APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A husband and wife disputed the value of the husband’s business for purposes of equitably dividing the marital estate in their divorce. The trial court adopted a value proposed by the wife’s expert. Because we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

In 2020, a local board of education adopted changes to its student code of conduct requiring, among other things, that teachers participate in a student discipline policy and engage in social and emotional learning support. The local teachers’ association filed suit, arguing that the board of education was required to engage in collaborative conferencing with the teachers’ association before adopting the changes because they constituted “working conditions” under the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011, Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-608(a). The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the teachers’ association. We reverse.

This appeal concerns service of process. Vernon Lowe (“Plaintiff”) sued Elisha Harvey (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. Defendant lives out of state. Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant via the Tennessee Secretary of State. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting insufficient service of process. The attempted service on Defendant occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the signature requirement for return receipt mail was suspended by the postal service. The signature space on the proof of delivery shows “E Harvey” handwritten with “MRC1C19” underneath. Plaintiff does not argue that this represents Defendant’s signature. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his service upon the Secretary of State was sufficient in itself. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

After the death of Calvin Leroy Whitehead, his daughter, Regina Whitehead, petitioned to probate the decedent’s December 2015 will and for permission to sell the decedent’s residence. The probate court admitted the will to probate and letters testamentary were issued to Ms. Whitehead as the executrix. The court also granted permission to sell the residence. Thereafter, the decedent’s step-niece, Elizabeth Otto, filed an intervening petition to probate a purportedly more recent will, from March 2016. The estate answered the petition, alleging fraud and, in its amended answer, requested attorney’s fees in defending the petition. The estate then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the proffered will was a copy, with no explanation as to the absence of the original, that the post-death affidavits were not valid. The day before her scheduled deposition, Ms. Otto filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit of her petition. The estate responded by moving for an assessment of attorney’s fees and costs against Ms. Otto. The trial court then issued an order that dismissed Ms. Otto’s petition and denied the estate’s motion for attorney’s fees in defending the intervening petition. The estate appeals, arguing that the request for attorney’s fees in its motion to dismiss is a claim for affirmative relief that survives the dismissal. The estate also requests attorney’s fees under alternative legal grounds. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the intervening petition and, finding no abuse of discretion, affirm the denial of attorney’s fees. We also deny the estate’s post-appeal Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 motion for sanctions, as well as Ms. Otto’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

To facilitate the sale of two closely held companies, an employee signed a restrictive covenant agreement containing a release provision. After the sale, the employee filed suit against the buyer, the seller, and others involved in the sale, alleging that he had been defrauded out of his ownership interest in the companies. Later, the employee dismissed the corporate defendants and filed an amended complaint reasserting claims against his alleged former co-owners for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the release provision. Concluding that the language of the release was broad enough to encompass the claims in the amended complaint, the court granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm.

This Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”) dispute concerns emails and documents (the “Materials”) requested by Kathleen Marquardt (“Ms. Marquardt”) from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UTK”). Ms. Marquardt argued that the Materials, which include emails pertaining to an article authored by a part-time UTK employee that was published in the Huffington Post, were public records because they were created as a part of the official business of the university in furtherance of its goal of becoming a top-25 university. Following an in camera review of the Materials by the trial court only and a show-cause hearing, the trial court ruled in UTK’s favor, holding that “the requested records do not meet the definition of the [TPRA] statute; that these records were made or received pursuant to law or ordinance, or in [connection] with the transaction of official business by any governmental entity.” Ms. Marquardt challenges this ruling as well as other rulings including the denial of her motion for “an attorney’s eyes only” review of the Materials and the denial of her discovery requests. We affirm.

In the first appeal of this parental termination case, we affirmed the trial court’s findings that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven, but we vacated one ground and the trial court’s best interest determination due to insufficient findings in the termination order. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order containing additional findings. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of parental rights.

This is an appeal of the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her children. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Angela B. (“Mother”) to her two children, Meadow L. and Greyson L. (“the Children”).1 Mother appeals, contesting the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellants fail to identify an error of fact or law for our review, and their brief fails to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Appellee’s request for damages for a frivolous appeal is granted.

This appeal concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Saad Al Qaragholi (“Petitioner”) filed a petition against the Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee (“Respondent”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) challenging tax assessments against him.  Petitioner opted not to pay the tax before proceeding with his challenge.  However, Petitioner failed to timely sign his petition under penalty of perjury as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1801(b)(2).  Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the oath requirement was jurisdictional and could not be corrected after the 90 days in which to file a petition expired.  The Trial Court denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted Petitioner leave to amend, citing the legal principle that leave to amend is freely granted.  This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed.  We reverse.  

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal stems from the trial court’s granting of Appellee’s petition for an order of protection against Appellant. We do not reach the merits of Appellant’s argument because her brief does not comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee—most notably by failing to include a statement of issues presented for review. This appeal is therefore dismissed.

