APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted review and consolidated these cases in order to consider the circumstances under which imposition of two convictions resulting from a "single" criminal act may violate the double jeopardy and du process clause of the state and federal constitutions in light of State v. Anthony, 817S.W. 2d299 (Tenn. 1991).

The petition to rehear is denied. ENTER this the 2nd day of December, 1996.
 

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner, William Wesley Goad, was afforded his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial.
 

The Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga and Dr. Harry Reynolds, Superintendent of Chattanooga schools, appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision finding that Leonard L. Rowe was deprived of liberty without due process of law by a Board policy which renders any employee previously terminated “for cause, inefficiency, or immorality” ineligible for future employment within the Chattanooga school system. The primary issue for our review is whether adoption of Board policy 4117.5 deprived Rowe of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest to which the requirements of procedural due process apply.1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that due process is not implicated because the Board policy did not deprive Rowe of either a protected property or liberty interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Ethel Faye George, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. This case presents the following issue for our determination: whether a defendant in a negligence case must, pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, plead comparative fault as an affirmative defense if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff’s injury. We conclude that the defendant is required to affirmatively plead comparative fault in such a situation; and because that was not done in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.