In Re Estate of Billy Hawk, Jr. Et Al v. Chambliss Bahner & Stophel, P.C.
E2022-01420-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Robert E. Lee Davies

The appellants sued the appellee, a law firm, alleging that the law firm committed legal malpractice when it gave the appellants legal advice with regard to the tax implications of a stock sale. The law firm filed two motions for summary judgment arguing that the legal malpractice case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Both motions were denied when the trial court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found that the legal malpractice case was timely filed but that the law firm had not committed legal malpractice. Upon our diligent review of the record, we affirm.

Christopher A. Duncan v. State of Tennessee
M2023-01549-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry J. Wallace

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Duncan, appeals from the Cheatham County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted
second degree murder, aggravated arson, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
burglary, and theft of property valued at more than $2,500 but less than $10,000, for
which he is serving an effective seventy-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner
contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective
assistance of counsel allegations for trial counsel’s failure (1) to file motions to suppress,
(2) to file a motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants, (3) to file a motion to
dismiss count five of the indictment relating to theft of property and to object to other
evidence relating to the theft of the victim’s car, (4) to request jury instructions for
facilitation of a felony or accessory after the fact, and (5) to object to the State’s witness
vouching during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Peggy Mathes et al. v. 99 Hermitage, LLC
M2021-00883-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

This appeal raises a thorny question about adverse possession. Under that doctrine, a party may gain legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property by maintaining exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious possession of the property for a certain length of time. At issue here is the adversity requirement. The original plaintiff in this case, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property near downtown Nashville years ago but did not register the deed. About two decades later, the individual who sold the property to Mr. Eads defaulted on a loan, and his creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold to enforce the lien. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Eads adversely possessed the property during the intervening years. Defendant, the subsequent purchaser of the property, disagrees and argues that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse. We agree with defendant. Adversity, for purposes of both common-law and statutory adverse possession, requires either a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Because neither existed here for the requisite time period, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and reinstate the chancery court’s judgment in favor of defendant.

Peggy Mathes et al. v. 99 Hermitage, LLC (Dissenting)
M2021-00883-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

I agree with the majority that, to acquire legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property through adverse possession, the Plaintiffs must show Mr. Eads had “exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious” possession of the property for the requisite time. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Eads’s possession of the property was not “adverse.” ¹ I would hold Mr. Eads has met the requirements to show a hostile or adverse possession for common-law and statutory adverse possession.²

In Re Cartier H., Et Al.
M2024-00203-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

This is the second appeal involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two children. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s finding that the mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We remanded the case for the trial court to make additional factual findings and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order with additional findings and conclusions. The mother appeals again. We affirm.

In Re Violet R.
E2023-00308-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mike Dumitru

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned his child by failure to visit. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

James Nicholas Howard v. Ama Narvarte Howard
M2022-01478-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Wall Olita

The parties to this appeal separated in 2019 and executed a separation agreement requiring
the husband to pay child support for the parties’ three children. When the husband filed
for divorce in 2021, he requested that the child support be modified pursuant to a provision
in the separation agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the
husband’s child support obligation should be modified due to a substantial change in the
parties’ circumstances. Following a motion to alter or amend filed by the wife, however,
the trial court reversed its initial ruling, holding that the husband’s child support obligation
was non-modifiable. The husband appealed to this Court. Because the trial court erred in
granting the wife’s motion to alter or amend, we reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Lisa Ann Welch v. William Mark Welch
W2022-00227-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Gadson W. Perry

The trial court found multiple counts of criminal contempt stemming from Husband’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug and alcohol testing. It fined him $7,100.00 and sentenced him to fifty days in jail. On appeal, Husband contends that the court’s order holding him in contempt lacked sufficient factual findings. He also contends that the orders requiring testing were ambiguous and unclear and that there was insufficient proof that his failure to submit to testing was willful. Finally, he challenges the punishment because of its impact on his parenting time. We affirm the finding of criminal contempt in part as modified and vacate the sentence.

State of Tennessee v. Andrew James Skaalerud
M2023-01595-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Angelita Blackshear Dalton

The Defendant, Andrew James Skaalerud, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of the three-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded conviction for possession with intent to sell or to deliver alprazolam. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Derrick Lee Johnson
M2023-01662-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barry R. Tidwell

Derrick Lee Johnson, Defendant, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s judgment revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his probationary sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by improperly considering Defendant’s indicted charges instead of the ones for which he was ultimately convicted, and by failing to consider whether alternative sentencing would serve the ends of justice. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Eric Lee Hoosier, Sr.
M2022-01305-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert T. Bateman

The defendant, Eric L. Hoosier, Sr., was found guilty by a Montgomery County jury of criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder, criminal attempt to commit second-degree murder, employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, and reckless endangerment firing a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventy years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding character evidence of a victim, in denying the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial, and in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence within the range. The defendant also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Cornielus Thompson
M2023-01424-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

The Defendant, Gregory Cornielus Thompson, pled guilty to two counts of robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant was arrested and convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and felony evading arrest. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentences in full and ordered the original sentences into execution. On appeal, the Defendant argues that a complete revocation of his sentences was an abuse of discretion. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Dedrick Wiggins
W2024-00035-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

The pro se Defendant, Dedrick Wiggins, appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the Defendant has not raised a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re Keira F. et al.
M2023-01184-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two of her children based on three statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Michelle Miller v. Carlos Durand
E2024-00889-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Suzanne Cook

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. Michelle Miller, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

Marshall G. Tate v. State of Tennessee
M2022-01358-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bradley D. Sherman

After remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court, we reconsider Petitioner’s, Marshall G. Tate’s, appeal from the Franklin County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In Re Logan F.
M2023-01280-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge M. Caleb Bayless

This appeal concerns a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination existed: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) incarceration under a ten-year sentence; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child.

In Re Bentley E.
W2023-00846-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Michael Maloan

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Appellant/Father appeals the
trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to
provide more than token support and failure to exercise more than token visitation. Father
also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the
child’s best interest. Because Father met his burden to show that his failure to provide
support and to visit was not willful, we reverse the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights and granting Appellees’ petition for adoption.

In Re Bentley E. - Dissent
W2023-00846-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Michael Maloan

The Majority Opinion concludes that the trial court erred in finding clear and
convincing evidence that Father abandoned the Child by failing to either visit or support
him in the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(1) (stating that “abandonment” by the parent is a ground for termination of
parental rights); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A) (offering several definitions of the
term “abandonment,” including failure to visit or support the child in the four consecutive
months preceding the filing of the termination petition, as alleged in this case). Because I
conclude that Tennessee law compels the opposite conclusions, I must respectfully dissent
from the Majority Opinion.

Jack Scott v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
M2023-00422-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

The Tennessee Department of Transportation terminated a preferred service employee. Following the Step I and Step II appeals, the Board of Appeals upheld the termination. The employee petitioned for judicial review in the trial court. The trial court initially affirmed the Board of Appeals’ decision. The trial court then granted the employee’s motion to alter or amend and reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals. We reverse the trial court’s order.

State of Tennessee v. Jermaine Mitchell Gray
W2023-01158-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Brent Bradberry

The Appellant, Jermaine Mitchell Gray, appeals his conviction of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine for which he received a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.  He argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the State failed to reveal the existence and identity of a second confidential informant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (3) the trial court denied his right of allocution before sentencing.  We additionally deny appointed counsel’s July 18 motion to withdraw as counsel in this case.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Michael Dinovo, Jr. et al. v. Kenneth Binkley et al. (Dissenting)
M2023-00345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda J. McClendon

I agree with the majority that Mr. DiNovo failed to cite the record in the argument section of his brief in violation of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7), which requires appropriate references to the record in the argument section itself. I also agree with the majority that violations of Rule 27 may result in the dismissal of an appeal. Where I respectfully divide from my colleagues is that I do not agree that effectively dismissing Mr. DiNovo’s appeal is the appropriate response to the violation of Rule 27 under the circumstances of this case. I would instead consider Mr. DiNovo’s appeal on the merits; accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Craig Charles Et Al. v. Raymond Keith McCrary Et Al.
E2023-00608-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Lauderback

Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him liable for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. We affirm the jury verdict, but reverse, in part, the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under the parties’ contract. We also award the plaintiffs their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code section 27 1-122.

State of Tennessee v. Noah Rashad Lyles
M2023-01063-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Parkes

The defendant, Noah Rashad Lyles, pleaded guilty to theft of property between $1,000 and $2,500, and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Dinovo, Jr. et al. v. Kenneth Binkley et al.
M2023-00345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda J. McClendon

The Appellant previously entered into a workers’ compensation settlement agreement with the Appellee herein, Southern Energy Company, Inc., following serious injuries he received in an incident that had occurred at the latter’s biodiesel plant. Years later, the Appellant also attempted to recover against the Appellee in tort for the incident in the Davidson County Circuit Court. After the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee, the Appellant appealed to this Court. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.