State vs. Larry Morris
02C01-9701-CR-00008
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

State vs. Ctjuan James
02C01-9701-CR-00033
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

State vs. Joseph Manuel
02C01-9705-CC-00175
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn

State vs. Reginald Mabone
02C01-9705-CR-00181
Trial Court Judge: W. Fred Axley

State vs. Tyree
03C01-9607-CC-00279

State vs. Smith
03C01-9704-CR-00130

State vs. Felts
03C01-9708-CR-00333
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen

State vs. Cooley
03C01-9701-CR-00009
Trial Court Judge: James C. Witt

Burton vs. State
03C01-9704-CR-00122

Nelson vs. State
03C01-9704-CR-00142

State vs. Latavis Bailey
02C01-9703-CC-00115
Trial Court Judge: Dick Jerman, Jr.

H.W. Jenkins Co. vs. G.T. Designs
02A01-9707-CH-00170
Trial Court Judge: C. Neal Small

Estate of Bessie Holmes, Deceased
02A01-9707-PB-00158
Trial Court Judge: Leonard D. Pierotti

Charles Dorse vs. Martin Kriger
02A01-9712-CH-00315

Rice vs. Rice
03A01-9709-CV-00415

Martin vs. Martin
03A01-9708-GS-00323

Swiggett vs. Ogle
03A01-9709-CH-00430

Shankel vs. Morris
03A01-9710-CV-00478

Buford vs. Buford
03A01-9710-CV-00445

Collins vs. State
03C01-9704-CR-00148
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown

Graves vs. State
03C01-9705-CR-00171
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown

Clapp vs. State
03C01-9701-CR-00028

Weston vs. State
03C01-9612-CR-00484
Trial Court Judge: Mary Beth Leibowitz

Bobby Riddick v. Jackson Metal Services
02S01-9703-CV-00016
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Franklin Murchison,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 25 percent permanent partial disability to his left foot. The defendant says the evidence preponderates against a finding the plaintiff had suffered any permanent impairment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. On May 25, 1995, a steel beam fell upon the plaintiff's foot, causing a fracture of the foot. The medical testimony in this case is not extensive. Dr. Larry David Johnson, an orthopedic surgeon, was the treating physician. Dr. Johnson diagnosed the injury as a non-displaced fracture of the first metatarsal bone of the [left] foot. Dr. Johnson saw the plaintiff on May 23, 1995 for the initial exam and on four occasions after that. He testified the plaintiff recovered from the injury in due course. Dr. Johnson released the plaintiff to work on July 5, 1995 and found he had reached maximum medical recovery at that time. Dr. Johnson examined the plaintiff on August 16, 1995 and found the fracture had healed. Dr. Johnson found the plaintiff suffered no permanent impairment from the injury. Dr. Robert J. Barnett, an orthopedic surgeon, examined the plaintiff in June 1996. Dr. Barnett found that the plaintiff was continuing to have pain in his foot, that he has to walk on the outside of his foot, and that he had some swelling in his left foot. Dr. Barnett's testimony, when read in context of the injury in question, is that the plaintiff sustained a 14 percent permanent partial impairment to his left foot. The defendant asks that Dr. Barnett's testimony be depreciated because his notes showed the injury occurred May 22, 1994 rather than May 22, 1995. When the defendant asked Dr. Barnett if the injury occurred in 1995 rather than 1994 "then we'd be talking a little different situation, wouldn't we," Dr. Barnett answered "could be." The "could be" was never explored beyond this. Dr. Barnett testified subsequently that the differences in dates would not change any opinion he gave. 2

Patsy Stedman v. Hardaway Construction Co., Inc.
02S01-9703-CH-00017
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained a 25 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as the result of an injury she suffered at work. The defendant has filed an appeal from the judgment. The plaintiff has moved to dismiss the appeal because the defendant failed to timely file a notice of appeal. We find that the appeal was not timely filed and therefore dismiss the appeal. The judgment in which the plaintiff was awarded 25 percent disability was entered on November 19, 1996. On December 23, 1996, the defendant filed a motion for relief from the judgment under RULE 6.2(1) and (5), TENN. R. CIV. P. The defendant's only basis for relief under this rule was that the failure to timely file a notice of appeal was inadvertent. Counsel asserted she thought the notice had been filed and was surprised to learn it had not been filed. On December 27, 1996, the defendant filed a motion to have the trial court enter a final judgment in the case. In that motion, the defendant asserted the trial court's judgment of November 19, 1996 was not final because it disposed of less than all the claims raised by the plaintiff in the original petition. The defendant's motion asserted that the trial court, in its judgment, had not disposed of the following issues: "(1) Whether plaintiff is entitled to temporary disability benefits; (2) When plaintiff's disability became permanent within the meaning of the Tennessee W orkers' Compensation Law; (3) Whether plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses incurred to date; and (4) Whether plaintiff is entitled to a lump sum award." On January 8, 1997, the trial judge entered an Amended Final Judgment. It is the defendant's contention that under RULE 54.2, TENN. R. CIV. P., the original judgment entered on November 19, 1996 was not final, and until the trial court had entered a final judgment the defendant could not appeal the case under the directive of RULE 3, TENN. R. APP. P. The defendant argues that the time for 2