In the Matter of J.L.E.
This is a mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights to her son. After the Tennessee Department of Children's Services took custody of her son, it prepared a permanency plan requiring Mother to obtain therapy and case management services and perform other remedial tasks within approximately twelve months. After only six months, however, the Department filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, and the court terminated her rights. Mother appeals claiming, in pertinent part, that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to reunite mother and son and that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother committed severe child abuse. We have determined that the Department has failed to prove a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and, consequently, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Author R. Turner v. State of Tennessee
This is a medical negligence case brought by a state prisoner. The plaintiff prisoner alleges injury stemming from an act of medical negligence by a state employee in August 2001, while the plaintiff prisoner was in state custody. In March 2002, the prisoner erroneously filed a lawsuit in chancery court, which was dismissed in January 2003. In February 2003, the prisoner filed the instant claim with the claims commission. The claims commission found that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the filing of the chancery lawsuit because the Attorney General had not agreed to transfer the chancery lawsuit, and dismissed the claim as untimely. The plaintiff prisoner appealed. This Court reversed the dismissal on the basis that the agreement of the Attorney General to the transfer was no longer required, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the claims commission found that the plaintiff prisoner’s claim was not in the class of cases eligible for transfer from chancery court, and on that basis again dismissed the plaintiff prisoner’s complaint as being untimely. The plaintiff prisoner again appeals. We affirm, concluding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the erroneous filing of the chancery court lawsuit, and that consequently the plaintiff prisoner’s claim with the claims commission was untimely. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Puckett, et al. v. Rebecca D. Roberson, et al.
Parents of minor killed as passenger in a single-car accident brought wrongful death action against Defendants/Appellees, a husband and wife whose home decedent had visited, as an uninvited guest, in the hour preceding the accident. Trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants/Appellees. Parents/Appellants appeal, asserting that Defendants/Appellees owed a duty of care to decedent because they condoned the use of alcohol by minors in their home and thereby created a special relation with decedent. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Beverly Dixon
The defendant, Beverly Dixon, pleaded guilty to one count of felony Class B theft of property over $60,000. The trial court imposed an incarcerative eight-year sentence and denied any form of alternative sentencing. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentencing process was flawed by the introduction of prejudicial hearsay and that the trial court should have granted probation or placement into a community corrections program. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Helen Richardson, Individually and on behalf of her Daughter and her Minor Children, Trina Richardson, Deceased v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis, et al.
This case involves the authority of the General Sessions Court to set aside its own judgment. The plaintiff’s decedent died in January 2000. In January 2001, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim in the General Sessions Court against the defendants. In April 2001, the General Sessions Court entered an order dismissing the case, without prejudice, for lack of prosecution. The General Sessions Court later determined that the order dismissing for lack of prosecution was erroneously entered. Consequently, in May 2001, the General Sessions Court entered a consent order setting aside its April 2001order. In December 2001, the plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the General Sessions lawsuit, and the General Sessions Court entered a consent order of dismissal without prejudice. In June 2002, the plaintiff refiled her lawsuit in the Circuit Court below. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, claiming that the plaintiff was required to refile her lawsuit within one year of the April 2001 General Sessions order, dismissing for lack of prosecution. The defendants asserted that the General Sessions Court was without authority to adjudicate the matter further after the April 2001 order of dismissal was entered. The Circuit Court disagreed and denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The defendants were granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal. We reverse, concluding that the General Sessions Court did not have the authority to set aside its April 2001 judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chester Floyd Cole
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Chester Floyd Cole, of incest, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years for the incest and six months for the assault1 to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the incest count pursuant to Rule 8, Tenn. R. Crim. P., and State v. Dominy, 67 S.W.3d 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mack T. Transou
The defendant, Mack T. Transou, stands convicted of rape and sexual battery, for which he received an effective sixteen-year sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions and sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress DNA evidence and the imposition of his sentence in violation of his right to trial by jury. Following our review upon the record, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer Lynn Alsip, et al. v. Johnson City Medical Center, et al.
In this medical malpractice case involving the alleged wrongful death of Walter Ray Alsip ("Mr. Alsip" or "the deceased"), we granted the plaintiffs' Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for an interlocutory appeal in order to review the trial court's order allowing defense counsel to engage in ex parte dialogue with Mr. Alsip's last-illness, non-defendant treating physicians. We conclude that the trial court erred in entering the order that permitted defense counsel to have private conversations with the non-defendant physicians who treated the deceased during his last illness. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. William F. Cain
The Appellant, William F. Cain, was convicted of misdemeanor stalking and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. On appeal, Cain raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and (2) whether he should have received a suspended sentence. After review, the judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Ebbs, alias
The appellant, Chris Ebbs, pled guilty in May of 1996 to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six (6) years in the Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the sentence to probation for six (6) years conditioned upon various requirements. In June of 2001, a probation violation warrant was filed. As a result, the trial court revoked the appellant's suspended sentence and ordered the appellant to serve the six-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's decision to revoke probation. After a review of the record and applicable legal authorities we conclude the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Amy Denise Sutton
We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to determine the legality of the defendant’s sentence. The defendant, Amy Denise Sutton, was convicted by a jury of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced her to confinement for one year, followed by two years in community corrections. On appeal, she contends that because the length of her confinement exceeds her estimated release eligibility date of 10.8 months, her sentence is illegal. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because we conclude that the defendant’s release eligibility date is a mere possibility and not a right, we find the sentence to be valid. Further, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented for a rational jury to convict the defendant of the charged offense. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Carroll | Supreme Court | |
Jeffrey Lynn Myers v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal as of right from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Jeffrey Lynn Myers, was convicted of one count of attempted rape upon entry of a best-interest guilty plea. He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment as a Range I, standard offender. The Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and received an evidentiary hearing. The trial court subsequently denied the Defendant's petition, and he now appeals to this Court. He argues multiple issues, all of which we find to have been waived because the claims are either (1) not proper issues for a post-conviction proceeding, (2) not properly preserved for appeal, or (3) not reviewable due to an incomplete record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roland R. Smith
The Defendant, Roland R. Smith, was convicted by a jury of nine counts of statutory rape and three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years on each of the statutory rape convictions and eleven years on each of the sexual exploitation convictions. The sentences were ordered to be served in such fashion as to result in an effective term of seventeen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support certain of his convictions of statutory rape; 2) whether certain of the Defendant's convictions must be reversed under the doctrine of election of offenses; 3) whether certain of the Defendant's convictions violate principles of double jeopardy; 4) whether the trial court erred in refusing to sever some of the offenses; and 5) whether the Defendant's sentence is excessive. We reverse and remand for retrial the Defendant's convictions of statutory rape arising out of Counts Four, Five, Eight and Nine. We reverse and dismiss the Defendant's conviction of statutory rape arising out of Count Six. The Defendant's effective sentence is thereby modified to fifteen years. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A. v. David Udom - Concurring and Dissenting
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Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A. v. David Udom
The issue presented in this case is whether a covenant not to compete is enforceable between a physician and his former employer, a private medical clinic. The trial court concluded that the noncompete agreement was enforceable and enjoined the physician from establishing a medical practice at a location within the restricted area. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the non-compete agreement was enforceable, but reversed the grant of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to the trial court for further determinations with respect to the agreement’s “buyout” provision. After a thorough review of the issues presented, including considerations of public policy, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We hold that except for those specifically prescribed by statute, physicians’ covenants not to compete are unenforceable and void. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. D.W.J.
This is a parental rights termination case. The mother appeals the trial court's decision terminating her parental rights to two of her three children. On appeal, the mother argues, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision and therefore, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Erskin McCullough
The Defendant, James Erskin McCullough, pled guilty to various offenses, and, while he was on probation for these convictions, a probation violation report was filed, stating that the Defendant failed to report to his probation officer and was arrested for theft. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation, and it ordered that the Defendant serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to revoke the Defendant's probation, and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linda Wagner v. Mark Firestone
In this action involving child support, the issues are whether the trial court erred in finding that the father provided adequate discovery information regarding his income and assets; whether the trial court erred in ordering the mother to pay half the cost of the father's airfare to attend his deposition in Tennessee; whether the court should have awarded the mother more attorney's fees than it did; and whether the trial court erred in failing to hold the father responsible for a hospital bill for medical treatment of the parties' child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
City of Knoxville v. Entertainment Resources, LLC. - Concurring
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
City of Knoxville v. Entertainment Resources, LLC.
We granted this appeal to determine the constitutionality of a Knoxville city ordinance regulating the location of adult businesses. The chancery court upheld the ordinance and enjoined operation of the defendant’s video store after finding that it fit the definition of an adult bookstore and was located within 1,000 feet of prohibited areas and therefore was operating in violation of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the ordinance’s definition of adult bookstores is unconstitutionally vague. Because we have also determined that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals but on the separate grounds set forth herein. We remand to the trial court for an assessment of the amount of damages incurred by the defendant as a result of the chancery court’s injunction. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
James Robert (Bo) Hobbs v. Nora Estelle Hobbs, Teresa Windle, and Don Holland
This case involves the conversion of personal property. For several years, the plaintiff son stored various types of equipment in a pole barn located on his mother’s property. The mother decided to sell her property and, in preparation for the sale, she hired the defendant scrap dealer to clear out the pole barn and sell its contents. The scrap dealer cleared out the pole barn and sold the son’s equipment for a total of $657. After the son learned of this, he sued his mother and the scrap dealer, claiming that they converted his property and asserting that the property was worth $22,000 if purchased new. After a trial, the trial court held that the mother and the scrap dealer had converted the son’s equipment, but awarded him $657 in damages, the salvage value of the property. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the son failed to submit proof of the actual value of the property at the time of the conversion. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Rick Watkins and Ellen Watkins, Individually and F/U/B How Insurance Company, in Receivership, b. Tankersley Construction, Inc.
This is a negligent construction case involving a statute of repose. The defendant developer bought the residential lot in question in 1992. The developer hired the defendant subcontractor to remove trees and perform the grading work necessary to make the lot suitable for the construction of a house. In 1993, the developer sold the lot to the defendant construction company, which constructed a house on the lot. In 1994, the construction company sold the lot and the house to purchasers not party to this litigation. In 1997, the purchasers sold the house to the plaintiffs in this case. A few weeks after the plaintiffs moved into the house, they noticed cracks in the walls and abnormal settling of the house. In April 2000, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the construction company and the subcontractor for negligent construction of the house and negligent grading of the lot. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the four-year statute of repose set out in T.C.A. § 28-3-202. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on that statute. The plaintiffs now appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment only as to the defendant subcontractor. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Tim Lewallen, et al. v. J. C. York, Jr.
Tim Lewallen and Marietta Lewallen ("Plaintiffs") sued J.C. York, Jr. ("Defendant") claiming, in part, that Defendant was interfering with their lawful right to use an easement over Defendant's land. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, "[t]hat an easement exists which runs with the land and burdens the defendant's property . . . ," and that Plaintiffs "have the use and benefit of the aforementioned easement for the purpose of ingress and egress." Defendant appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs have an easement over Defendant's land, and also that the Trial Court erred in considering parol evidence regarding the easement. We affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Harlan Thomas et al. v. John Carpenter, et. al.
This interlocutory appeal involves a plaintiff who was injured while helping the contractor building his house cut a board. The sole issue concerns whether the contractor is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the plaintiff's claims. The trial court determined that, by paying the plaintiff $10,000 for his medical expenses, the contractor's insurance company induced the plaintiff to believe the matter would be settled amicably without the necessity of a lawsuit. Thus, the trial court denied the contractor's motion for summary judgment, but granted the contractor an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also agree that summary judgment is not appropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist. However, the trier of fact should decide whether the $10,000 payment induced the plaintiff to believe that the matter would be settled amicably, and, therefore, we vacate the trial court's order to the extent it makes specific findings with regard to the plaintiff's beliefs stemming from the $10,000 payment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick D. Collins
We granted review of this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the defendant was sufficiently advised of the consequences of refusing to take a breath-alcohol test. The arresting officer informed the defendant that his license would be suspended for one year if he refused the test, but under the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(a) (2000) in effect at the time, the penalty was two years. The trial court held that the defendant was not sufficiently advised of the consequences and barred the State from seeking any suspension of the defendant's driver's license. The trial court also barred the State from arguing to the jury on the DUI charge that the defendant had refused the breath test. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was adequately advised of the consequences for refusing the test. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on the separate grounds set forth herein. We hold that although the State may request suspension of Collins' license, the State may not seek a suspension of longer than one year because Collins was incorrectly advised of the consequences of refusing to take the test. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |