APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a plaintiff with a personal injury claim who has challenged the validity of a declaratory judgment involving the defendant tortfeasor and his insurer because the personal injury plaintiff was not made a party to the declaratory judgment action. The personal injury plaintiff brought an action for damages against the defendant tortfeasor in December 2013 in Hamilton County, prior to the filing of the instant declaratory judgment action, based upon an automobile accident that occurred in December 2012. The defendant tortfeasor in the personal injury action reportedly failed to notify his insurance company of the lawsuit or cooperate with his insurance company regarding an investigation into the accident, which allegedly amounted to a breach of the automobile insurance policy between them. In March 2015, the insurance company filed the instant action in the Bradley County Chancery Court against the defendant tortfeasor, seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurance company had no duty to defend or indemnify the defendant tortfeasor based on his alleged breach of the insurance contract. In June 2015, the Bradley County Chancery Court entered a declaratory judgment against the defendant tortfeasor, holding that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify him. In June 2017, the personal injury plaintiff filed a petition to set aside that declaratory judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, alleging that she was a missing indispensable party to the declaratory judgment action and requesting to intervene therein. Following a hearing, the Bradley County Chancery Court denied the personal injury plaintiff’s petition. The personal injury plaintiff has appealed. Having determined that the personal injury plaintiff had a sufficient interest in the declaratory judgment action and was therefore an indispensable party, we set aside the underlying declaratory judgment as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal concerns visitation and parenting responsibilities following a divorce. The trial court granted decision-making authority over both children, a son and a daughter, to the father. After granting both parties 50/50 visitation with the son, the court awarded the father most of the visitation time with the daughter. The mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A manufacturer of military uniforms entered into an agreement with its supplier of fabric and the manufacturer’s bank whereby the bank would disburse funds from the manufacturer’s account to pay invoices for fabric the supplier shipped to the manufacturer. After several months, the supplier learned that the process for paying the invoices was not being followed and sent the bank the unpaid invoices directly and demanded payment. The manufacturer filed a declaratory judgment action, naming the supplier and the bank as defendants, and asked the court to determine the “rights, status or other legal relations” under the agreement. The supplier filed a crossclaim against the bank, asserting claims for breach of the disbursement agreement, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), fraud in the inducement of contracting, and civil conspiracy to commit fraud in the inducement. The court granted summary judgment to the bank on all of the supplier’s claims except the civil conspiracy claim; the supplier appeals. Upon a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.  

This appeal concerns an employee who made preparations to start a competing business while still employed by his old company. Todd Heins (“Heins”) was a manager working for Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc. (“Leslie’s”), a nationwide pool supply business, at its Bartlett Hills location in the Memphis, Tennessee area. Jay Karcher (“Karcher”), while a customer in Leslie’s Bartlett Hills store, approached Heins one day while he was working with an idea about starting a new pool supply business. Heins was intrigued and followed up with Karcher to found Blue Wave Pool Supply of Memphis, LLC (“Blue Wave”). Heins resigned from Leslie’s before Blue Wave opened for business. Heins’ friend and Leslie’s employee Chad Pitcock (“Pitcock”) also resigned and went to work for Blue Wave. Leslie’s sued Blue Wave, Heins, Pitcock, and Karcher (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) for, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and inducement to breach contract. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Defendants and dismissed Leslie’s complaint with prejudice. Leslie’s appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal results from a jury trial on claims of negligence, medical malpractice, and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act by a nursing home. In addition to finding the limited liability company nursing home liable for the resident’s injuries, the jury awarded extensive compensatory and punitive damages against the nursing home’s related administrative services provider, the nursing home’s parent companies, and the individual members of the parent companies. Defendants appeal, raising a variety of issues related to the jury impaneled, the evidence presented, and the finding of liability against the non-nursing home defendants. We reverse the jury’s decision finding material evidence to subject the nursing home’s parent companies and their members directly or vicariously liable in this case. We affirm the direct liability of the nursing home’s administrative services provider. Because the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury appears to be largely predicated on the liability of the non-nursing home defendants, we vacate the award and remand for a new hearing solely as to the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. In all other respects, the verdict is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Breach of contract and negligence action brought by disabled plaintiff who engaged nonattorney representative to assist in plaintiff’s application for social security disability benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant and denied the plaintiff’s motion to set the judgment aside, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(1). Plaintiff appeals; Determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60.02 motion, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from a detainer action. Brewers Rentals (“Brewers”) obtained a detainer warrant against tenant Otto Karl Appelt (“Appelt”) in the General Sessions Court for Bradley County (“the General Sessions Court”). Appelt thereafter appealed to the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”). Appelt paid a $500 appeal bond. However, Appelt did not post bond equal to one year’s rent as required by statute in order to retain possession during the appeal. Brewers filed a motion to dismiss and/or for possession in the Trial Court, which was granted. The Trial Court held that, as Appelt had neither surrendered possession nor posted the requisite bond, dismissal was required. Appelt appeals. We hold that Appelt’s failure to post bond equal to one year’s rent enables Brewers to regain possession immediately but does not deprive the Trial Court of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Appelt’s appeal. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for this case to proceed.

