APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this probate action, the executor of the decedent’s estate alleged that the defendant, who was the decedent’s wife, had exercised undue influence over the decedent.  Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding that the defendant did not have a confidential relationship with the decedent.  The plaintiff has appealed.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.                                                                

Wesley Allen Lacey, Defendant, was charged in a presentment by the Knox County Grand
Jury with one count of second degree murder and one count of delivery of fentanyl in an
amount less than fifteen grams. A jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder
and casual exchange. As a result, he was sentenced to fifteen years to be served at 100%
for the second degree murder conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the
casual exchange conviction, to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of
fifteen years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant
appealed challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for second
degree murder and the admission of testimony from a medical examiner who did not
perform the autopsy of the victim. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Collin Kilpatrick, was convicted by a Lewis County Circuit Court jury of possession of drug paraphernalia and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of eight years at 85% release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding exculpatory information of addresses on file with the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“Board” or “Board of Probation and Parole”); that the trial court erred by refusing to conduct an in camera review of the Board’s records that were in the possession of the State, by denying the Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction on possession, and by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the State’s discovery violations; and that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A defendant appeals a judgment arising out of a dispute over residential electrical work. Because the defendant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Dewayne Winslow, was convicted by a Knox County jury of possession of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony, failure to carry vehicle registration, and unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court imposed an effective 17-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the narcotics and firearm found in his vehicle and by allowing the State to introduce Defendant’s prior drug conviction as evidence of intent. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charlie M. Gardner, was convicted in May 1999 by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of one count of first degree murder and two counts of reckless aggravated assault.  State v. Gardner, No. M1999-02214-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 306227, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2001).  The Defendant’s convictions were affirmed on appeal.  Id. at *13.  On March 11, 2025, the Defendant filed a motion to correct clerical errors in his judgments of conviction, which the trial court granted on April 11, 2025.  The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on May 12, 2025, arguing it was timely because it was filed within thirty days of the entry of his corrected judgments.  The trial court summarily dismissed the Defendant’s motion for a new trial as untimely.  The Defendant appeals.  Discerning no error, we affirm. 

The Defendant, Cliesha D. Tedunjaye, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of driving under the influence (“DUI) and DUI per se, Class A misdemeanors; possessing a handgun while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; violating the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor; and failing to maintain her lane of travel, a Class C misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail and the remainder on probation supervised by community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions of DUI, DUI per se, and possession of a handgun while under the influence because the State failed to prove her intoxication. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

Defendant, Timothy Christopher Pillow, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent felon, evading arrest with a motor vehicle, and identity theft. At sentencing, Defendant requested an alternative sentence under the Community Corrections Act. Instead, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven years’ incarceration, finding that Defendant’s history of criminal conduct and the need to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the current offenses warranted confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for community corrections. Following our review, we affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim for false imprisonment based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, filed by Samuel Forrester Hunter (“Father”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Father, and finding no error, we affirm the denial of the recusal motion.

Andrew Wylie, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus (“the Habeas Petition”), claiming that his sentence had expired and that he was being illegally restrained of his liberty due to the trial court’s refusal to award sentence credits for the time Petitioner served while on community corrections (“street credit”). The trial court summarily dismissed the Habeas Petition for failing to state a colorable claim. Because Petitioner failed to follow the mandatory procedural provisions of the habeas corpus statute, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the Habeas Petition.

I write separately because I reach a different conclusion than the majority as to the appropriate response to the trial court’s deficiency. I agree that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on the record regarding the grounds on which it found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation. However, I disagree that a de novo review of the record supports a conclusion that the Defendant committed a technical violation rather than absconding. I will endeavor to briefly explain my reasoning.

Husband and Wife both sought a divorce, with each attributing fault to the other. During the divorce process, Wife alleged to the police, the Department of Children’s Services, and Husband’s military employer that Husband had abused her and their child. Husband denied the allegations and responded with a petition to hold Wife in criminal contempt for making false allegations of abuse. The contempt petition and the military investigation into Wife’s claims remained open at the time of Wife’s deposition. Wife refused, allegedly based on these open matters, to answer questions at her deposition, pleading the Fifth Amendment. The deposition was relocated to the courthouse, where the trial court held an impromptu hearing on the matter. During the hearing, the judge informed Wife that her refusal to answer questions could result in her being held in civil contempt. However, instead of holding Wife in civil contempt, with no warning, the trial court struck Wife’s pleadings and entered a default judgment. Addressing Husband’s pleadings and testimony thereupon, the trial court thereafter entered a final order dividing the parties’ property and fashioning a parenting plan. Wife appealed, arguing, among other things, that the sanctions of striking her pleadings and issuing a default judgment were improper. Because we conclude that Wife had insufficient notice, we vacate the trial court’s sanctions order and remand the case.

