APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action arises from the Tennessee Board of Parole’s revocation of an inmate’s parole. Following the inmate’s filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking judicial review, the trial court dismissed the action for failure to make partial payment of the required filing fee. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for dismissal on this basis.

This appeal stems from the dismissal of a premises liability action. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s first amended complaint as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations, finding that the amended complaint, which was filed more than a year after the incident, did not relate back to the original complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Property owners brought an action seeking an injunction to prohibit an adjoining property owner from blocking access to their properties. The trial court granted the request for an injunction after concluding that the land at issue was a public road that had not been abandoned. The adjoining property owner appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

A member of a Tennessee limited liability company filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to operate the company and the dissolution and winding up of the company. The trial court appointed a receiver, the receiver moved to sell the company’s assets, and the member objected to the sale. The member also sought to amend his complaint to add additional claims against additional defendants. The trial court entered an order approving the receiver’s proposed sale of the assets and denying the member’s motion to amend his complaint. The trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale are to be paid into the trial court’s registry and certified its order as a final judgment. We conclude that the trial court’s order was not a final judgment and that the trial court improvidently certified it as such. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal.

Appellant filed a petition to probate the will of her former husband, asking that she be awarded a life estate in the former husband’s residence, per the terms of the will. The estate was eventually closed by agreed order, which granted Appellant a life estate in the subject property. Appellant thereafter filed a motion to set aside the agreed final order, arguing that her and the decedent’s marital dissolution agreement awarded her at least a one-half ownership interest in the property. The trial court denied the motion after concluding that Appellant did not meet her burden under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Due to profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we dismiss this appeal and award Appellees their reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal.

Appellant, homeowner, appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee, real estate company’s, motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim arising from Appellant and Appellee’s contract for the sale of Appellant’s property. After the expiration of the initial period of the listing agreement, Appellant transferred the property by quitclaim deed to himself and another party. Appellee sought compensation under the contract. Appellant failed to respond to Appellee’s requests for admissions, and the trial court deemed the requests for admissions admitted. Appellant also failed to respond to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and Appellee’s statement of material facts for purposes of summary judgment was undisputed. Despite the admitted facts, the trial court erred in finding that Appellant breached the plain language of the contract. Because Appellee was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals only the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance.  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.  Although Father does not appeal the termination of his parental rights, we are required to review that decision.  The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court also found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

A self-represented petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because the filing does not comply with Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns a driveway easement. Robert Davis and Lala Davis (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued their neighbor Karen Edwards (“Edwards”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) to enforce an oral agreement whereby Edwards agreed to build her own driveway on her property. Edwards had been using Plaintiffs’ driveway under the terms of the Driveway Easement and Maintenance Agreement (“the DEMA”), an express easement agreed to by Plaintiffs and Jeanette Schlaeger (“Schlaeger”), the previous owner of Edwards’ property. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Edwards had reached a verbal agreement with Plaintiffs to build her own driveway, and that she must build it. Plaintiffs filed a motion for additional findings asking that the DEMA be terminated even though that was not an issue at trial. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion on grounds that the DEMA was meant to be temporary despite the DEMA’s unambiguous language to the contrary. Edwards appealed. Subsequently, Joe Hamby and Amber Hamby (“Defendants”) bought Edwards’ property and were substituted as appellants. We hold, inter alia, that the DEMA is permanent and runs with the land. The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for additional findings. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment nullifying the DEMA.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

This is an action for breach of contract, unlawful procurement of breach of contract, and civil conspiracy arising out of a purchase and sale agreement related to real property in Moore County, Tennessee. The buyers, Karl and Beth Ann Kokko, alleged that the sellers, Thomas and Wendy Moore, breached the contract by failing to fulfill their obligation to close. The Kokkos further alleged that Gregg and Daffney Driver induced the breach by conspiring with the Moores to sell the property to the Drivers’ company, MOCAR Enterprises, Inc. The listing realtor, Crye-Leike of Nashville, Inc., intervened to collect a commission. The trial court took several actions that are at issue on appeal. First, the court granted the Kokkos’ Motion for Sanctions against the Drivers and MOCAR and entered a default judgment against them on the claims for unlawful procurement and conspiracy. Second, the court granted the Kokko’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered judgment against the Moores on the claims for breach of contract and conspiracy. Third, the court set aside the MOCAR deed and ordered specific performance of the contract. And fourth, the court granted Crye-Leike’s claim against the Moores for a commission. This appeal followed. We conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate on the Kokkos’ claim for civil conspiracy but affirm the trial court in all other respects. Thus, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in part, affirm it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, an inmate incarcerated by the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of disciplinary proceedings held at Morgan County Correctional Complex. Because the petition was not notarized and because a notarized petition was not filed within sixty days of the denial of his administrative appeal of that decision, the trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error with the trial court’s decision, we affirm