Appellant filed a Rule 60 motion with the trial court while the matter was pending on appeal. The trial court denied the motion finding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the matter. Appellant appeals the denial of his Rule 60 motion. We affirm the trial court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion at that time.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. The child’s guardians, who had been granted custody of the child, filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court granted the guardians’ petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that four grounds for termination were proven—willful failure to visit, willful failure to provide child support, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions—and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We vacate the trial court’s finding regarding one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the order terminating the father’s parental rights. 

This case involves the last will and testament of the deceased, Joe Marce Abbott. Upon the death of the deceased, his daughter, Marce Harvey, filed a petition in the trial court seeking to probate the deceased’s will. The validity of the will is not contested by any beneficiary or other person. The court, however, apparently acting sua sponte, held that the will failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 32-1-103 (2015), 32-1-104 (Supp. 2017), and 32-2-110 (Supp. 2017). As a consequence of this determination, the court rescinded its previously-entered order to probate because, as the court stated, the will “does not meet the requirement of the Laws of the State of Tennessee.” The petitioner appeals. We reverse.

This action arises out of an incident in which an instructor with the Eagleville High School’s Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps pulled a stool from beneath a student participant in a JROTC competition while the student was sitting on it, causing injury to the student. The student’s parents brought suit against the Rutherford County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for her injuries. Following a trial, the court dismissed the suit, holding that the instructor’s actions were not within the scope of his employment, and therefore, the Board’s immunity from suit was not removed. Plaintiffs appeal. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s holding that the instructor acted outside the scope of his employment, and as a consequence, the Board retained immunity from suit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 

This is an appeal from an Amended Final Decree of Divorce entered on November 15, 2017. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the decree as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The University of Tennessee at Knoxville terminated the employment of Appellant, a tenured faculty member. Appellant appealed his termination to an administrative hearing officer pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Following a contested hearing, the hearing officer upheld the University’s termination of Appellant.  Appellant then petitioned the chancery court to reverse the decision of the hearing officer.  The chancery court upheld the hearing officer’s decision to affirm the termination of Appellant’s employment and tenure. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

This is a case concerning a commercial-property insurance policy dispute. The insured party filed suit upon the insurance company denying theft coverage on a claim. The insurance company claimed that the vacancy clause excluded the theft coverage of the property at issue. The trial court found that the vacancy clause did not apply and that the policy required the insurance company to cover the theft. The insurance company appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed a claim for trespass against the defendants. The trial court found trespass and awarded nominal damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. After a hearing on the parties’ respective motions to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and declined to increase the amount of nominal damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court after the trial court denied a motion for recusal. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

This is a healthcare liability case. Before filing the complaint, the plaintiff gave written notice to the potential defendants of her healthcare liability claim against them. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires that a plaintiff’s pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the healthcare provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is being sent a notice. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on noncompliance with the statute, as the defendants alleged that the HIPAA authorization provided by the plaintiff had already expired when they received it. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the HIPAA authorization was invalid due to the fact that the listed expiration date had already passed when the authorization was provided to the defendants with pre-suit notice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

