In Re Ryan B.
The Juvenile Court for Franklin County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Chasity R. (“Mother”) to her son, Ryan B. (“the Child”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Hamid Houbbadi v. Chase T. Smith
While incarcerated for first-degree murder, Appellant filed suit against Appellee, an attorney who represented Appellant during his criminal trial, for legal malpractice. Shortly after filing the complaint, Appellant filed a motion to appear for hearings by video. The trial court did not rule on the motion to appear by video and proceeded to enter several orders on other motions on the pleadings only, including an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Because the trial court failed to address Appellant’s motion to appear by video, we vacate specific orders of the trial court in their entirety, including the final order dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider Appellant’s motion to appear by video. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kandy Page v. Holly Cikalo et al.
This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect and dismissal of adoption proceedings. Adoption petitioner contends that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address dependency and neglect, which the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear. Concluding that the chancery court had exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption petitions, we affirm the trial court. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Cole v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming newly discovered evidence of an improper ex parte communication between the assistant district attorney general and the trial court about her case. Based upon our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shira Skopp Levy v. Alan Louis Levy
This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the issues on appeal principally concern the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional school or extracurricular expenses. Prior to trial, the parties agreed to a parenting schedule and that the husband would pay $4,100 per month in child support, but they did not agree on the wife’s claim for alimony, the allocation of optional expenses for the children’s school or extracurricular activities, or the division of the marital estate. Following a multi-day trial, the trial court divided the approximately $12 million marital estate equally between the parties and awarded the wife $2,000 a month in alimony in futuro. The award of alimony in futuro was based, in principal part, on the court’s finding that the wife had an earning capacity of $160,000 a year—although the most the wife had ever earned was $80,000 a year—and that some of the wife’s claimed monthly expenses were “overstated” or unsubstantiated. The court also allocated 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school and extracurricular activities to the wife and 80% to the husband. The wife challenges the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional expenses, contending that the trial court “grossly overestimated” her earning capacity and erred by reducing her claimed expenses. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination of the wife’s earning capacity, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and the court’s order that the wife pay 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school or extracurricular activities, and remand both issues for further consideration. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Evanny Littlejohn
The Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, she argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because the State failed to establish she acted knowingly; and (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of three prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Jah'Quie Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jah’quie Brown, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He argues he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations because his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right to file a direct appeal or petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harold Thomas Centers, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Harold Thomas Centers, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated assault and received a sentence of six years. After that, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to conduct an adequate investigation before the plea. The post-conviction court denied the petition by finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition, asserting that he proved his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Lucas Et Al. v. Joseph Berryman
The attorneys for a deceased defendant appeal the trial court’s order dismissing this action pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). Because the attorneys do not have standing, this appeal is dismissed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Hudson
The Appellant, Melvin Hudson, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and violating the sexual offender registry act. The trial court imposed an agreed-upon sentence of eight years and denied the Appellant’s request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Appellant argues this denial was an abuse of discretion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
PMC Squared, LLC v. Rita Gallo Et Al.
Tenants filed action against their former landlord in the form of a Countercomplaint, alleging that they had |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elizabeth Y.
In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence four statutory grounds supporting termination. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety, including termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Allison Cooper v. Tony Cooper
This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s classification, valuation, and equitable division of marital property. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Michael D. Lewis v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner, Michael D. Lewis, pleaded guilty to four counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and received an effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because counsel: (1) was unprepared for trial and failed to develop a defense; (2) failed to inform Petitioner “of the potential merits of his motion to suppress the State’s evidence” before Petitioner entered a plea agreement; and (3) failed to contact material witnesses named by Petitioner that may have benefited his defense. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dominque Justice
In 2020, the Defendant, Dominque Justice, entered an open plea to twenty-eight counts of |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Southern Advanced Materials, LLC
Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to deny its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and grant the plaintiff’s motion to confirm an arbitration award. Because we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish that the trial court had either specific or general jurisdiction over this matter, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alejandro Avila-Salazar
In 2006, the Defendant, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, pled guilty to second degree murder and attempted aggravated rape. Seventeen years later, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or, alternatively, to modify his sentences. The trial court denied the motion, finding it to be untimely. On appeal, the Defendant raises different issues. He argues that an amended judgment for his attempted aggravated rape conviction is improper because the sentence is expired. He also asserts that his conviction for second degree murder is invalid because it violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant did not raise these issues in the trial court and has thus waived them on appeal. We respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lizandro Guevara
The Petitioner, Lizandro Guevara, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sheryl Galison v. Jennifer Brownell, et al.