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Senior Pastor Charles Dowell, Jr. and Priest Baldwin Hutchinson (“Petitioners”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioners and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the sale of certain real property by a custodian for the benefit of two minor children pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. The custodian sold the property without having it appraised, hiring a real estate agent, or listing the property for sale on the open market. Rather, the custodian reviewed an appraisal published by the county’s property assessor and then sold the property for a price slightly exceeding the listed value. The children’s mother filed a lawsuit on their behalf, alleging that the custodian breached his fiduciary duty of care. The trial court determined that the mother failed to prove that allegations and dismissed the case. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Gloria Juanita Milton (“Milton”) hired attorney Thomas J. Tabor, Jr. (“Tabor”) to defend her as an appellee in Milton v. Powell.  After successfully defending her in the appeal, a disagreement arose between Tabor and Milton over the attorney’s fees she owed him.  Tabor filed a complaint in the General Sessions Court for Claiborne County (“the General Sessions Court”), which found that Milton owed Tabor $10,030 in unpaid attorney’s fees.  Milton appealed to the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”), which came to a different conclusion than the General Sessions Court.  The Trial Court determined that any remaining amount owed by Milton above and beyond what she already had paid was excessive and unreasonable.  Tabor appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of her personal injury negligence action against a social services organization.  The trial court found that the action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations and that the discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute of limitations.  Because the plaintiff’s action accrued more than one year before she filed the lawsuit, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was properly granted.  Accordingly, we affirm. 

Appellee was injured in an automobile accident where Appellant’s, a governmental entity, employee was 100% at-fault. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that Appellant’s governmental immunity had been removed; (2) admitting testimony from two of Appellee’s treating physicians; and (3) admitting certain medical billing records. Appellees ask this Court to award frivolous appeal damages. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court order and deny Appellees’ request for appellate attorney’s fees.

This is the second appeal by a mother and a father of the termination of their parental rights. We have concluded that the juvenile court correctly determined that a ground for termination existed as to the father. Regarding Mother, we find that the court erred in its analysis finding a ground for termination. We also conclude that the court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the ground for termination and vacate this portion of the order and remand for further proceedings. We also conclude that the juvenile court did not make sufficient findings of fact in its best interests analysis regarding Father. Therefore, we also vacate this part of the order and remand the matter for the juvenile court to enter an order that makes sufficient findings.

Father appeals the trial court’s order changing his children’s surnames from his surname to another family name. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not address four of his stated issues. As to his final issue, because the appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we have no evidence to review. Accordingly, we must presume that the evidence presented at the final hearing supports the trial court’s conclusion that the name change was in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

In this conservatorship action, the trial court’s appointment of the ward’s stepdaughter as conservator has been appealed by the ward’s nephew and ostensibly the ward herself. Because the record leaves us unable to discern the basis of the trial court’s decisions, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for the entry of an appropriate order.

This is an appeal from an order suspending a mother’s parenting time until she completes a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 mental health evaluation. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The appellant appeals the circuit court’s finding that her minor children are dependent and neglected. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant appeals the circuit court’s findings that her minor child is dependent and neglected and a victim of severe abuse. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case originates in a dispute over the administration of two trusts created for Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr. (“Meersman”). Meersman has filed multiple lawsuits against former trustees Michael Castellarin (“Castellarin”) and Regions Bank (“Regions”) (“Defendants,” collectively) alleging that they mismanaged the trusts. The trusts were terminated by court order in 2015. Laila Rumsey (“Rumsey”), Meersman’s partner, sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that she too was damaged by Defendants’ actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted based on the statute of limitations. Rumsey filed a motion to alter or amend within thirty days of entry of judgment but, contrary to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, did not serve Defendants within thirty days. The Trial Court denied Rumsey’s motion as untimely. Rumsey appeals. Rule 59.04 requires such a motion be both “filed and served” within thirty days of entry of judgment. Rumsey failed to serve Defendants timely. Therefore, Rumsey’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and did not toll the time in which to file a notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.