State of Tennessee v. Michael Flamini, Jr.
The Defendant, Michael Flamini, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Gladys Claire Bowen v. Michael W. Nelson, M.D., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of her proffered expert for failure to comply with the locality rule. Plaintiff also appeals the grant of summary of judgment based on the exclusion of that expert. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, we affirm that ruling. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment as the excluded testimony was the only evidence offered regarding the applicable standard of care. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline Payne v. Shelby County, Tennessee et al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s award of damages to the plaintiff after a bench trial in an auto accident case. The trial court declined to award the plaintiff all of the damages she sought because it concluded that her most significant injury, a torn rotator cuff, was not caused by the auto accident at issue. The plaintiff then filed a motion to recuse and to set aside the judgment due to a friendship between the trial judge’s son and counsel for the defendant, but the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Hutson Boone v. Paul Dale Boone
The main issues in this post-divorce appeal concern the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. In addition to the post-divorce proceedings, the husband filed a declaratory judgment petition to determine the amount he owed the wife under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”). The husband and the wife then engaged in protracted litigation to determine the amount owed. The husband later amended the declaratory judgment petition to include a request to modify alimony. The parties resolved the declaratory judgment petition by providing the trial court with an amount upon which they agreed. The husband then voluntarily nonsuited the petition to modify alimony. Both parties sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the MDA. The trial court determined that the husband was the successful party in the declaratory judgment action and that there was no successful party in the request to modify alimony. The court declined to award either party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, asserting that she was the successful party in both actions and that the court should have awarded her attorney’s fees to her. The wife also challenged discovery sanctions entered against her. First, we determine that the declaratory judgment action did not fall under the fee provision of the parties’ MDA. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the husband to be the successful party in that action; we affirm the portion of the order declining to award either party attorney’s fees. Next, based upon a recent decision of our Supreme Court, we determine that the wife was the successful party in the petition to modify alimony and reverse the trial court’s decision to the contrary. We affirm the imposition of discovery sanctions. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Randall L. Pruitt v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Randall L. Pruitt, entered open guilty pleas to three counts of rape, and following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-eight and one-half years. This court affirmed Petitioner’s sentences on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him of his potential sentences by pleading guilty without a sentencing agreement with the State. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kristen Alice Rowe v. Calvin Albert Rowe, III
Following a bench trial in this divorce action, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court entered a permanent parenting plan order, designating the wife as the primary residential parent to the parties’ four minor children and granting the husband 144 days of annual residential co-parenting time. In what the court found to be an equitable division of the marital estate, it awarded to the wife $303,260.00 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of the marital residence and her marital share of the husband’s military retirement. The husband received $274,097.10 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of an unimproved parcel of real property. The court directed that the wife would be responsible for the mortgage owed on the marital residence but also directed that the wife would not be required to refinance the mortgage debt until the youngest child had reached the age of eighteen years. Finding the wife to be the economically disadvantaged spouse and expressly finding that she was not voluntarily underemployed, the court awarded to her $5,000.00 monthly in transitional alimony for a period of six years, to be offset by her share of the husband’s military retirement benefits upon his retirement. However, the court specified that “[t]he amount of $5,000.00 is a global amount which shall include the child support obligation owed by [the husband].” Based on the child support guidelines, the court ordered the husband to pay $1,992.00 monthly in child support. The court further awarded to the wife $10,127.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment with the minor modification of an added provision stating that the wife will indemnify and hold the husband harmless for the mortgage debt on the marital residence until it is paid in full or refinanced. We also award to the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacorey Tyvon Forte
The Defendant, Jacorey Tyvon Forte, was found guilty by a Hamilton County jury of aggravated robbery, and he received a sentence of eleven years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of this offense. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Sands v. Grady Perry, Warden
The Petitioner, David Sands, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his sentence has expired due to “missing” pretrial jail credit and improper calculation of behavioral and work credits. After review, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Valerie Garrett
Defendant, Valerie Garrett, was convicted following a bench trial of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, and failure to maintain lane of travel. Defendant claims that the deputy who arrested her lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
HG Jones, LLC v. Jordan Howell et al.
At issue is a purely legal question, the interpretation and application of “other insurance” clauses in two respective insurance policies that determine which policy provides primary coverage and which provides excess coverage to the property management company in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones, LLC, d/b/a Real Property Management Solutions (“HG Jones”), is the manager of property owned by Jordan Howell (“Mr. Howell”). Both are defendants in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones is the named insured under a Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Mr. Howell is the named insured in a Dwelling and Personal Property Coverage Policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In this action, HG Jones sought a declaration that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action as the primary insurer because HG Jones qualifies as an “insured” as that term is defined in the Cincinnati policy. For its part, Cincinnati claimed that its policy only provides excess coverage over HG Jones Auto-Owners’ policy based, inter alia, on the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies and the fact that HG Jones was not specifically listed as an “additional insured” under the Cincinnati policy. The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court determined that there was no legal distinction between the terms “insured” and “additional insured” and HG Jones was an insured under the Cincinnati policy. Therefore, the court ruled that Cincinnati had the primary duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action. Cincinnati appeals. We have determined that the “other insurance” clauses set forth in the two policies must be deemed void because they are mutually repugnant. Because HG Jones is the named insured under the Auto-Owners’ policy and HG Jones is an insured under the Cincinnati policy by virtue of the definition of an “insured” under that policy, both policies afford HG Jones primary coverage. Thus, the duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action must be prorated between Cincinnati and Auto-Owners. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Frazier II and Bionka McGaughy
In June 2021, the Shelby County Grand Jury issued a three-count indictment charging Roy Frazier II (“Defendant Frazier”) with two counts of aggravated rape of a child (Counts 1 and 2) and Bionka McGaughy (“Defendant McGaughy”) with child abuse or neglect of a child eight years of age or less (Count 3). Following a joint trial, a jury convicted Defendant Frazier of aggravated rape of a child in Count 1 and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count 2, for which he received a sentence of life without parole plus twenty years. The jury convicted Defendant McGaughy of child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, for which the trial court imposed a sentence of two years to be served in the workhouse. On appeal, Defendant Frazier contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting multiple hearsay statements; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity; (4) the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors in sentencing; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentencing. For her part, Defendant McGaughy argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for child neglect of a child eight years of age or less. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of conviction in all respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System v. Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration et al.
