APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After losing in general sessions court, Plaintiff attempted to appeal the judgment to the circuit court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a counterclaim in the circuit court. Plaintiff’s appeal was thereafter dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not perfected in a timely manner. The circuit court then entered a default judgment against the Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the counterclaim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the circuit court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim upon the dismissal of the appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Husband and Wife both appeal the trial court’s ruling with regard to alimony. Based on Husband’s failure to adequately support his arguments with legal authority, his issues are waived. We affirm the trial court’s decision to exclude Wife’s affidavit of income and expenses. We vacate the trial court’s alimony award and remand for the entry of an order that contains specific findings of fact as to Wife’s need and Husband’s ability to pay.

This appeal involves a request for, inter alia, the modification of child support. Because the trial court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are unable to effectively review the issues raised on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Mother filed a petition for modification of the residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan. Father filed a
counter-petition for modification of the permanent parenting plan seeking designation as the primary residential parent of the parties’ two children. After a hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s petition and reduced Father’s parenting time by thirty-seven days based on conduct by Father that necessitated limiting his residential parenting time. Father appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

This appeal arises from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville Civil Service Commission’s decision to suspend and demote Appellant, a police officer with Metropolitan Nashville Police Department. The department’s decision to suspend Appellant was affirmed by the administrative law judge, but the administrative law judge reversed the demotion. The Commission then reviewed the administrative law judge’s order and upheld the suspension but reinstated the demotion. On appeal to the Davidson County Chancery Court, the Commission’s decision was affirmed. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court.

The majority opinion concludes that the Commission’s finding that Officer Davis violated both MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(B) and MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(K) was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence. In reaching its decision concerning MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(B), the majority essentially concludes that consideration of the public authority defense is irrelevant because the only question involved is whether Officer Davis committed the acts that constitute the offense outlined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-301(a), not whether Officer Davis would be able to assert any defense to criminal prosecution of that crime. 

Former employee of the City of Lewisburg brought an action pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act challenging his termination. The trial court held a bench trial and, a year and a half later, entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order, finding in favor of defendant and dismissing the action. The judge who tried the case retired shortly thereafter. Five months later, the employee filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to have the order dismissing the complaint set aside on the grounds that his counsel did not receive the order dismissing the case and that, because the order did not comply with Rule 58, it was not a final order. The motion was heard by a new judge, who ruled that the order substantially complied with Rule 58 and was therefore an effective, final order. The employee appeals. Upon our review, we determine that the order dismissing the case did not comply with Rule 58 and was not a final order. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of a final order that complies with Rule 58.

In this appeal, the father challenges the trial court’s determination of the residential parenting schedule as it relates to visitation during the school term. Upon our review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The owner of four contiguous properties filed unlawful detainer actions against the entities that were occupying the properties. The owner did not name as defendants the individual who signed the lease or his company. A year and a half after the cases were filed, the lessee moved to intervene, claiming that it was entitled to intervene pursuant to Tenn. Rs. Civ. P. 24.01 and/or 24.02 and that it was a necessary party pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. The trial court denied the lessee’s motion on the grounds of prior suit pending and timeliness. The lessee appealed. Because the court failed to address the lessee’s claim that it was a necessary party, we are unable to address that argument on appeal. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 

The father has filed a notice of appeal from a final judgment entered on January 7, 2019. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Nearly three years after a child was placed with them by an unlicensed child placing agency, the child’s guardians petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents. The chancery court found two statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by willful failure to visit and abandonment by willful failure to support. The court also found that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Only the child’s mother appeals. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to each of the alleged statutory grounds. So we reverse the termination of mother’s parental rights.

I concur in the result reached in this very difficult case.

Our holding that the record does not clearly and convincingly establish the grounds for termination means that we do not reach the question of what is in Raeshad’s best interest. The dismissal of the termination proceeding means that Mother and Raeshad retain the parent-child relationship and does not compel his return to her custody. Neither does it necessarily lead to the lack of involvement by the Guardians in his life; it is clear that Raeshad and the Guardians, along with their other children, have formed familial bonds.

A private citizen initiated a proceeding in Shelby County Environmental Court to remove a billboard; the environmental court denied the petition, and the citizen appealed to Circuit Court. That court held that the citizen did not have standing to initiate the action and granted summary judgment to the billboard’s owner. The citizen appeals, contending that he has standing. The undisputed facts show that the Memphis and Shelby County Office of Construction Code Enforcement issued a citation to the billboard’s owner indicating that the billboard violated the Uniform Development Code, and initiated a proceeding in Shelby County General Sessions Court against the billboard owner, which was dismissed and no appeal was taken. We conclude that the fact that a proceeding to remove the billboard was initiated by the City deprives the citizen of standing to enforce the pertinent provisions of the Code himself. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment.