I concur, reluctantly, with the entirety of the opinion of the Court. I concur because this is the result mandated by statute and case law. I do so reluctantly because this case is the latest in a long line of healthcare liability actions dismissed on technical grounds since the enactment of the sections of the Health Care Liability Act governing pre-suit notice adopted by our General Assembly in 2008. This Court has seen healthcare liability case after case brought by Tennessee citizens dismissed without any determination of whether the case has any merit.

This is a jury case. Appellants sued Appellee, hotel, for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and the Tennessee Identity Theft Deterrence Act (“TITDA”). The trial court granted a pre-trial motion for summary judgment as to Appellants’ TITDA claims. The remaining TCPA claims proceeded to trial, and the trial court delivered a modified jury instruction as a sanction against Appellee for alleged discovery abuse. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. Appellants appeal.  Appellee appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 68. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellee’s costs pursuant to Rule 68; the trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

This case involves claims asserted by a cancer patient against his radiation oncologist, the hospital where he was treated, and the developer of the radiation therapy system used to treat the patient. The patient alleges that the defendants failed to disclose that the treatment posed a risk of radiation damage to surrounding tissue and organs and misrepresented the safety of the treatment, such that he would not have agreed to undergo the treatment if he had known of the risks. The patient’s wife also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. All three defendants moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds. The trial court granted summary judgment to each of the defendants, and the patient and his wife appeal. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims against all three defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we vacate in part, affirm as modified, and remand for further proceedings.

The father in this post-divorce dispute challenges the trial court’s determinations regarding his child support arrearage, medical insurance premiums, credits against the arrearage, and attorney fees. Finding no merit to father’s arguments, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Administrator CTA of Decedent’s estate filed a petition, against Decedent’s daughter, to recoup assets of the estate. In the final year of Decedent’s life, Appellant transferred almost $400,000 of Decedent’s assets to herself using a power of attorney she obtained after her brother’s power of attorney was revoked. The trial court determined that the transfers were self-dealing transactions and that Appellant breached her fiduciary duty to Decedent. The trial court entered a judgment against Appellant in the amount of $116,747.85 plus pre-judgment interest. Additionally, the trial court declared the quit claim deed executed in favor of Appellant to be void ab initio. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights. On April 24, 2013, the then threeyear- old child was removed from the parents’ home after a visitor to the home notified the Department of Children Services that he saw the child behind what appeared to be a jail-cell, making only grunting noises. The child has been in foster care ever since. After working with the parents for nearly two years, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights. Following the first trial in October of 2015, both parents’ rights were terminated; however, that decision was vacated and the case remanded “for a new hearing so that a complete transcript may be produced. . . .” Order, In re Charles R., No. M2015-02347-COA-R3-PT (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016). Following a second trial in September and October of 2017, the trial court entered an order on November 21, 2017, terminating both parents’ rights. We affirm.

The parties to a wrongful death action reached a mediated settlement under which the settlement proceeds were divided between the surviving spouse and the deceased’s children. After the settlement agreement was judicially approved and the proceeds disbursed, the trial court ruled that the surviving spouse had waived his right to collect any settlement proceeds. The deceased’s children filed a legal malpractice action against the estate of the attorney who had represented their guardian ad litem in the wrongful death action because he failed to contest the surviving spouse’s standing. As part of the settlement of the legal malpractice action, the children assigned their claims against the surviving spouse to the estate of the attorney. The estate then filed this equitable action
against the surviving spouse and his girlfriend, seeking recovery of the settlement proceeds and a constructive trust on any property purchased with those proceeds. Both the estate and the surviving spouse filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the spouse’s motion but granted the estate summary judgment based on unjust enrichment. We reverse the grant of summary judgment.

Appellant alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against a University and its employees. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Discerning no error, we affirm.