This appeal concerns a homeowner’s attempt to vacate an arbitration award entered after a dispute arose regarding the homeowner’s contract with a construction company to build a deck on the homeowner’s property. We have determined that the trial court properly confirmed the arbitration award and that the contractor waived any argument that the trial court erred by not awarding the company its attorney’s fees at the trial level. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of the contractor’s reasonable appellate attorney’s fees.

The tenants appeal from the judgment in this action involving a lease with a purchase option for real property. We vacate the attorney fee award to the landlords. We affirm the trial court’s order in all other respects.

This appeal arises from a petition to determine custody and establish parenting time. Following a two-day trial, the court ruled that the parents shall have joint legal custody of their two-year-old child and that the mother shall be the primary residential parent. The court also established a parenting schedule, pursuant to which the mother was awarded more parenting time than the father. The father appeals the designation of the mother as the primary residential parent and the allocation of parenting time. Finding no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff homeowners’ association filed this lawsuit against certain defendant homeowners who owned homes within its subdivision, seeking to enjoin the homeowners from using their residences as short-term rentals.  After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment that focused on interpretation of the association’s restrictive covenants with respect to short-term rental properties.  Following a hearing on the competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant homeowners and concomitantly denied the association’s motion.  The trial court concluded that the language of the restrictive covenants was ambiguous as to short-term rentals and therefore unenforceable to enjoin the homeowners from using their residences as short-term rental properties.  The association has appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

The Plaintiffs in this case, who live in the Dominican Republic, were allegedly injured by toxic herbicides used in the sugar cane industry. Following the Plaintiffs’ filing of a lawsuit against the Defendant, a Tennessee corporation, pursuant to the Tennessee Products Liability Act, the Defendant moved to dismiss the case on several grounds. Although the trial court rejected the viability of a number of these defenses asserted by the Defendant at the motion to dismiss stage, the trial court concluded that the case should be dismissed on the basis that “the TPLA does not have extraterritorial application.” The trial court also opined that, “even if a case were to proceed in Tennessee, the applicable law would be the law of the Dominican Republic” but noted that the Plaintiffs “have only set forth a specific claim under the TPLA.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case.

The primary question in this case is whether the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ action on the basis of extraterritoriality. In answering that question, the trial court ruled that because no Tennessee law was on point to address the issue, federal law provided an appropriate framework to resolve the dispute. Under that framework, a court is tasked with answering two questions. First, “whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 337 (2016). If the statute does not give a clear indication of extraterritoriality, all is not lost, however, so long as there can be a domestic application of the statute.

This appeal stems from a trial court’s order enforcing a settlement agreement regarding a
long-running business divorce. However, because the appellants’ notice of appeal is
untimely, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.

This appeal concerns counterclaims and third-party claims for breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Pay Act of 1991, and enforcement of a lien. The counter-plaintiff, C4 Sourcing Solutions, LLC, alleged that a third-party defendant, Capital City Construction, LLC, breached its agreement to purchase 171 custom-fabricated steel containers for use in an apartment complex. C4 also sought to enforce a lien against the complex property, which was owned by the plaintiff, 83 Freight, LLC. After a trial, the jury found Capital City breached its contract with C4 and awarded $866,000 in compensatory damages. And after a post-trial hearing, the court granted C4’s request to collect on its lien. Capital City and 83 Freight raise numerous issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify in part.

This appeal involves statutory construction. Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates (“Mr. Bates” and “Ms. Bates,” “Plaintiffs” collectively) sued the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging personal injuries, loss of services, and loss of consortium stemming from Mr. Bates’ fall on Defendant’s golf course. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq., which provides immunity to landowners who open their property to recreational use. The Trial Court held that Defendant, the landowner, was immune under the TRUS because Mr. Bates was on Defendant’s property to play golf, and golf is comparable to the non-exclusive list of recreational activities found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. No exception to the TRUS was found to apply. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that golf is not an activity like those listed at Section 102 of the TRUS. Plaintiffs argue further that the fact Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course means Defendant is not entitled to immunity. We hold, inter alia, that golf is sufficiently comparable to Section 102 enumerated activities, particularly hiking, sightseeing, and target shooting, such that Defendant is entitled to immunity under the TRUS. In addition, the fact that Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course is not dispositive because the TRUS has no applicable consideration exception. We affirm.

In granting appellee’s motion to amend her petition over appellant’s objection, the trial court did not consider any of the factors relevant to a trial court’s determination of whether to grant a motion to amend. In the absence of any explanation in the trial court’s order concerning the basis for its decision, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review of whether the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to amend. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order granting appellee leave to amend her petition and pretermit the remaining issues on appeal.

This appeal arises from a verified claim against an estate seeking the repayment of a purported loan made to the decedent by his mother. The decedent’s surviving girlfriend, as executrix of the estate, claimed the funds provided to the decedent by his mother were a gift as opposed to a loan. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the funds were a loan and entered an order in favor of the mother. The estate timely appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.