The trial court designated Father primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, and adopted Father’s proposed parenting plan. Mother appeals. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order regarding the designation of the child’s primary residential parent does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The day before a hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution was held, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff did not appear at the hearing the following day. As such, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice. We reverse and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Siblings appeal the trial court’s refusal to set aside a deed conveying real property from their decedent father to their brother. The siblings also appeal the trial court’s denial of their post-trial motion to consider purported newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner commenced this action in the Knox County Circuit Court (“trial court”), naming as respondents his mother, his brother, and a purported family trust. He alleged, inter alia, that his mother and brother had “brought about” the wrongful death of his father and had mishandled trust funds. Additionally, the petitioner requested “financial separation” from familial assets, a money judgment, and injunctive relief to freeze familial assets. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing this action with prejudice upon finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because all parties involved in the matter resided in Campbell County and all acts forming the basis for the petitioner’s claims had occurred in Campbell County. The petitioner has appealed. We determine that although the trial court correctly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court erred by dismissing this action with prejudice. We further determine that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-1-116 (2009), this matter should be transferred to the court wherein jurisdiction lies. We therefore vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and remand for entry of an order transferring this action to the Campbell County Circuit Court.

Charles Stinson and Glenda Stinson (“the Stinsons”) appeal the November 17, 2017 order of the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”) expanding the injunctive relief granted in our Opinion in Stinson v. Mensel, No. M2016-00624-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2972219 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017), no appl. perm. appeal filed. We find and hold that the Trial Court lacked the authority to modify or revise the injunction entered by this Court in the first appeal of this case. We, therefore, vacate the portion of the Trial Court’s November 17, 2017 order modifying the injunction.

In a case involving a long-term marriage, the trial court found that the husband performed most of the household duties and the wife earned most of the income. Moreover, the husband’s earning capacity was substantially less than that of the wife at the time of the divorce. The trial court denied the husband’s request for alimony, and the husband appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to award the husband alimony and reverse and remand that part of the trial court’s decision.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s action in classifying as Husband’s separate property the appreciation in value of shares of stock, arguing that the appreciation in value was marital property. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not show that Wife substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation in value of the stock; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is another appeal arising from the divorce of Corey Daniel Hopwood (“Father”) and Andrea Renea Hopwood (“Mother”). In a previous opinion, we remanded for a new determination concerning the duration and amount of an award to Mother of rehabilitative alimony and the calculation of an award to Mother of attorney’s fees attributable only to child custody and child support issues. The Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Remand Court”) addressed these two issues on remand. Father appeals to this Court, arguing in large part that he simply cannot afford to pay what the Remand Court ordered him to pay. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the Remand Court’s rulings with respect to rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees attributable to child support and child custody. However, we modify the Remand Court’s judgment to reduce the amount of life insurance Father is required to carry to secure his alimony obligation in light of the reduction of his alimony obligation. We further modify the Remand Court’s judgment to eliminate $750 in attorney’s fees assessed against Father for filing an improperly-styled motion when he was acting pro se. The judgment of the Remand Court is affirmed as modified.

This is a divorce case. Wife filed for divorce in February 2017 after twelve years of marriage. Following a three-day trial, the trial court ordered Husband to pay $1000 in transitional alimony to Wife for six months and $500 per month for the following six months. The trial court also entered a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ two minor children naming Husband primary residential parent. Husband received 233 days of parenting time, and Wife received 132 days. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves an alleged contract for the sale of real property. The proposed buyers, who were originally lessees of the property, brought suit to enforce the alleged agreement, seeking specific performance and damages. After a trial, the Maury County Chancery Court held that a contract for the sale of the property did exist and that specific performance of the contract should be awarded. Certain monetary damages were also awarded to the former lessees. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Although we affirm the chancery court’s decision that a valid contract exists and that the contract is properly subject to specific performance, we reverse the award of damages that is challenged on appeal for the reasons stated herein.

The appellees have moved the court to dismiss this appeal as premature. Because multiple motions remain pending in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Tora W. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Kaden W. (“the Child”), who was eleven years old at the time of trial. On January 19, 2017, the Anderson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) found that the Child was dependent and neglected and entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he remained at the time of trial. On December 20, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home for him, (2) Mother had not substantially complied with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.