Robert C. Daniels, v. Charles Traughber, Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al. - Concurring
01A01-9707-CH-00297
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s order. In my view, it is simply a case of statutory application. In the “Open Parole Hearings Act” of 1993 the legislature provided that the Parole Board shall receive and consider victim impact statements, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-504(a); that notice be given to the victim or the victim’s representative and to the trial judge and district attorney involved in the original criminal prosecution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(b)(1), (2) and (4); and that on a failure to provide the required notices, the Board may schedule a new hearing if the Board receives a written victim impact statement within fifteen days of the time the parole decision is finalized, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(d)(2).

Lunn Real Estate Investments, v. Boiler Supply Company, Incorporated
01A01-9704-CV-00191
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.

This case involves a contractual dispute between the lessor and lessee of certain commercial property. The appellant, Lunn Real Estate Investments, Inc. (Lunn), leased the subject premises to the appellee, Boiler Supply Company, pursuant to an agreement executed by the parties on January 1, 1989. On August 31, 1995, Lunn served Boiler Supply with written notice that it was requiring the latter to vacate the premises by October 1, 1995.1 On October 5, 1995, Lunn filed a detainer action in the general sessions court seeking possession of the property. By order entered April 19, 1996, the court found the claim for possession moot due to Boiler Supply’s vacating of the premises on November 30, 1995, but awarded Lunn a judgment for two months holdover rent plus attorney’s fees.2 Lunn appealed the decision to circuit court where, after a hearing, a judgment was entered for Lunn for $17,790. Lunn now appeals from that decision to this Court requesting additional compensatory damages, due to Boiler Supply’s alleged failure to maintain the premises in accordance with the contract, and attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Robert C. Daniels, v. Charles Traughber, Chairman, Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
01A01-9707-CH-00297
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

The plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed in the Trial Court a petition for the writ of certiorari from the action of the Board of Paroles on April 18, 1996, rescinding its order of April 9, 1994, granting the prisoner a parole. At the time of the rescission, the prisoner had not been released from custody.

Contour Medical Technology, Inc., v. Flexcon Company, Inc.
01A01-9707-CH-00315
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The plaintiff, ContourMedical Technology, Inc., has appealed from a partial summary judgment dismissing that part of plaintiff’s claim against the defendant, Flexcon Company, Inc., which seeks consequential damages resulting from defects in material purchased by plaintiff from defendant. The Trial Judge directed entry of final judgment as provided by TRCP Rule 54.02.

Eli Mike, an individual, James A. Schrampfer, an individual, and Jane B. Forbes, as Trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of David L. Osborn, et al. v. Po Group, Inc., et. al.
01A01-9707-CH-00321
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

The captioned plaintiffs’ have appealed from a summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ actions against the corporate defendant for the value of their stock as dissenting minority shareholders and their action against the individual defendants for breach of fiduciary duty as corporate directors.

Batson East-Land Co, Inc., v Ronnie D. Boyd
01A01-9708-CH-00387
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Alex W. Darnell

Ronnie D. Boyd, the Assessor of Property of Montgomery County, Tennessee, appeals the trial court’s judgment which ruled that eighty-nine percent (89%) of a parcel of real property owned by Petitioner/Appellee Batson East-Land Company, Inc., was entitled to “Greenbelt” status for the tax year 1991. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling and, thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Car Connection, Inc. v. Auto Buyers, Inc.
01A01-9707-CV-00301
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This suit was filed in General Sessions Court to collect a dishonored check, but was appealed to the Circuit Court where a complaint was filed stating more details of transactions involving the transfer of ownership of two automobiles, a Honda and a Chevrolet.

Carver Plumbing Company, Inc., v. Martha Cone Beck
01A01-9708-CV-00377
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer

The appellee has filed a petition for rehearing in this cause which, after due consideration, is denied.

In re: The Estate of Harold L. Jenkins, Deceased, Hugh C. Carden and Donald W. Garis as Co-Executors of the Harold L. Jenkins Estate, v. Joni L. Jenkins and Kathy L. Jenkins
01A01-9709-CH-00500
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas E. Gray

This is yet another chapter in the administration of the estate of Harold L. Jenkins, a popular entertainer whose stage name was “Conway Twitty.” The executors initiated the present proceeding to resolve disputed rights of three devises in respect to the collection from them of certain charges appearing on the records of the deceased. The Probate Court resolved the issues in favor of the executors, and two of the devises appealed.

Barbara Ann Hall and David A. Hall, v. St. Thomas Hospital\, Rachel Kaiser, M.D., and Daniel L. Starnes, M.D.
01A01-9709-CV-00504
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This is a medical malpractice suit in which the plaintiffs have appealed from a summary
judgment in favor of all defendants.

