APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

About a year after the parties’ divorce, the mother, who had been named primary residential parent, decided to move to Murfreesboro.  Alleging that her move constituted a material change in circumstance, she filed a petition in the divorce court requesting a change in the residential parenting schedule.  Because she planned to move less than fifty miles, the mother asserted that the parental relocation statute did not apply.  But, in case the court disagreed, the mother also asked the court to approve the move.  In response, the father filed a counter-petition seeking to change either the primary residential parent designation or the parenting schedule.  After a hearing, the trial court denied both modification petitions.  And although the court agreed that the parental relocation statute did not apply, the court ordered the mother to remain in Sumner County, Tennessee.  The mother has appealed the court’s restriction on her ability to move.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court had no legal basis for prohibiting the mother from moving.  So we reverse that part of the court’s order.   

This appeal arises from Father’s Petition for Custody and/or Visitation with the parties’ only child. The juvenile court granted the petition following an evidentiary hearing and established a parenting plan and parenting schedule. Mother appeals contending, inter alia, the evidence does not support the court’s findings and ultimate rulings. We have determined that both parties’ briefs are profoundly deficient. Moreover, because Mother failed to provide a transcript of the evidence or a statement of the evidence, there is a conclusive presumption that there was sufficient evidence before the juvenile court to support its judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

L.D. (mother) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her children S.D., S.B.D., and M.D. Both mother and father were convicted of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and statutory rape. On September 28, 2007, the criminal court ordered them to serve an effective twelve-year sentence. After serving less than one year, mother was granted probation and subsequently regained custody of her two older children. Later, mother gave birth to M.D. Still later, mother violated probation and returned to jail in July of 2011. Petitioners filed a petition to terminate parental rights, and for adoption of the children. The trial court terminated mother’s rights to S.D. and S.B.D. on the ground that she was incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years, and the subject children were under eight years old at the time of the sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) (2017). The court further held that mother had abandoned all three children by failing to visit and support them during the four months immediately preceding her re-incarceration following her probation violation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1); 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). We affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding S.D. and S.B.D. pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating mother’s rights with respect to M.D. on the ground of abandonment, because the proof at trial fails to demonstrate abandonment for the entirety of the pertinent four-month period.

The petitioner was convicted of rape in 1988, served a six month sentence of incarceration, and successfully completed five and a half years of probation; in 2016 he was advised that he was required to register as a sex offender. After registering, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act of 2004, as written and as applied to him, and requested that he not be required to register as a sex offender. The court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our de novo review, we reverse the dismissal of his as-applied challenge to the Act and remand the case for further proceedings; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Mark Pintaure and Patricia Pintaure (plaintiffs) sued Andrew Farmer and Mariah Farmer (defendants) for breach of a lease agreement. Plaintiffs, the landlords, leased a residence to defendants under a six-month lease agreement. Defendants counterclaimed for alleged breach of contract, violation of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and fraud. Following a bench trial, the court awarded plaintiffs $2,256 in damages and dismissed the counterclaim. Because the lease provides for an award of attorney’s fees, the trial court initially awarded plaintiffs a fee of $694. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that the attorney’s fee they had paid was significantly higher. After plaintiff’s counsel submitted an affidavit and documentation of time spent on the case, the trial court awarded plaintiffs an additional $500 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court’s award was unreasonably low. Because the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was unsupported by a finding of reasonableness or analysis of the required factors provided in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 1.5, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal concerns the potential dissolution of an LLC under the Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act due to the bankruptcy of one of its members. The trial court held that the LLC was not dissolved under the Act because neither section 48-245-101(a)(5)(G) nor 48-245-101(b) of the Tennessee Code applied to the LLC. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant sued the City of Jackson, Tennessee, after Appellant’s commercial building was damaged by flooding. Appellant stated claims, under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, for temporary and permanent nuisance, trespass, negligence, and gross negligence. Appellant also sought relief for inverse condemnation and equitable relief under a theory of nuisance. On a grant of summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the GTLA claims, finding that the City’s immunity to suit was not removed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the City on the inverse condemnation and nuisance claims. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and to visit. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm

A teacher dismissed from his teaching position filed suit against the school system and the chief human resources officer for libel and breach of contract. The trial court denied the teacher’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint and granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to both claims. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

