APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This cause is before the Court on the petition for rehearing filed by the respondent, Michael
H. Sneed. The crux of the petition is Sneed’s request for a period of thirty days within which to
“wind down [his] practice and to prepare for the transition of any remaining cases to substitute
counsel.”

We granted this appeal to determine the following two issues: 1) whether double jeopardy bars multiple convictions for criminal contempt based on violations of an order of protection and 2) whether domestic violence counseling may be imposed as part of the sentence for criminal contempt. After finding the defendant guilty of six counts of criminal contempt, the trial court's sentence consisted of 1) ten days in jail for each act of contempt to be served consecutively and 2) forty-five weeks of domestic violence counseling. A new order of protection was issued. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported only one conviction for criminal contempt and that the trial court lacked the authority to impose counseling as part of a sentence for criminal contempt. After reviewing the record and authority, we hold that double jeopardy does not bar multiple convictions for criminal contempt and that the evidence supports three convictions in this case. We further hold that although the legislature has not specifically authorized domestic violence counseling as a sentence for criminal contempt, the trial court properly imposed the requirement as part of a new order of protection.

This workers' compensation case presents two issues for review concerning the merits of the employee's claim for benefits. The first is whether this action is barred by the statute of limitations. The second is whether the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the employee's injury was work-related. The trial court ruled that the statute of limitations had expired, and it also addressed the merits and found that the employee failed to prove that his injury was work-related. We hold that the statute of limitations had not expired, and we further hold that the trial court's dismissal of the employee's claim should be affirmed on the merits because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was not work-related. In addition to the merits of this suit, we also granted review to determine the legality of the trial court's practice of referring workers' compensation cases to a clerk and master for trial. We hold that the proper procedure for appointing a special/substitute judge was not followed; however, reversal is not required because the Clerk and Master was acting as a de facto judge.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employer, Famous Hospitality, Inc., defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County finding that the employee, Debra Lambert, plaintiff-appellee, sustained a 60 percent permanent impairment to the whole body due to a workrelated shoulder injury. The trial court also directed the employer to pay various medical and litigation related expenses incurred by the employee, but did not require the employer to pay for future medical treatment by doctors that had been selected by the employee and who had treated her before trial. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(5)(B). We granted the motion to determine whether the employee should have been authorized to seek future medical treatment, at the employer’s expense, from doctors selected by her who had treated her injuries. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment except to the extent that the judgment does not authorize future medical treatment by the employee’s treating physicians at the employer’s expense.

QUESTION CERTIFIED Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules,1 we have accepted a question certified to us by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court has asked: Which of the following is the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E): (1) Once asserted in any judicial proceeding, the exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective with respect to all subsequent executions, seizures or attachments of alimony; or (2) The exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure or attachment of alimony is sought. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the alimony exemption set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure, or attachment of alimony is sought.

We granted the State's appeal to consider whether the defendant's federal or state constitutional right of confrontation was violated by the admission into evidence of surveillance photographs taken at the scene of the robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated and that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, they reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction.

The Court has accepted for decision two questions of law certified by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 23, Supreme Court Rules, which questions are as follows:

( l ) Whether the tort of negligent misrepresentation applies only to professinals and others who  specialize in providing information as a service; and not to commercial entities or businesses which allegedly supply misleading information for the guidance of others in their business transactions; and

(2) Whether a party alleging negligent misrepresentation, in order to recover 'economic losses," must be in privity of contract with the defendant. The decision of the Court is that liability for the tort of  negligent misrepresentation is not limited to 'professionals'; however, the record in this case does not establish the essentials of that cause of action.