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| Lenore Berry Ross Storey, Debtor v. Bradford Furniture Company, Inc.
93-08973-KL3-7
QUESTION CERTIFIED Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules,1 we have accepted a question certified to us by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court has asked: Which of the following is the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E): (1) Once asserted in any judicial proceeding, the exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective with respect to all subsequent executions, seizures or attachments of alimony; or (2) The exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure or attachment of alimony is sought. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the alimony exemption set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure, or attachment of alimony is sought.
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Originating Judge:Judge Keith N. Lundin |
Supreme Court | 12/04/00 | ||
| State vs. Garrison
E1997-00045-SC-R11-CD
The defendant, John C. Garrison, was convicted by a jury of solicitation to commit first degree murder. In this appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether trial counsel's failure to communicate a plea bargain offer from the State is per se prejudicial to the extent necessary to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); and (2) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury that the "request," as used in the statutory definition of the offense of solicitation, must be intentional. After a thorough consideration of the record and a full review of the authorities, we conclude that trial counsel's failure to communicate a plea bargain offer does not demonstrate, alone, prejudice sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Strickland. We conclude also that the trial court's omission of certain required language from the jury instruction constitutes harmless error. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, reversed and the case is dismissed.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Thomas W. Graham |
Bledsoe County | Supreme Court | 11/22/00 | |
| White vs. Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc.
E1999-02023-SC-R11-CV
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether a private employer may be held liable for the negligent actions of an off-duty police officer who was hired by the employer for private security purposes. In the circuit court, the defendant employer moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' wrongful death action for failure to state a claim, and the motion was granted by the trial judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the actions of the off-duty officer were taken in furtherance of his official duties as a peace officer, and therefore, the defendant employer could not be held liable for the officer's negligent actions. After reviewing the complaint in this case, along with the applicable legal authority, we hold that the complaint does state a claim against the defendant employer for the negligence of the off-duty officer. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Knox County Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:Dale C. Workman |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 11/22/00 | |
| State vs. Coley
M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
|
Supreme Court | 11/22/00 | ||
| State vs. Maurice Shaw
W1998-00503-SC-R11-CD
We granted this appeal to decide two issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver and (2) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction and that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals upon the separate grounds stated herein.
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Originating Judge:Joseph H. Walker, III |
Tipton County | Supreme Court | 11/17/00 | |
| Edgar Doyle, et al vs. Charles Frost, M.D., et al
W1998-00391-SC-R11-CV
In this appeal, the plaintiffs contest the trial court's overruling of a motion to amend their complaint to add the Jackson-Madison General Hospital District, a governmental entity, as a party defendant. At issue is the scope of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03, which allows the filing date of certain amendments to a pleading to "relate back" to the date of the filing of the original pleading. We are asked to determine whether Rule 15.03 applies to governmental entities. We conclude that it does and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Jon Kerry Blackwood |
Hardeman County | Supreme Court | 11/17/00 | |
| State vs. Timothy Walton
W1998-00329-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:R. Lee Moore Jr. |
Dyer County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| State vs. Timothy Walton
W1998-00329-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:R. Lee Moore Jr. |
Dyer County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| Memphis Housing Authority vs. Tara Thompson
W1998-00108-SC-R11-CV
The appellee, Memphis Housing Authority brought this unlawful detainer action seeking to evict the appellant, tenant Tara Thompson, after drugs were discovered on the father of her child while he was inside her apartment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellee, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the lease agreement imposes strict liability upon the appellant for the drug-related criminal activity of her "guests and other persons under her control." We granted permission to appeal to consider the appropriate standard that applies when a public housing authority seeks to evict a tenant for drug-related criminal activity. This is an issue of first impression in Tennessee. After due consideration, we hold that the lease agreement imposes strict liability for drug-related criminal activity engaged in by the tenant or any household member but permits eviction for the drug related criminal activity of "guests and other persons under [the tenant's] control"only if the tenant knew or should have known of the drug-related criminal activity and failed to take reasonable steps to halt or prevent the illegal activity. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of the appellee's motion for summary judgment under the legal standard announced herein.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Robert A. Lanier |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| In the Matter of All Assessments, Review of Ad Valorum
M1998-00243-SC-R11-CV
This Court granted the applications for permission to appeal submitted on behalf of the Tennessee Board of Equalization and certain public utility companies. The purpose of our grant was to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Board of Equalization had exceeded its authority in granting a reduction in the assessed value of certain centrally-assessed public utility tangible personal property for tax year 1998. We hold that the Board of Equalization does have the legal authority, as part of the equalization process, to reduce the appraised value (and the assessed value) of centrally-assessed public utility property. Such a reduction is an appropriate remedy where the reduction causes the appraised value of such centrally-assessed personal property within each local tax jurisdiction to bear the same ratio to fair market value as obtains for the personal property within such local jurisdiction that is appraised and assessed by local taxing authorities. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Tennessee Board of Equalization for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
|
Davidson County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| 00243-SC-R11-CV
00243-SC-R11-CV
|
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| State vs. Derrick Sayles
W1998-00425-SC-R11-CD
Shelby County -Derrick Sayles was convicted of second degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial on the ground that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances surrounding the bond reduction and the charge reduction accorded to the State's principal witness immediately after his testimony. The State appealed. We hold that the trial court erred when it refused to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances surrounding benefits granted to the witness after his testimony; Sayles's right to confrontation was therefore violated. We cannot hold that this violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This cause is therefore remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances resulting in the bond reduction and the charge reduction, both of which were granted after the witness had testified. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and this cause is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Arthur T. Bennett |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| Willie Jean Johnson vs. James Johnson