Bill McMurry v. Hancock County Election Commission, John Knox Walkup, Attorney General of Tennessee, et al. - Concurring
03A01-9804-CH-
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Dale Young

The appellant, a nonlawyer, was elected to the office of General Sessions Judge of Hancock County in the August 1990 general election.

State of Tennessee vs. Darrell Braddock
02C01-9707-CR-00279
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

On Septem ber 12, 1996, a Shelby County jury found Appellant, Darrell E. Braddock, guilty of first degree felony m urder, criminal attem pt: to wit especially aggravated robbery, criminal attempt: to wit murder in the first degree, and two counts of aggravated assault. Appellant appeals from his convictions, raising two issues:

1) whether the evidence presented at trial was leg ally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict; and
2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State, because of the victim ’s family’s feelings, to withdraw its offer of a plea bargain.

After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Jeff Hubrig v. Lockheed-Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Linc Hall, Individually; Larry Pierce, Individually, and Jim Kolling, Individually
03A01-9711-CV-00525
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott

The plaintiff describes himself as a whistle blower, as that term has come to be used, and seeks damages for his termination from employment because he allegedly refused to participate in and keep silent about certain allegedly illegal corporate activities. The allegations were denied by the defendants whose motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appeals and presents for review the issues of (1) whether he was terminated for time card abuse and sexual harassment or whether these reasons were pretextual, (2) whether a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge remains viable in this jurisdiction, and (3) whether his termination constituted outrageous conduct by the defendants. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is denovo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of thecorrectness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d). See, Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). We will refer to the plaintiff as Hubrig, or as the appellant, or as the plaintiff. This record is unusually prolix; prima facie, it appeared to reflect a trial by affidavit, an impermissible use of RULE 56, see: Womack v. Blue Cross- Blue Shield, 593 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. 1980), but an in-depth analysis reveals that the trial court correctly held that the totality of the evidence demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact or law. We therefore affirm the judgment.

State of Tennessee vs. William Robert Diaz
03C01-9610-CC-00375
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

The appellant, William Robert Diaz, appeals as of right the convictions and sentences he received in the Criminal Court of Anderson County. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder and was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to twenty-two (22) years for the murder and to twelve (12) years for attempted murder.1 The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

Ronnie Erwin v. Moon Products
M2002-00877-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: J. B. Cox
This is an appeal from a denial of an application to compel arbitration. For the following reasons, we affirm the court below.

State vs. Jesse James Gilbert
03C01-9707-CC-00269
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

03A01-9901-CH-00015
03A01-9901-CH-00015

Hon. Frank v. Williams,
03S01-9706-CH-00074
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In March 1995, the plaintiff in this case brought suit against Superior Steel, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("the defendants") and the Second Injury Fund1 claiming that he was entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits for two work related injuries: a knee injury and an occupational disease. First, the trial judge found that the plaintiff had sustained a ten percent permanent partial disability to his right leg. Second, the trial judge found that the plaintiff was 1 percent permanently and totally disabled as a result of a chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder which he classified as an occupational disease because the plaintiff's condition was exacerbated by breathing diesel fumes during his employment with the defendant. The trial judge merged the two injuries and thereby awarded the plaintiff 1 percent disability benefits. The defendants appeal the trial court's findings regarding the plaintiff's occupational disease, contending that the trial judge erred (1) in ruling that the statute of limitations had not expired, (2) in ruling that notice had been properly given, and (3) in finding that the plaintiff's condition was an occupational disease which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant. The defendants do not appeal the trial court's findings of disability to the plaintiff's leg, but a brief reference to the knee injury is necessary for a proper discussion of the facts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND The plaintiff, 48 years of age, worked as an oiler and crane operator for most of his working life -- approximately 28 years. For almost 32 years of his life, the plaintiff smoked two packs of cigarettes per day. The plaintiff quit smoking in June 1992. 1 The trial judge dismissed the Second Injury Fund from this case and we find the dismissal was proper. By reason of Tenn. Code. Ann. __ 5-6-28(a) and (b), the Second Injury Fund is not liable to the plaintiff. 2

State vs. Stanley Harville a/k/a Stanley Salahuddin
01C01-9703-CC-00104

State vs. Garrett Raines
01C01-9704-CC-00127

State vs. Pam Davis
02C01-9704-CC-00139

State vs. Mario Boyd
02C01-9703-CR-00110

Jerry Cunningham vs. Baker, et al
02A01-9712-CV-00299

Regan vs. Malone
03A01-9707-CH-00281

McClellan vs. Stanley
03A01-9708-CV-00343