APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case is before us for automatic review of the Court of Criminal Appeals’
affirmance of a death sentence imposed upon Donald Ray Middlebrooks in a
Davidson County resentencing hearing for first degree murder.

We granted this appeal by the State of Tennessee to address the issue of jury unanimity in cases where the State relies on alternative theories of guilt to convict an accused under a single count indictment. In this case, the appellee, James Lemacks, was charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the appellee of DUI based upon evidence that he operated his automobile while intoxicated or that he was criminally responsible for allowing his friend, Clinton Sanchez, to drive the automobile while intoxicated. The jury returned a general verdict convicting the appellee of DUI.

We granted this Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appeal to determine the appropriate standard of review of a trial court’s decision to admit a breath-alcohol test result under State v. Sensing, 843
S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the test result of the defendant, Jerry Wayne Edison.1 We affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court and conclude that a trial court’s Sensing decision must be presumed correct on appeal unless the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary.

Because the opinion filed by the Court of Criminal Appeals states the view I take, I respectfully dissent from the view held by the majority of my colleagues and would adopt the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We granted this appeal by Ronnie William (Billy) Taylor, the appellant, in  order to address issues pertinent to the sentences he received in the trial  court. In our review, however, we notice as plain error an invalid conviction  that was imposed upon appellant for an offense that was not charged in the indictment.1 Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, we vacate the invalid burglary conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I agree with the majority that the jury’s reliance on the felony murder aggravating circumstance in this case violated article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution and that a harmless error analysis must be applied under our decision in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993). I disagree, however, with both the majority’s application of the Howell analysis and its conclusion.

In this post-conviction capital case, we granted this appeal to determine whether the jury’s reliance on an invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless error. Upon review, we hold that the jury's consideration of the invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the strength of the remaining valid aggravating circumstances and the relative weakness or absence of any mitigating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition is affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in their determinations of the amount of child support to be paid by the child’s father. Although both the trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that the total monthly payment should be increased from four hundred dollars ($400.00) to six hundred fifty dollars ($650.00), each court reached its conclusion upon different reasons. We conclude that both courts erred and that the base amount of child support should have been $1,241.00 per month. In addition, Mr. Brooks shall pay the child's private education expenses per the parties agreement.
 

We granted this appeal to decide whether: (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated burglary and felony murder committed during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to criminal trespass. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant and that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the defendant’s convictions is affirmed.

We granted this appeal to decide whether a defendant’s credibility may be impeached by reference to a prior conviction for a “felony involving dishonesty.” We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach the defendant by asking him whether he had been convicted of any “felonies involving dishonesty.” We hold, however, that the error was harmless.¹