APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant’s due process rights were violated when the lower courts dismissed his post conviction petition as timebarred by the three-year statute of limitations since the asserted violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), did not arise until after expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.

I concur in the majority's holding that this case falls within the purview of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). I, however, continue to adhere to my dissent in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998), in which I concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a) is applicable when there is a subsequent injury and the employee is rendered permanently and totally disabled. Subsection (b), however, should apply only when the employee is still able to earn a wage or be gainfully employed but has received compensable vocational disabilities that exceed 100 percent or 400 weeks of compensation

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court determined that Wayne Eldred Hill, the employee, was permanently and totally disabled. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a), the court apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent of the award to the Second Injury Fund. The case was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e). The Appeals Panel modified the award by apportioning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b).

In this case, we are invited to decide whether the Tennessee Plan for election of appellate judges, codified as Title 17, Chapter 4 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons, but most particularly because it contemplates “retention elections” for incumbent appellate judges. In general, the Tennessee Plan provides that an incumbent appellate judge may run for reelection unopposed on the ballot, provided the incumbent’s retention has been recommended by the judicial evaluation commission; the judge will be retained in office if a majority of those voting in the election for that judge’s seat vote for such retention. Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 115(d)(1)(1994). It is the duty of all courts, including the Supreme Court, to pass on a constitutional question only when it is absolutely necessary for the determination of thecase and of the rights of parties to the litigation. Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 666-667, 383 S.W. 2d 9, 13-14 (1964). See also, Jackson v. Davis, 530 F. Supp. 2, 4 n. 1 (E.D. Tenn.), aff’d, 667 F. 2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1981). We hold that it is not necessary to address the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan in this case, because it is not applicable to the facts of this case. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding the Tennessee Plan constitutional, just as the trial judge erred in holding the Plan unconstitutional. We reach this conclusion because the express provisions of the Tennessee Plan render it inapplicable to the election for which defendant Brook Thompson, State Coordinator of Elections, refused to accept a qualifying petition submitted by the plaintiff, Robert L. DeLaney.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").

We granted this appeal to determine whether an employer is entitled to an offset of long-term disability payments against a workers’ compensation award for permanent total disability. A 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 permits offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to an employee under an employer-funded disability plan. The plaintiff’s injury pre-dated the effective date of the statute. We hold that the amendment is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset in this case.