APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I dissent from the majority's holding that a person arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicant will be denied the right to consult with counsel prior to submitting to a breath test, regardless of the circumstances, and also from the majority's holidng that the defendant's right against self-incrimination would not be violated by the adminssion of his refusal to submit to the breath test as evidence of intoxication.

This interlocutory appeal presents for determination the principles of comparative fault applicable to the assessment of liability among joint tort feasors and the application of those principles to this transitional case, in which the cause of action accrued prior to the decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d52 (Tenn. 1992). The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified and the case is remanded to the trial court.

Based on the plaintiff's expectations at the time he filed this lawsuit in 1988, I agree with the majority that, in this transition case, it is reasonable to permit the plaintiff to recover from the defendants that he named in his complaint ("Truckstops") all of his damages that were proximately caused by Truckstops and that were not attributable to the plaintiff's own fault (if any). I also agree with the majority that it is fair in this transition case to permit Truckstops to receive contribution from the parties that were named by Truckstops as third-party defendants. However, I believe that the contribution should be based on the parties' respective percentages of fault, and that this method should apply not only to the negligence claims set forth in the thirdparty complaint, but to the strict products liability claim as well. If liability were thus linked to fault on each claim in the third-party complaint, each defendant (including the third-party defendants) would be liable only for the percentage of the plaintiff's damages that was caused by that defendant's fault, and the doctrine of joint and several liability would have no application.

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground the suit is barred by the three year statute of limitations. This Court finds the essential cause of action alleged is breach of contract rather than injury to property and, therefore, the applicable limitation period is six years rather than three years.

At issue in this appeal by the Board of Dentistry is the validity and constitutionality of a proposed civil penalty against Harold Richardson for practicing dentistry and operating a dental clinic without a license. Also  called into question is the authority of the Davidson County Chancery Court to resolve, on judicial review of an administrative order, constitutional issues that were not addressed in the administrative order. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Chancery Court has jurisdiction to  consider constitutional issues not addressed in the administrative  proceeding. As a result, the Chancery Court's resolution of those issues in the first Chancery Court proceeding from which Richardson did not appeal, bars consideration of those issues. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Board of Dentistry for further proceedings.

This divorce case presents for review the judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, that a one-half undivided interest in a tract of real property is marital property within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b)(1)(B) (1991). This Court finds that the interest is the husband's separate property, not marital property, thus requiring that the Court of Appeals' decision be reversed.