After a jury trial, Appellant received a $500.00 award. She then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the exclusion of certain testimony, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Appellant again argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony. Because Appellant failed to properly raise these issues post-trial, the issues are waived, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Ann Giro v. Kaleb Wilburn Et Al.
This appeal concerns service of process and the statute of limitations. Vicki Ann Giro (“Giro”) sued Kaleb Wilburn (“Wilburn”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Giro sustained in a car accident with Wilburn. Giro failed to timely serve the summons in compliance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and failed to issue new process before the statute of limitations expired. Giro filed a motion for enlargement of time. In opposition to Giro’s motion, the Trial Court was furnished with an altered copy of Hollis ex rel. Nicole N. v. Sanchez, No. M2022-01190-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5920145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2023), no appl. perm. appeal filed. The altered copy of Hollis retains the heading “MEMORANDUM OPINION” but omits Footnote 1 stating that, as a memorandum opinion, Hollis is not to be cited or relied on in any unrelated case pursuant to Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10. The Trial Court, which had been furnished on Wilburn’s behalf with the altered copy missing the explanatory footnote, relied heavily on Hollis to deny Giro’s motion for enlargement of time. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to exercise its discretion on whether to grant Giro’s motion for enlargement of time without considering Hollis or any other opinion designated by this Court as a memorandum opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Hardison (Stokes) Williams v. Ernest K. Hardison, III et al.
This is a breach of trust action by a trust beneficiary, Nancy Hardison (Stokes) Williams (“Plaintiff”), against the co-trustees, Ernest K. Hardison, III, and Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (collectively “Defendants”). The issues raised in this appeal only pertain to Plaintiff’s claims against Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (“Cumberland”). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Cumberland committed a breach of trust by failing to properly manage and invest trust assets resulting in the trust sustaining significant financial losses. In her effort to recover damages against Cumberland, Plaintiff also sought to declare two trust indemnity and investment agreements—which she and all qualified beneficiaries entered into with Cumberland in 2006 and 2009—void ab initio on the basis that they are unenforceable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008 because they violate a material purpose of the trust. She also contended that the agreements are unenforceable because they constitute “an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008(b). Upon the motion of Defendants for partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims arising prior to July 1, 2016, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1005(a). Additionally, upon the finding that Plaintiff and the qualified beneficiaries had released Cumberland from liability pursuant to the indemnity and investment agreements, the trial court summarily dismissed all remaining claims against Cumberland. The court then awarded Cumberland its attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $45,594.70 pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1004(a). This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Cumberland is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses it has incurred in this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demond Maurice Buchanan
Defendant, Demond Maurice Buchanan, appeals his resentencing resulting in a 52-year sentence, imposed following the trial court’s revocation of his original 12-year community corrections sentence. Defendant argues the sentence is excessive and the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects, but, because Defendant’s 12-year sentence for evading arrest in case number 2016-C-1352 is illegal, we modify the sentence to six years and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in that case. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Merritt v. Christian Fahey, et al.
Bringing a suit pro se, a Patient sued his healthcare providers under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court dismissed the Patient’s claims, deeming them time-barred. Instead of promptly appealing that order, the Patient serially submitted various motions over the course of approximately a year. The trial court denied the Patient’s motions. The Patient appeals. Concluding that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the Patient’s appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Small et al. v. Jon Law et al.
This began as an immediate appeal of an order dismissing a suit under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the appeal, the only issue that remains is the request of the defendants, now proceeding as appellants, for an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred on appeal. Because an award is mandatory, we grant the request and remand to the trial court to determine the amount. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah G.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals |