APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony.

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

A jury convicted defendant, Mario Lamont Wilson, of three counts of aggravated assault and of felony reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Wilson’s felony reckless endangerment conviction and sentence, but reversed and dismissed the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a deadly weapon. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it dismissed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault.1 Although we conclude that Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault may not stand, we do not adopt entirely the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Rather, we affirm the dismissal of the aggravated assault charges because the evidence is insufficient to prove that Wilson intentionally and knowingly caused another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case.  I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

I concur in the dissent of Justice White.

We granted the application of Terry E. Wood, the defendant, for permission to appeal in order to resolve an issue of first impression in Tennessee: whether the return of a sealed presentment 1 engages an accursed person's speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 , of the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough examination of the reocrd and careful consideration of the issue, we conclude, for reasons appearing below, that the reutnr of a presentment, whether sealed or unsealed, whether the accompanying capias is executed or unexecuted, is a formal accusation that engages constitutional speedy trial provisions. Thus, we must apply the criteria of Barkery.Wingo 2 and state b. Bishop 3 to determine whether the thirteen-year delay in this case deprived the appellant of this constitutional speedy trial rights. We find that there was no such deprivation and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In this property confiscation case, the Court must decide whether a direct  appeal was timely and whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act's1 twelve-month statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-20-305(b) applies to bar plaintiff's claim for damage to and loss of personal property seized by police officers employed by defendant, the City of Columbia. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the appeal was timely and that plaintiff's claim is controlled by the three-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-105 and is, therefore, not barred.

This case presents a question of first impression in Tennessee: whether or not a legal malpractice claim is assignable. We have determined that soundpublic policy reasons militate against allowing assignment of legal malpractice actions. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and dismiss the complaint.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party with a derivative claim - loss of consortium - is entitled to challenges under the peremptory jury challenge statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-3-105.

We conclude that the clear and unambiguous language of the jury challenge statute provides additional peremptory challenges to a party with a derivative claim,1 and that a new trial is required because the denial of that statutory right constitutes prejudice to the judicial process. In the interest of judicial economy, since a new trial is required, we have also decided that under comparative fault principles, the recovery of a spouse claiming loss of consortium will be reduced in proportion to or barred by the fault of the physically injured spouse. We, therefore, affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision reversing and remanding for a new trial.