applies to this case, and therefore, the Trial Court correctly dismissed this suit. We affirm.

A woman died in a multi-vehicle accident. Two wrongful death actions were filed, one by the woman’s daughter, the other by the woman’s husband. The daughter’s suit named the husband and others as defendants. The husband’s suit named one of the other drivers as the only defendant. The trial court dismissed the daughter’s complaint, holding that Tennessee’s wrongful death statute creates only one cause of action and that the husband, as the surviving spouse, was granted priority to prosecute the action under the statute. The daughter appeals the dismissal of her complaint. Because the husband is unable to name himself as a defendant in the suit he has filed, he is not able to prosecute the wrongful death action in a manner consistent with the right of the decedent to sue all wrongdoers whose actions are alleged to have led to her death; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing the daughter’s complaint, reinstate the complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings.

A musician/composer borrowed money from a bank and assigned performance royalties as collateral. He later filed for bankruptcy, and his debt to the bank was discharged. The bank, however, continued to collect royalties during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. The musician/composer filed suit against the bank seeking recovery of the royalties collected by the bank after the filing of the bankruptcy petition based on theories of unjust enrichment and conversion. The musician/composer also sought damages from the bank for violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bank moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion. Because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, we vacate the decision of the trial court.      

This appeal arises from a dispute over a residential parenting schedule. Joshua Parker (“Father”) filed a petition against Anna Marsh (“Mother”) in the Juvenile Court for Sumner County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to modify the parenting plan regarding their minor child, Maddox (“the Child”). Mother filed a counter-petition. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court made certain modifications to the existing parenting plan but otherwise left it in place. Mother appeals to this Court, arguing in part that the Juvenile Court should have established specific days each month that Father may exercise visitation with the Child. Father, an airline pilot, has a shifting work schedule. We hold that Mother’s requested schedule would have the practical effect of unduly limiting the Child’s time with Father and that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s requested modification. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

This appeal arises from a civil action in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Defendants appeal contending the trial court committed reversible error by limiting their impeachment of Plaintiff regarding three felony convictions. After applying the balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 to determine if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court allowed Defendants “to question the plaintiff about whether he has been convicted of three felonies” but barred any questions about “the details regarding the nature of the convictions, types of convictions or the facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions.” The dispositive issue is whether a party to a civil action has an absolute right under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 to impeach a witness with evidence of prior felony convictions including the details regarding the nature of his convictions, the types of convictions, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions. Defendants contend the evidence was admissible as a matter of right under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609; therefore, the trial court did not have the discretion to conduct a balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. Having determined that the trial judge had the discretion to conduct a balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 and that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of Defendants’ impeachment of Plaintiff, we affirm.