APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The present case is Husband’s second appeal in relation to the parties’ divorce. In the first
appeal, this court modified the trial court’s valuation of the marital residence but otherwise
affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Husband, subsequently, sought additional
modifications of the judgment in relation to the marital residence, which the trial court
denied. Husband appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order reforming a deed to correct the legal description of the
property. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the
appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Shamarion Bown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to adequately review discovery materials and offer an honest assessment about the strengths and weaknesses of Petitioner’s case. Petitioner contends that because of counsel’s alleged deficient performance he did not fully understand the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan and request that Father be held in contempt for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order generally finding that the parties simply had two different parenting styles and denying Mother’s request to modify the parenting plan. The trial court also found that the contempt matter had been addressed, but the trial court’s order lacked any findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the alleged contempt. After review, we reverse the trial court’s determination that Mother had not proven a material change in circumstances to permit modification of the parenting plan. To that end, the matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct an analysis of whether a change in the parties’ parenting plan is in the children’s best interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a). Further, we vacate the trial court’s order as it relates to the civil contempt action against Father. That matter is remanded as well for additional findings and conclusions related to Father’s civil contempt.

While unclear from the record, which does not include the relevant documentation, the Petitioner, Kavaughn Jones, states that he pleaded guilty in 2022 to two counts of attempted rape and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and that the trial court sentenced him to eight years to be served at 45%. In January 2025, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his case. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Craig Taylor, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his Madison County convictions for first degree premeditated murder, attempted aggravated burglary, two counts of first degree felony murder, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a total effective sentence of life plus eight years. The Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to call expert witnesses to rebut the State’s experts. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this complex suit over a breach of a contract to sell real estate, the trial court dismissed one of the plaintiffs in an order certified as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, but it reinstated that plaintiff two years later. The court awarded the plaintiff-buyers specific performance, one of the limited available remedies under the contract. However, because the seller had meanwhile taken actions that may have made this relief impossible, the trial court also noted it would consider civil contempt in the event the seller would not perform, and would award approximately $12.2 million in damages, which was the measure of harm for the dismissed plaintiff party. The seller appeals. We conclude that the trial court erred in reinstating the party and that the proper method to challenge an improvidently granted 54.02 final judgment is appeal or an appropriate post-judgment motion. We also conclude that, although the party was erroneously reinstated, the seller is not entitled to a new trial on the issue of liability. Additionally, the trial court did not err in its determination that the seller committed the first material breach and did not err in awarding specific performance. This court cannot review a future and speculative contempt judgment, and we vacate the portion of the judgment delineating any future contempt award. We remand for consideration of whether the buyer is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal under the contract.

Defendant, Christian Sanderson, pled guilty in two separate cases to four counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. As part of the negotiated agreement, Defendant agreed to a five- to six-year sentence of incarceration on each count, with the trial court to determine whether to impose consecutive sentences. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve four consecutive six-year sentences, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering complete consecutive sentencing. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lawrence Darrell Patton, Defendant, claims that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement following the revocation of his probation. Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in partially denying his Rule 36 motion seeking pretrial jail credits. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the revocation of Defendant’s probation and the trial court’s award of pretrial jail credits. We reverse the trial court’s judgment requiring Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Guy A. Cobb, appeals the McMinn County Criminal Court’s denial of his
post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his guilty plea to possession of fentanyl with
intent to sell or deliver and the resulting three-year sentence. On appeal, he claims that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the postconviction
court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Kenyon Demario Reynolds, appeals from the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by summarily ordering a corrected judgment instead of holding a new sentencing hearing to resentence him to a legal sentence. Because the Defendant fails to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Maurice Tyrone Flanigan, filed a pro se pleading seeking to “correct” his six-year sentence for robbery, asserting that it had expired. The trial court treated the filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directed that the Defendant be brought before the court for a hearing. At that hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant’s sentence had expired and entered a release order based on its understanding that the district attorney general did not dispute that conclusion. The State now appeals through the Attorney General and Reporter, contending that it was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the trial court granted habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we agree that the Attorney General and Reporter is the only party who is statutorily authorized to appear and represent the State’s interests in a habeas corpus proceeding. Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the trial court’s order granting relief and remand for further proceedings so that the Attorney General may present the State’s arguments in the first instance.

The Petitioner, Robert Leroy Littleton, III, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely filed. Primarily, he argues that his petition was timely because it was filed during the “grace period” within which he had the opportunity to seek a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. He also alleges tolling exceptions to the limitations period based upon (1) his actual innocence and (2) attorney misconduct. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State asks this court to review the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for new trial. After reviewing the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order.

In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jabriel Linzy, of first-degree murder,
attempted first-degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a
dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the first degree murder
conviction, fifteen years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, and six years for
the conviction of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The
trial court ordered that the two shorter sentences be served consecutively to each other but
concurrently with the life sentence. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, and this court
affirmed. State v. Linzy, No. E2016-01052-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3575871, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017). The Petitioner filed
a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted
post-conviction relief, concluding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
inadmissible social media evidence in conjunction with not eliciting testimony about the
Petitioner’s prior conflict with the victim and that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced
the Petitioner. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred because
trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision when failing to object to the social media
evidence and because the Petitioner cannot show that trial counsel’s performance
prejudiced him. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jacquiz McBee, of first-degree murder, and
the trial court sentenced him to life in prison to be served consecutively to his prior threeyear
sentence for aggravated assault. The Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence,
and this court affirmed both. State v. McBee, No. E2021-01048-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL
16833562, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2023).
The Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act asking
that evidence in his case be tested for DNA and undergo fingerprint analysis. The postconviction
court summarily dismissed the petition. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining
that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition for fingerprint and DNA
analysis of evidence in his case. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the indictment
against Defendant, Joshua Morris, charging him with driving under the influence (“DUI”).
The State contends that the criminal court erred in concluding that under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, the State was precluded from relitigating the issue of probable cause
that Defendant was driving under the influence in relation to his DUI charge after a circuit
court determined that probable cause was not established in adjudicating Defendant’s
implied consent violation charge. We conclude that the criminal court erred in finding that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied and in dismissing the indictment. Accordingly,
we reverse the criminal court’s dismissal of the indictment, reinstate the indictment, and
remand to the criminal court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Husband and Wife divorced. In dividing the marital estate, the trial court determined that an account inherited by Wife had been transmuted into marital property and that Wife had dissipated a substantial portion of the transmuted account. Considered as a whole, the trial court allocated the marital estate in a manner that Wife asserted was inequitable. She repeatedly requested findings by the trial court explicating its division of marital estate. The trial court declined to provide such findings. On appeal, Wife challenges the trial court’s classification of the aforementioned account and its conclusion that she dissipated the account. Wife also challenges the trial court’s overall division of marital property both as being inequitable and for the insufficiency of the trial court’s findings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to transmutation. We vacate the trial court’s ruling as to dissipation and the trial court’s division of property, and we remand for further proceedings.

In this post-divorce dispute, a father petitioned to modify the permanent parenting plan and child support. The mother counterpetitioned for civil contempt alleging the father had willfully violated the parenting plan. After a bench trial, the court denied the father’s petition and held him in civil contempt. Because the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule, we vacate the denial of the father’s petition to modify the parenting plan and remand for the court to determine whether modification is in the child’s best interest. We reverse the court’s decision to hold the father in civil contempt for failure to maintain insurance coverage because the decision lacked sufficient factual support. Given our disposition of these issues, we also vacate the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the mother as the prevailing party. Otherwise, we affirm.

The defendant, Raymond Benson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of reckless homicide and convicted felon in possession of a handgun for which he received an effective sentence of four years suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless homicide and asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case addresses whether the Uniform Arbitration Act confers subject matter jurisdiction on Tennessee courts to confirm an arbitration award when the parties’ arbitration agreement specified that arbitration would occur in another state. Berkeley Research Group, LLC and Southern Advanced Materials, LLC entered into a contract which provided that any dispute would be resolved by arbitration in Pennsylvania, not Tennessee. A dispute arose and the parties entered arbitration, which resulted in an award to Berkeley. Berkeley sought to confirm the arbitration award in Shelby County Chancery Court. The trial court confirmed Berkeley’s arbitration award and entered judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that while the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked personal jurisdiction over Southern. We find that Tennessee courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration reward when the parties agreed arbitration would occur in another state. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to confirm an award resulting from an arbitration the parties agreed would occur in Pennsylvania. We vacate the judgments of the lower courts and dismiss the petition to confirm the award.

The April 2025 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively entered, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to facilitation of first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant, Heather Fisher, of possession with intent to
sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule II, to wit: methamphetamine in an amount
in excess of 0.5 grams (count one); three counts of possession of a schedule IV drug with
intent to sell or deliver (alprazolam, diazepam, and clonazepam) (counts three through
five); possession with intent to sell or deliver a schedule VI controlled substance, to wit:
marijuana in excess of 0.5 grams or more (count six); possession of a weapon during
commission of a drug offense (count seven); maintaining a drug involved dwelling (count
eight); and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia (count nine), for which she received
an effective thirteen year sentence.1 In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges
only her conviction in count seven for possession of a weapon during the commission of a
drug offense and argues (1) the evidence failed to establish that she possessed a weapon
and failed to establish that she had the requisite intent to go armed; and (2) that the trial
court erred in determining that the offense of carrying a weapon was not established by the
evidence and that it erred in excluding carrying a weapon as a lesser-included offense of
count seven.2 Upon our review, we affirm.

The plaintiff, Patricia Slate, appeals the dismissal of her complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against either of the defendants. Because the appellant’s brief is profoundly noncompliant with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal.