APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A prison inmate appeals the trial court’s decision to appoint a limited conservator for healthcare decisions over the inmate and give the conservator the authority to consent to the forcible treatment on behalf of the inmate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this case, Benjamin Buffington (“Mr. Buffington”), is a former member of Legacy & Exit Planning, LLC (“Legacy”). Mr. Buffington sued the Appellants on the basis that they had not made certain required contractual payments incident to his departure from Legacy. In response, the Appellants asserted various counterclaims predicated upon Mr. Buffington’s acquisition of a company that had been a former client of a company affiliated with Legacy. The trial court dismissed the Appellants’ counterclaims upon Mr. Buffington’s motion for partial summary judgment, and following a trial, it held that the Appellants were jointly and severally liable for the outstanding payments owed to Mr. Buffington. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This case primarily concerns the interpretation of a legal separation agreement that was approved by the trial court as part of a decree of legal separation. After the husband failed to pay child and spousal support, the wife filed a petition for contempt and modification. The husband responded by, among other things, requesting a divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce, reformed the provisions of the legal separation agreement, awarded a judgment for child and spousal support arrearages, and held the husband in criminal contempt. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the legal separation agreement; in awarding the wife a judgment for child and spousal support arrearages; in granting his request for a divorce; and in holding him in criminal contempt. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

This is a health care liability action wherein a trial by jury resulted in judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions in limine, which restricted plaintiffs’ ability to adequately cross-examine defendants’ expert witnesses regarding the “best possible care”; (2) the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions in limine, which restricted plaintiffs’ ability to present evidence relating to medical expenses; (3) the trial court failed to give a curative instruction after defendants’ opening statement; and (4) the weight of the evidence was against the jury verdict. The trial court denied the post-trial motion and affirmed the jury verdict as the thirteenth juror. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights and to adopt filed by the child’s grandparents. The trial court found that no ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence and therefore denied the petition. The grandparents appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.      

Plaintiff was a partner of a physician practice and a limited partner in a real estate investment limited partnership. Continuing employment with the physician practice was a condition of remaining a limited partner. Following the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with the physician group, Plaintiff, the physician group, and the limited partnership entered into a Separation Agreement. The limited partnership agreed not to redeem Plaintiff’s interest in the limited partnership if he did not expand his practice outside Giles and Hickman Counties. Plaintiff began practicing outside these counties, and the limited partnership redeemed Plaintiff’s interest. Plaintiff objected and filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. The trial court granted the limited partnership’s motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

This is a post-divorce matter in which Ms. Parsons filed a petition for civil and criminal contempt against her former husband, Mr. Parsons. Ms. Parsons argues that Mr. Parsons unilaterally modified the terms of their divorce by failing to compensate her for what she alleges to be a vested interest in his federal retirement benefits. At the conclusion of Ms. Parsons’ direct examination, Mr. Parsons moved for dismissal on the ground that Ms. Parsons did not elect whether she was seeking civil or criminal contempt at the outset of the proceedings. The trial court dismissed Ms. Parsons’ petition for contempt, finding that she did not prove contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court used the wrong legal standard and did not allow Ms. Parsons to complete her proof, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his suit for lack of prosecution, asserting that the trial court failed to rule on several dispositive motions. Upon a review of the record, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand the case for a hearing on the pending motions.

This appeal arises from the certification of a class. Numerous individuals (“Plaintiffs”), some next of kin and some who had contracted for funerals of loved ones, filed suit against certain funeral homes (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the funeral homes abandoned human remains to an unlicensed cemetery, Galilee Memorial Gardens (“Galilee”), where the remains were disposed of improperly. Plaintiffs sought to bring their claims, which include breach of contract and a request for equitable relief, as a class. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted class certification. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion, and we find no error by the Trial Court in granting class certification. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

On October 3, 2015, the Jefferson County Sheriff filed a petition in the Jefferson County Juvenile Court requesting the court to “make inquiry into” an alleged violation of the adult crime of first degree murder by B.T., an eleven-year-old boy. The juvenile court initially set an adjudicatory hearing for October 28, 2015, but the court later granted two continuances at the request of the State. B.T. filed a petition for writ of certiorari and motion to dismiss in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County seeking dismissal of the petition against him on the basis that the juvenile court erred in granting the continuances. On January 6, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing on the respondent’s filings. The court took the matter under advisement pending the juvenile court’s adjudicatory hearing scheduled for January 22, 2016. B.T. appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action to recover for emotional injuries allegedly sustained when the decedent/defendant’s automobile drove into Plaintiff’s business, struck a gas meter, and started a fire, which destroyed the business. The Plaintiff filed suit alleging causes of action for negligence and negligence per se and sought damages for emotional distress. The Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that Tennessee law does not recognize a cause of action for emotional injuries arising out of damage to or loss of property. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, finding that Plaintiff did not establish that the injury was the proximate and foreseeable result of the Defendant’s negligence. The court dismissed the remaining claim on the basis of the prior suit pending doctrine due to a pending interpleader action filed by Defendant’s liability insurer. Plaintiff appeals; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the modification of an agreed parenting plan under which the child’s mother was the primary residential parent. After the father obtained an injunction to prevent Mother from homeschooling the child, the mother sought to obtain sole decision-making authority. The father then filed a petition seeking to be named primary residential parent and sole decision maker. The juvenile court granted both of the father’s requests and denied the mother’s request. The court also placed several limitations on the mother’s visitation and enjoined her use of social media and from making disparaging remarks about the father to the child or in the child’s presence. We conclude that certain of the restrictions placed on Mother’s communications were overly broad or vague. Accordingly, we modify the injunction the juvenile court placed on Mother’s communications. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.  

In this divorce case, Ed Street (Husband) appeals the trial court’s division of property, arguing that he should not have been assigned all of the debt associated with the business assets awarded to him. Husband also asserts that the trial court erred in granting Jane Bingham Street (Wife) an award of monthly alimony in futuro of $2,000. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Father appeals an order of the trial court setting current child support, awarding retroactive child support, and changing the child’s last name to a hyphenated name comprised of Father and Mother’s surnames. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.     

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (2) persistence of conditions. Because the grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, we affirm and remand.

Ronald G. Freeze and Carla R. Freeze (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). The Trial Court found and held that material misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs on their application for property owner’s insurance increased the risk of loss thereby causing the insurance policy to be void pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103. We find and hold that Tennessee Farmers made a properly supported motion for summary judgment showing that Plaintiffs could not establish an essential element of their claim for insurance benefits, and that Plaintiffs failed to show that there were genuine disputed issues of material fact. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers.

This is the third appeal in this suit; on remand from the prior appeal the court considered whether a discovery sanction previously imposed upon Plaintiffs was reasonable and the amount of damages to be awarded Defendants for defending the previous appeal, which was deemed frivolous. The trial court upheld the discovery sanction and awarded Defendants $8,488.50 in damages for the prior appeal. Plaintiffs appeal, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in affirming the prior sanction and in making the award for the frivolous appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court; we declare this appeal frivolous and remand the case for a determination of damages.

American Plastics Technologies, Inc. (APT) and RAO Design, International, Inc. (RDI) (collectively the Plaintiffs) brought this action in the trial court seeking to enroll an Illinois judgment against National Partitions (NP). The judgment had been awarded by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. NP filed an answer questioning the jurisdiction of the Illinois court. NP coupled its answer with a counterclaim asserting that the Plaintiffs had been guilty of the initial breach of the contract. Following a hearing, the trial court decreed registration of the Illinois judgment and ultimately dismissed NP‘s counterclaim. NP appeals. We affirm

Appellants appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to recuse on the ground that the trial court conducted an impermissible ex parte communication with counsel for the opposing party. The dispute in this case stems from Appellants’ pursuit of several documents that the opposing party claimed were privileged. In the course of hearing proof on the claimed privilege, the trial court announced its intention to conduct an ex parte hearing concerning the documents with only the opposing party present. Appellants did not object to the hearing. After the hearing was conducted, however, Appellants moved to recuse the trial judge on the basis that he had engaged in prohibited ex parte communications. The trial court promptly denied the recusal motion. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

Plaintiff James R. Goan’s mail delivery vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Billy B. Mills as Plaintiff was delivering mail. The Plaintiff and his wife, Judy Goan, sued Mills. During settlement negotiations, Plaintiffs offered to settle for $100,000, the limits of Defendant’s insurance policy. Defendant accepted the offer on December 4, 2013. Over a year later, Defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that there had been no meeting of the minds and no enforceable agreement. The trial court enforced the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions. Because the record does not contain an adjudicatory order of dependency and neglect, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions. We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment and on the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

The father of two children appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit them within the four month period preceding his incarceration and by engaging in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment in all respects.