In this wrongful dismissal case, Sonya Brooks (“Brooks”) sued her former employer Roane County and county officials Ron Woody and Gloria Wright (“Defendants”). In a March 9, 2017 order, the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Brooks’ lawsuit against Defendants with prejudice. The Trial Court reserved taxation of costs for a later date. Brooks filed a notice of appeal on January 10, 2018. Defendants argue that Brooks’ appeal was filed untimely. Brooks contends that the March 9, 2017 order was not final and appealable because it reserved the issue of costs. We hold that, in keeping with longstanding Tennessee case law, taxation of costs is incidental and not a factor in determining whether a judgment is final. As Brooks’ notice of appeal was not filed timely, we are constrained to dismiss her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This post-divorce dispute concerns the enforcement of a retirement benefits provision in a marital dissolution agreement. After the defendant retired, he refused to pay any portion of his retirement benefits to his ex-wife based on his interpretation of their marital dissolution agreement. His ex-wife disagreed with his interpretation and petitioned the trial court to enforce their agreement. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion and granted his ex-wife’s cross-motion. Upon review, we affirm the trial court in all respects and award the ex-wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

A motor vehicle accident on the roadway abutting a truck stop resulted in the death of the plaintiff’s husband. The driver of the vehicle turning left into the truck stop was using the entrance meant for semi-trailer trucks and had a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested a short distance ahead. The plaintiff filed a negligence claim against the truck stop owners and operators, asserting they created a hazardous condition by failing to place visible signage on their property directing passenger vehicles to the appropriate entrance. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending they owed no duty to the traveling public because the collision occurred on a municipal road, not on their property. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment, holding that a balancing test is required to determine whether the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff’s husband and that dismissing the complaint is premature at this stage of the proceedings.

Ex-husband filed a petition for modification of alimony of $1,000 each month to ex-wife, claiming a material and substantial change in circumstances. Ex-wife filed a counter petition to increase the alimony. The trial court found that neither party met their burden of proof and awarded attorney’s fees to the ex-wife for the expense of defending exhusband’s petition. Ex-husband subsequently filed two motions to alter or amend. The trial court denied both of these motions and awarded additional attorney’s fees to ex-wife for defending the motions. Ex-husband timely appeals. We affirm.

I concur in the affirmance of the Circuit Court for Hamilton County’s denial of the petition of Dr. Kerry Douglas Friesen for modification of his alimony obligation and the award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Beverley Joy Friesen. I write separately to address the authority under which the trial court awarded attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant on a premises liability claim. Because the plaintiff offered no evidence to support an essential element of her premises liability claim at the summary judgment stage, we affirm.

This opinion is being filed contemporaneously with our opinion in Cox v. Lucas, No. E2017-02264-COA-R3-CV. Each case involves a custody dispute between Laura Nicole Lucas (mother) and one of her two ex-husbands. In the present case, Lewis Alvin Minyard (father) filed a petition in the trial court for ex parte emergency relief and modification of the permanent parenting plan. Over two and a half years later, mother filed a motion to dismiss all orders resulting from father’s petition as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother argued that father’s petition included allegations of dependency and neglect, which implicated the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied mother’s motion. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This opinion is being filed contemporaneously with our opinion in Minyard v. Lucas, No. E2017-02261-COA-R3-CV.1 Each case involves a post-divorce custody dispute between Laura Nicole Lucas (mother) and one of her two ex-husbands. In the present case, Bradley James Cox (father) filed a petition in the trial court for ex parte emergency relief and modification of the permanent parenting plan. Nearly two years later, mother filed a motion to dismiss all orders resulting from father’s petition as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother argued that father’s petition included allegations of dependency and neglect, which implicated the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied mother’s motion. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and persistence of conditions. The father appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that it was not in the child’s best interest for his rights to be terminated. We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating the father’s rights based on persistence of conditions because the child was not removed from the father’s home by an order of the court, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) requires. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Plaintiff real estate developer appeals the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants on claims of tortious interference with a contract, inducement of breach of contract, and promissory fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to construct any argument responsive to the stated basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we affirm. 

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

Father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

I concur in the conclusion that the Circuit Court for Davidson County correctly denied the petition of Ms. Nancy Maureen Jarman to increase her alimony.  But I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Jarman.  I share the view of Franklin N. Jarman that the trial court lacked the authority to award attorney’s fees in this instance.

This case involves a petition to modify a parenting plan to change the primary residential parent. The father sought to be designated as the primary residential parent, citing to the children’s excessive absenteeism from school while in the mother’s care. The trial court agreed and found that, while the children were doing well in school, they could be doing better and would be less stressed without the problem of their excessive absenteeism. We reverse, finding that the mother had remedied the children’s excessive absenteeism from school prior to trial and that the prior absenteeism does not rise to the level of a material change in circumstance warranting a modification of the parenting plan so as to change the designation of the primary residential parent from mother to father.

After the plaintiff’s father was killed by an armed security guard, she filed a wrongful death action against the security guard’s employer. The complaint alleged both vicarious and direct liability and sought an award of compensatory and punitive damages. The employer maintained that the guard acted in self-defense. After the first trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. But the trial court ordered a new trial based on errors in the calculation of damages. A second jury verdict apportioned the greater proportion of fault to the decedent, resulting in a defense judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court made numerous errors in the conduct of the second trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error. So we affirm.