APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Vanessa Faddoul sought an order of protection as a stalking victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 against her neighbor, Edward James Beyer, in Williamson County General Sessions Court. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the general sessions court issued a one-year order of protection prohibiting Mr. Beyer from contacting or coming about the victim, Mrs. Faddoul, or her family, and restricting Mr. Beyer’s second amendment rights. Mr. Beyer appealed to the Williamson County Circuit Court. Upon a pre-trial motion of Mr. Beyer, the circuit court modified the general sessions order by restoring Mr. Beyer’s second amendment right to possess firearms. Following three days of hearings on the petition, but before the circuit court could rule on the merits of the de novo appeal, Mr. Beyer filed a “Notice of Voluntary Nonsuit and Dismissal of Appeal” to dismiss his appeal of the general sessions court ruling against him in Case No. 2022OP-176, purportedly pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41.01(1). Because Mr. Beyer dismissed his appeal, the circuit court entered an order “affirming” the judgment of the general sessions court, save the second amendment issue, dismissing the appeal, and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to apply for an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mrs. Faddoul requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $168,112.50 under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), discretionary costs in the amount of $5,248.62 under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), and $2,579.37 in “non-discretionary cost expenses.” The circuit court denied her request for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs in toto based on several findings. It found that she was not entitled to an award of mandatory attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 because, inter alia, stalking victims are not entitled to the same “enhanced protections” as domestic abuse victims, that it did not complete the hearing on the petition, which it found to be a prerequisite for fees, and that the amount of attorney’s fees requested was unreasonable. The circuit court also declined to award Mrs. Faddoul any discretionary costs. Both parties appeal. Contrary to Mr. Beyer’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to take any action after he purportedly “nonsuited” his appeal, we find that the circuit court retained jurisdiction and that it did not err in affirming the judgment of the general sessions court and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to request attorney’s fees. Because Mrs. Faddoul, as a stalking victim, is entitled to the same rights afforded to domestic abuse victims, and as mandated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), we hold that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees and remand for the circuit court to award Mrs. Faddoul her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of Mrs. Faddoul’s request for discretionary costs, finding that some of the court reporters’ invoices clearly delineate the discretionary costs that she is entitled to recover pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). We also conclude that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1).

This appeal arises from a will contest. Appellant David Riss (“Respondent”) and Appellee Adam Riss (“Petitioner”) dispute the validity of a typewritten codicil and holographic document that purportedly amended the last will and testament their mother, Nancy G. Riss (“Decedent”), executed on September 25, 2018 (“the Will”). After petitioning to admit the Will to probate and set aside the purported codicils, Petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. He argued that the typewritten codicil and holographic document do not meet applicable statutory requirements and thus should be given no testamentary effect. The trial court agreed with Petitioner and granted his motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the typewritten codicil failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-104 because the witness signatures were affixed to an attesting affidavit but not to the codicil. The court further held that the holographic document failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid holographic testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-105 because it did not contain any material provisions directing the distribution of Decedent’s estate. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The plaintiffs brought an election contest and a declaratory judgment action against the defendants to enjoin the implementation of Metro Ordinance No. BL2024-427, which implements Metro’s transit improvement plan created pursuant to the Improving Manufacturing, Public Roads and Opportunities for a Vibrant Economy Act. The trial court found that the plan and ballot question complied with the Act in all respects. We affirm, except that we find that the surcharge in the transit improvement plan cannot be used for the acquisition of land for housing and parks.

Because Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, he has waived review. Appeal dismissed.

John Lindberg (“Lindberg”), an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX”), was convicted of introducing drugs into TCIX by the prison’s Disciplinary Board (“the Board”). After failed appeals to the TCIX Warden and Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) Commissioner, Lindberg filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court denied his petition. He appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A man sought to intervene as of right in a family member’s action for partition of real property. The trial court determined that the proposed intervenor did not have an interest in the subject property. So it denied his request to intervene and his other requests for relief. We affirm.

Appellant, City of Memphis, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on June 4, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Christina Lemek Blackwell (“Petitioner”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against her joint employers, asserting sexual harassment/ hostile work environment, retaliation, and other related claims. The employers filed a motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiff opposed the motion and invoked the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, 9 U.S.C. §§ 401- -402. The trial court deemed the Act applicable and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The employers appeal. We affirm.

A husband and wife divorced a little over two years after marrying. On appeal, the wife asserts the trial court erred when it classified five real properties as the husband’s separate property. The wife also takes issue with the court’s division of attorney’s fees and requests her fees on appeal. We find the court failed to make adequate findings related to its division of attorney’s fees. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the order relating to fees and expenses and remand the matter for the court to make additional findings. We affirm the trial court in all other aspects and decline to award the wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

In this divorce with no children, the trial court declared the parties divorced and referred the property issues and requests for attorney’s fees to a special master. The special master recommended an equal division of the marital estate and that each party pay their own attorney’s fees. The wife objected to these recommendations. After a hearing, the trial court adopted the special master’s findings and recommendations, with one small exception. On appeal, the wife challenges the division of the marital estate and the failure to award attorney’s fees. We affirm.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Richard Brock Hill, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), brought an action for defamation against the State regarding statements made in connection with a sexual harassment investigation that resulted in the termination of his employment. The Claims Commission dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Claims Commission analyzed the potentially defamatory statements and concluded that each statement was time-barred and/or failed as to an essential element of a defamation claim. Regarding statements contained in an “Investigation Summary Memorandum,” the Claims Commission also concluded that Mr. Hill’s defamation claim failed because the document was prepared by a Deputy Commissioner and was, accordingly, protected by absolute executive privilege. We conclude that Mr. Hill adequately alleged defamation such that dismissal of his claim was error and that the existent record and filings do not support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, absolute executive privilege protects the statements contained in the Investigation Summary Memorandum. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

After discovering that her neighbors had built a home on rural property that she owned, the property owner brought an ejectment action to remove them. The neighbors asserted an affirmative defense based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-103, which protects against ejectment if the defendant can show adverse possession for seven years. Following a trial, the trial court found that the neighbors had proven adverse possession and set a boundary line of the possessed area, drawing upon an exhibit produced by a surveyor. The property owner asserts that the boundary determined by the trial court was too expansive and unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. The neighbors assert that the trial court drew the boundary line in a manner too restrictive, failing to encapsulate the entirety of the area they actually possessed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of certain property. Because the trial court’s order contains conflicting findings, we vacate and remand.

The defendant, Bath Fitter Tennessee, Inc. (“Bath Fitter”), appeals the denial of its motion to submit its contract dispute with the homeowner to arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The parties executed a written contract for the installation of a new shower for the homeowner, the parts for which were manufactured in Canada. Both parties signed the contract on the front page of the two-page agreement where the signature lines were provided; however, neither party signed or initialed the arbitration provision that appeared on the back of the contract. Although not explicitly stated in its order, it appears that the trial court denied arbitration based upon the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“TUAA”), which, at the time of contracting, required that arbitration clauses in residential construction contracts be separately signed or initialed. It is undisputed that the materials installed by Bath Fitter were manufactured in Canada; thus, the transaction involves interstate commerce. For that reason, the FAA applies. Because the FAA does not require signatures or initials to indicate approval of arbitration clauses and preempts conflicting state laws that invalidate otherwise valid arbitration agreements, we reverse and remand with instructions to submit the contract dispute to arbitration pursuant to the FAA and stay proceedings until arbitration is complete.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. Richmond S. and Lisa S. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Fentress County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Cory S. (“Father”) to his minor children Dawson S. and Bentley S. (“the Children,” collectively).1 The Children were removed from Father’s custody following an incident in which Bentley was severely injured. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on five grounds, including severe child abuse. Father appeals, arguing among other things that he did not intentionally or knowingly harm Bentley. We vacate the Trial Court’s waiver of a home study of Bentley in Petitioners’ home because Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116 requires that such a study be conducted when the child, like Bentley, is unrelated to the prospective adoptive parents.2 Otherwise, we find that each of the grounds for termination found by the Trial Court were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We remand to the Trial Court for a home study to be conducted in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116.