The Defendant, Jarvis Jones, appeals from the order of the trial court revoking his probation. He argues that trial court failed to properly adhere to the two-step consideration for probation revocation and, as a result, abused its discretion in revoking his probation. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Defendant’s probation and that the record, considered as a whole, supports full revocation as the appropriate consequence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Amir Hassan Spears, appeals from his convictions for first degree felony
murder, criminally negligent homicide, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated
assault. On appeal, he presents three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was
insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for failure to establish identity; (2)
whether the State committed a Brady violation when it failed to disclose, prior to the close
of the State’s proof, the circumstances surrounding a victim’s identification of the
Defendant; and (3) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (i) failing to
take appropriate action when this issue came to light at trial, and (ii) failing to adequately
challenge testimony that the Defendant had concealed a long rifle inside his pants. After
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in Appellant’s petition, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Wayne Morris Flood, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s probation revocation for his eight-year sentence for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for the trial court to reinstate the Defendant to probation.

This appeal follows our remand in Acute Care Holdings, LLC v. Houston Cnty., No. M2018-01534-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2337434 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2019) (hereinafter “Acute Care I”). The dispute involves the alleged breach by Houston County of a Letter of Intent pertaining to the purchase of a hospital in Erin, Tennessee. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Acute Care Holdings, LLC (“Acute Care”), by granting its motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that Houston County breached the Letter of Intent. Thereafter, the trial court entered an Agreed Final Judgment awarding Acute Care a judgment of $1,218,062.63 and prejudgment interest of $730,036.65. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

The appellant is a physician assistant accused by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) of sexually abusing a stepchild. After one appeal of the dependency and neglect case, the appellant and DCS entered into an agreed order to resolve the matter. According to the appellant, he did not stipulate in the agreed order that he engaged in the alleged misconduct. In a related criminal case, the appellant was indicted by a grand jury and ultimately entered a no contest plea. He did not admit guilt, no conviction was entered, and all charges will be dismissed and expunged if he completes his probation. The Tennessee Department of Health (“DOH” or “the Department”) informed the appellant that it had opened a case against him before the Board of Physician Assistants regarding his fitness to practice “due to the allegations in the [dependency and neglect] matter.” The Department sought certain records from the juvenile court case, and the appellant opposed it. The trial court granted the Department’s motion, and the appellant appealed. We affirm.

The Defendant, Corey Ellis, appeals from the order of the trial court revoking his probation.
The Defendant contends the trial court failed to consider the Defendant’s amenability to
future rehabilitation or whether he was a danger to others when deciding on revocation.
He also argues that the trial court failed to consider an updated risk and needs assessment.
After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Patrick Gardner Ford, petitioned the trial court to enter a guilty plea to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony crime of violence, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1) (Supp. 2022). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was to be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in confinement. However, the State conditioned this agreement on the Defendant’s appearance at a later court date and his good behavior up to this court date; the State also informed the Defendant that his failure to fulfill these conditions would subject him to a sentencing hearing and the imposition of a sentence in his required sentencing range. When the Defendant failed to appear at this later hearing, the trial court conducted a full sentencing hearing, ultimately sentencing the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twelve years in confinement for his conviction offense. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for an alternative sentence, specifically a sentence through the community corrections program. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, in his capacity as the executor of the decedent’s estate, commenced this action for breach of a stock purchase agreement against the decedent’s former business partner and the business that they owned together. The agreement comprised two documents: one requiring an initial lump-sum payment of $1 million, and one requiring payment of “$8,000.00 per month for 96 months and two new automobiles with lease payments or purchase payments not to exceed $1,500.00 per month for 96 months.” The decedent also signed a handwritten note in which he agreed to forgive “all debts” if the former business partner honored “all agreements for 1 (one) year after [the decedent’s] death.” The plaintiff later moved for summary judgment based on evidence that the defendants made only 17 monthly cash payments and only 114 of the vehicle payments. In response, the defendants asserted that they made a lump sum payment of $40,000 “in full satisfaction of the debt” before the decedent’s death. The defendants also argued that the debt was forgiven pursuant to the handwritten note. Regardless, the defendants maintained that there was no evidence of missed payments. The trial court granted the motion in part, finding it undisputed that the defendants made only 17 payments. The court also found that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of his attorney’s fees and costs under a “Hold Harmless and Indemnity” clause in the purchase agreement. But the court found a dispute of material fact on whether the defendants breached their obligation to make all car payments. At trial, the defendants moved for a directed verdict due to the plaintiff’s alleged failure to prove damages. The trial court granted the motion because there was no evidence that the defendants missed any car payments. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment in all respects except for the award of attorney’s fees, which was based on an incorrect interpretation of the contract.

The plaintiffs in this case are two individuals who transferred a substantial amount of money to a business. After the business failed to repay the plaintiffs, they filed a lawsuit against the business and its owner, alleging various wrongdoings and seeking to pierce the corporate veil of the business. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs had proven all of their claims and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against both the business and its owner. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court failed to apply the proper test for piercing the corporate veil and failed to provide sufficient clarity in its damages award. We, therefore, remand the matter to the trial court for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Isaac Caldiero (“Appellant”), filed a notice of appeal with this Court in September 2025, which states that Appellant is appealing the August 8, 2025 order of the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”). Upon receiving the appellate record in this appeal, this Court reviewed the record on appeal to determine if the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(b).