APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff can combine an original action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with a petition for judicial review under the Uniform Administration Procedures Act when the sole relief requested under the Section 1983 claim is an award of attorney fees. We affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision allowing plaintiff an award of attorney fees.

In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to review the trial court’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6- 207(4)(A)(i) is unconstitutional and that plaintiff is entitled to life-time workers’ compensation benefits. Having considered the positions of the parties, the plain language and the legislative intent of the statute, and relevant authority in other jurisdictions, we reverse.

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Ethel Faye George, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. This case presents the following issue for our determination: whether a defendant in a negligence case must, pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, plead comparative fault as an affirmative defense if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff’s injury. We conclude that the defendant is required to affirmatively plead comparative fault in such a situation; and because that was not done in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

In this case we are faced with the issue of the continued viability of the zone of danger test as a limitation on liability when plaintiff is neither physically injured nor in an area where physical injury is possible. We conclude that in cases such as this, in which plaintiff sensorily observes the injury and resulting death of his mother, recovery should be allowed under circumstances in which the incident which produces the emotional injuries and the emotional injuries are reasonably foreseeable.

These consolidated cases arise from the efforts of appellants, Lewis Laska and John Jay Hooker, to have their names placed on the ballot for the August 1, 1996, statewide election to the office of Supreme Court  Justice. The deadline for filing nominating petitions for this election was 12:00 noon on May 16, 1996, in accordance with T.C.A. § 2-5-101.

The State has requested a rehearing in this case. The Court has considered the petition and finds it to be without merit. The petition to rehear is denied. The Members of the Court adhere to the positions stated in the original Opinions in this cause.  It is so ORDERED.

Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to amend the judgment to delete the award of attorney fees, the Court concludes that the motion is without merit and should be denied. It is so ORDERED.
 

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming an award of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' suit charging the breach by a  majority shareh older of a fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders is barred by the o ne year statute of limitations. This Cou rt concludes that the applicable period of limitations is three years and remands the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiffs' action was time-barred.

In this retaliatory discharge action, the plaintiff, Geneva Coffey, appeals fromtwo aspects of the Court of Appeals’ judgment: (1) its suggested remittance of the punitive damage award from $500,000 to $150,000; and (2) its disallowance of the $20,000 in “front pay” awarded by the trial court. After a careful consideration of the law and the record in this case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects. Therefore, we reverse that court’s judgment, and reinstate, in its entirety, the judgment rendered by the trial court.
 

This case presents the question of whether the plaintiff, attorney Frank White,may recover attorney’s fees from the estate of Kasper McGrory. This broad question may, in turn, be divided into two specific subissues: (1) whether the contingency fee contract between White and McGrory is “clearly excessive” under Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professiona Responsibility, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, and is, thus, unenforceable; and (2) if the contingency fee contract is unenforceable, whether White may, nevertheless, recover attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the contract is unenforceable and that White is not entitled to recover under the theory of quantum meruit. Because the probate court and the Court of Appeals held that White could not recover under the contract, but could recover on a quantum meruit basis, we reverse the latter part of the judgment.

This case presents for review the right of a child born out of wedlock to  inherit from his natural father who died prior to the amendment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1995) in 1978. The record supports the finding of paternity, but the claimant failed to establish the right to inherit as required by the statute; however, the appellant is estopped to deny the claimant's asserted interest in the decedent father's real property.