In this post-divorce action, the parents filed cross-petitions to modify the agreed permanent parenting plan concerning their minor child. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order determining that a material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The trial court changed the designation of primary residential parent from mother to father and adopted a new permanent parenting plan, which granted 237 days with the child to the father and 128 days to the mother annually. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the father’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

Petitions involving child custody and support were filed in juvenile court. After a juvenile court magistrate ruled on the custody issues, Father filed a request for rehearing before the juvenile court judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d)(1)(E). The juvenile court judge affirmed the decision of the magistrate without explanation or addition. Because neither the juvenile court magistrate nor the juvenile court judge adjudicated the pending child support matter, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in his brief, we conclude that he has waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from a landowner’s complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that proposed construction was consistent with a permitted non-conforming use on its property. The parties agreed that the property was rezoned in 1957 and that certain non-conforming uses are permitted on the property. However, the city opposed the declaratory action due to the landowner’s refusal to submit plans to the city administrative zoning body to obtain its decision on whether the proposed use was a permissible extension of that non-conforming use. The city asserted that, without the landowner having applied for a building permit, the action was not ripe for adjudication. The trial court determined that the matter was ripe and that the landowner had standing, that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and that the proposed use was protected by the terms of the grandfather statute. Because the city was never permitted to rule on the proposed non-conforming use, we find that the matter was not ripe for review. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

Pro se Appellant, Robin Springer, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on July 3, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

David Ray Conley and Wade Parks (together, “Appellants”) appeal from the order of the Cocke County Chancery Court (“trial court”) granting summary judgment to plaintiff Robert John Collins (“Appellee”). The underlying controversy is a will contest surrounding the estate of Sandra Kay Parks (“Decedent”). Appellee, Decedent’s only heir-at-law, filed a Petition for Probate Administration asserting that no will of the Decedent had been located. Appellants subsequently sought to probate a document purported to be Decedent’s Last Will and Testament. Following cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Decedent’s proposed will had not been executed with the formalities required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104 and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellants timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

TKY Acquisitions, LLC (“TKY”) and its predecessors in title have owned the property now in dispute (“Subject Property”) since as early as 1922. The company introduced its chain of title during these proceedings. No evidence existed that someone other than TKY and its predecessors in title claimed ownership of the Subject Property. Although never in his chain of title, Billy Ray Blankenship’s father added the description of the Subject Property in a deed to his son dated and recorded in 2010. However, both before 2010 and after 2010, TKY paid property taxes on the Subject Property. TKY offered clear and convincing proof of payment of property taxes by it and its predecessors in title regarding the Subject Property from at least 1999 through 2022.

Lonnie Elmore (“Decedent”) died on July 5, 2020, a few weeks after being treated by Angelo J. Sorce, M.D., (“Sorce”), an employee of Tennessee Valley Orthopaedics, LLC (“TVO”), (collectively “Defendants”) and Travis Mills, CRNA, (“Mills”) an employee of Lakeway Regional Anesthesia Services, PLLC (“Lakeway”). On July 2, 2021, Robert Elmore, as Executor of the Estate of Lonnie Elmore, (“Plaintiff”) sent pre-suit notice to Defendants. Relying on the 120-day extension provided for by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 121(c), Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging wrongful death on November 1, 2021, in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), claiming that the accrual of Plaintiff’s cause of action arose no later than June 21, 2020, meaning Plaintiff provided pre-suit notice past the one-year statute of limitations, rendering his complaint untimely. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). The Trial Court disagreed and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed. We reverse.