W1999-01232-SC-R11-CV
The parties' marital dissolution agreement ("MDA") divided Mr. Johnson's "military retirement benefits" to provide one half of those benefits to Ms. Johnson. After the final decree was entered, Mr. Johnson unilaterally waived a portion of his military retired pay to receive the same amount in non-taxable disability benefits. The payment of Ms. Johnson's share of the military retired pay was reduced accordingly. Ms. Johnson requested a modification of the MDA to provide for alimony in an amount equal to the reduction. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied the requested relief, relying on Gilliland v. Stanley, No. 3258, 1997 WL 180587 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 16, 1997). We interpret the petition to modify as a petition to enforce the divorce decree. We hold that when an MDA divides military retirement benefits, the non-military spouse obtains a vested interest in his or her portion of those benefits as of the date of the court's decree. Any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the non-military spouse's vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce incorporating the MDA. The case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the decree.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Robert L. Childers |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| Don Culbreath vs. First Tennessee Bank
W1998-00426-SC-R11-CV
Don L. Culbreath (Culbreath) filed suit against Community First Bank (Community First) seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Culbreath alleged that Community First fraudulently refused to pay Culbreath the proceeds of a new $150,000 loan that had been agreed upon by a bank officer and Culbreath and for which Culbreath had signed a demand note and deed of trust. Instead, the bank used the deed of trust to serve as additional collateral for Culbreath's existing indebtedness to the bank. Prior to trial, Community First merged with First Tennessee Bank, N.A. (First Tennessee), and First Tennessee was substituted for Community First as the defendant in the case. The trial court found in favor of Culbreath and awarded $209,156 in compensatory damages. After a bifurcated hearing on the issue of punitive damages, the court awarded Culbreath an additional $9,000,000 in punitive damages. First Tennessee argues on appeal that as a successor corporation it should not be liable for punitive damages arising from Community First's actions. We hold that First Tennessee is liable for the compensatory damages awarded by the trial court and that it is also liable for punitive damages arising out of Community First's pre-merger conduct. However, we remand this case to the trial court for reassessment of punitive damages based upon the factors outlined in Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Floyd Peete, Jr. |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/16/00 | |
| D&E Construction Co. vs. Robert J. Denley Co.
W1998-00445-SC-R11-CV
The contractor submitted to arbitration a contractual payment dispute with the project owner arising from a contract to build a subdivision in Collierville. The arbitrators found in favor of the contractor and included an award of attorney's fees. The trial court determined that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority in awarding attorney's fees and vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the entire award. We hold that when the arbitrators awarded attorney's fees, they exceeded their authority by awarding upon a matter not within the scope of the contract's arbitration provision. Therefore, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate the award of attorney's fees.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:Walter L. Evans |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
| State vs. James P. Stout
W1998-00079-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
| State vs. Vincent Sims
W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
| State vs. Antonio Kendrick
W1997-00157-SC-R11-CD
We granted this appeal to determine whether the prosecution's failure to elect the particular offense of aggravated rape upon which it sought to convict the defendant constituted plain error and required a new trial. The main purpose of the election requirement is to preserve a defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict under the Tennessee Constitution. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for one count of aggravated rape without examining the election issue. After reviewing the record and controlling authority, we conclude that the prosecution's failure to elect the particular offense upon which it sought to convict the defendant failed to preserve the defendant's rights under the Tennessee Constitution and constituted plain error. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Originating Judge:Arthur T. Bennett |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
| State vs. Vincent Sims
W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
| State of Tennessee v. James P. Stout
M1998-00079-SC-DDT-DD
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/15/00 | |
| Suzanne Burlew vs. Brad Burlew
M1998-01177-SC-R11-CV
The issue in this divorce case concerns the type and amount of alimony that should be awarded to the Wife. The trial court awarded her $220,000 of alimony in solido to be paid out in decreasing amounts over eight years, and declined to award her rehabilitative alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's in solido award but remanded the case to the trial court to award rehabilitative alimony of at least $1,000 per month for a reasonable period of time. Before this Court, the Husband/appellee argues that rehabilitative alimony is unnecessary and that the alimony in solido award is excessive. The Wife/appellant counters that the in solido award was not excessive; indeed, she argues that she should have been awarded alimony in futuro. We hold that the trial court properly awarded alimony in solido rather than alimony in futuro. We also hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Wife's request for rehabilitative alimony. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Originating Judge:Floyd Peete, Jr. |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 11/14/00 | |
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Supreme Court | 10/27/00 | ||
| State vs. Culbreath, et al
W1999-01553-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Originating Judge:L. Terry Lafferty |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 10/20/00 | |
| Robert Cunningham, Jr.,e t al vs. Shelton Security Service, Inc., et al
M1998-00023-SC-WCM-CV
In this workers' compensation case, the estate of the employee, Robert W. Cunningham, Sr., has appealed from a chancery court judgment dismissing a claim for death benefits filed against the employer, Shelton Security Service, Inc. The employee, who worked as a security guard for the employer, died of heart failure while performing his duties at a store. At the close of the employee's proof, the trial court granted the employer's motion to dismiss on the basis that the emotional stress experienced by the employee the night of his death was not extraordinary or unusual for a security guard. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law, found that there was sufficient evidence of causation to warrant a trial and, thus, reversed the trial court's dismissal. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel's decision. We granted the motion for review to consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing the employee's claim on the basis that his heart failure did not arise out of the employment because it was not caused by a mental or emotional stimulus of an unusual or abnormal nature, beyond what is typically encountered by one in his occupation. After carefully examining the record and considering the relevant authorities, we agree with the Panel and reverse the trial court's judgment.
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy |
Davidson County | Supreme Court | 10/17/00 | |
| State vs. Coley
M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Donald P. Harris |
Williamson County | Supreme Court | 10/13/00 |