A hospital system filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking invalidation of two TennCare State Plan Amendments on the basis that they violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-108. The two State Plan Amendments set forth reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court declared that the TennCare State Plan Amendments were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
JANINE M LAMOTHE ET AL. v. DEER HILL VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION INC.
Deer Hill Village Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) appeals from the order of the Chancery Court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs Janine M. Lamothe and Matthew T. Davenport (hereinafter “Appellees”). The underlying controversy is a request from Appellees, who own a condominium in Deer Hill Village, to inspect the HOA’s corporate records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-66-102 et seq. After subsequent filings from both parties, including multiple motions to enlarge time for discovery from the HOA, the Chancery Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The HOA timely appealed to this Court. Having determined that the Chancery Court failed to state the legal and factual grounds on which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the order at issue and remand for entry of an order that complies with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority v. Division of TennCare et al.
A hospital system that was the aggrieved party in this contested case before The Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration sought judicial review of the agency’s decision upholding the validity of two TennCare rules. The two rules regulate reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court reversed the agency’s decision and held that the two rules were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David L. Richman Et Al. v. Joshua Debity Et Al.
This is the parties’ second appeal before this Court in the above-styled case. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. After this Court’s mandate issued, however, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. The defendants opposed the notice, but the trial court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice. The defendants again appealed to this Court. Because the plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary nonsuit was untimely, and because the trial court’s action exceeds the scope of our instructions on remand, we vacate the trial court’s order and again remand this case to the trial court for entry of a sufficient order. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Glenn Clark
A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Christopher Glenn Clark, of first-degree premeditated murder, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1); first-degree murder in perpetration of a felony, id. § 39-13-202(a)(2); burglary of a building other than a habitation, id. § 39-13-1002(a)(1); theft under $1000, id. § 39-14-103; unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior violent felony, id. § 39-17- 1307(b)(1)(A); and unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior felony drug offense, id. § 39-13-1307(b)(1)(B). After a sentencing hearing, the defendant received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, murder in perpetration of a felony, and burglary. Additionally, he contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we also conclude the trial court failed to make the required findings in support of its sentencing determinations, and therefore, vacate the defendant’s consecutive terms and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing to determine the appropriateness of consecutive terms. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jay Walker
The Defendant, Jay Walker, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction to the jury during their deliberations. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Dyquanne Cross
The defendant, Gary Dyquanne Cross, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jeremiah Devon Cohill
Defendant, Jeremiah Devon Cohill, was convicted by a jury of carjacking (count one), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and conspiracy to commit carjacking (count four). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years as a Range I offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instruction for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) his sentence is excessive; and (4) the judgment for count one contains a clerical error. Following our review of the entire record, the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we reverse, vacate and dismiss Defendant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two). In all other aspects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE EMORY S.
In this parental termination case, the father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, Emory S. The trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Based on these findings, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Ferguson Enterprises, LLC v. Norris Bros. Excavating, LLC et al.
A contractor purchased construction materials from a supplier and then failed to pay for the materials. The supplier brought suit to recover payment and later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the supplier’s motion. Finding no error, we affirm and remand the matter to calculate the supplier’s appellate attorney’s fees. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tristan Weatherspoon
The defendant, Tristan Weatherspoon, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Christ M. Christopher
A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Christ M. Christopher, guilty of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences imposed. He argues that the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors and imposed an effective sentence greater than necessary to achieve the purposes and principles of sentencing. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Dejuan Perkins
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Marcus Dejuan Perkins, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying an enhancement factor and denying an alternative sentence to incarceration. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tondre Dupress Ragland
A Haywood County jury convicted the Defendant, Tondre Dupress Ragland, of attempted second degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Defendant’s convictions, but we reversed the imposition of consecutive sentences and remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Wilkerson factors. State v. Ragland, W2022-01303-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 3947501, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 12, 2023), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On remand, the trial court found that the Defendant was a dangerous offender and again imposed consecutive sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it found that he was a dangerous offender for purposes of consecutive sentencing. After conducting a de novo review, we conclude that the Defendant’s sentences should be served concurrently, rather than consecutively. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals |