APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their two shared children. We conclude the trial court properly found that the Department of Children’s Services proved by clear and convincing evidence at least one ground for termination as to each parent and that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination of parental rights.

The Defendant, Fredrick Devell Rice Jr., entered guilty pleas to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, tampering with evidence, and felony drug possession with intent to sell. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years and placed the Defendant on probation after service of twelve months incarceration. The Defendant subsequently tested positive for fentanyl and norfentanyl four times. At the Defendant’s probation violation hearing, the Defendant objected to an assessment report the State offered through a witness who did not prepare it as inadmissible hearsay, which was overruled by the trial court. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony from the assessment report. After review, we affirm.

The plaintiff seeks recusal of the trial judge pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. The trial judge denied the plaintiff’s sixth motion to recuse. The plaintiff’s Rule 10B petition fails to comply with the rule, and the grounds for recusal offered are without merit. We affirm the trial court’s decision. 

In this declaratory judgment action, the trial court denied the appellant’s motions, filed one year after a decision from this Court affirming the trial court’s final judgment, seeking to intervene as a party in the lawsuit and to “correct” the trial court’s previous order. The trial court also awarded sanctions to the opposing party pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The appellant timely appealed these rulings. Following our thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to intervene as untimely. However, we vacate the trial court’s award of Rule 11 sanctions and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to make the appropriate findings concerning its adjudication of the Rule 11 motion, including the ability to hold a hearing, if necessary, regarding the factual analysis required by Rule 11. The appellant’s other issues are pretermitted due to his status as a non-party. We decline to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to the appellee, and we further decline to impose sanctions against the appellee’s counsel for representations made during oral argument.

Reginal Jenkins, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, claiming there was insufficient evidence regarding identity and premeditation. We disagree with Defendant’s claims and affirm the judgments.

Defendant, Sentrell Pittman, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count each of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective thirty-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to compel the victim to submit to a mental evaluation; 3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to allow the jury to visit the scenes of the incidents; 4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on the State’s violation of State v. Ferguson; and 5) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 seeking to allow cross-examination of the victim regarding her prior sexual history. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William C. Sutton, received and signed a written trespass notice from Walmart informing him that he was banned from entering its retail locations for life. Less than a year later, the Defendant entered one of Walmart’s retail locations and left without paying for clothing items he concealed in a plastic bag. Before trial, the Defendant made an oral motion in limine to exclude the trespass notice as inadmissible hearsay, which the trial court denied. The jury subsequently convicted the Defendant of burglary, for which he received a twelve-year sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Green a/k/a Michael Cheairs, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of violating the sex offender registry requirements, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-208, arguing that the admission of and testimony about the violation report by someone other than the officer who prepared it violated the Confrontation Clause and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the report was the only evidence supporting his conviction. The State argues that the Defendant waived plenary review of the issue, and that he is not entitled to relief via plain error review. Upon review, we conclude that the Defendant properly preserved the issue below and agree that the admission of the violation report via a substitute witness violated the Confrontation Clause. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the inadmissible statements in the report were the primary evidence of the Defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Defendant properly preserved his Confrontation Clause issue and that he is entitled to relief. I would conclude that Defendant’s issue is waived, and Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief.

Clarence Hayes, Petitioner, appeals the dismissal of his habeas petition in which he argued his judgment was void because the person for whose actions he was held criminally responsible was never convicted of murder. After the dismissal of the Petition, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider and a motion for clarification and reconsideration. The habeas corpus court denied both motions and Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. Because the interest of justice does not warrant the timely filing of the notice of appeal, Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

A Tennessee residential homebuilder alleged that a Floridian general contractor and its principal fraudulently disguised the painting of fencing at the principal’s personal residence as a legitimate business expense on a fraudulent invoice submitted to and paid by the Tennessee company. The company brought a tort suit in Tennessee. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We conclude that the homebuilder’s allegations and the Defendants’ contacts with Tennessee are sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction, and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not violate the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we reverse.

The Defendant, Devonta Ivy, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of aggravated robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, theft of property, and evading arrest. The trial court entered judgments ordering the Defendant to serve an effective eleven-year sentence consecutively to a previously unserved sentence from Mississippi. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support each conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior conviction. Following our review and pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, we remand for entry of corrected judgments for Counts Three and Four due to clerical errors. Otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to their two minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed and have proceeded pro se upon waiving their rights to appointed counsel. Having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of the statutory abandonment ground of failure to support as to the mother, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to this ground as to the mother. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights.

Appellant sued the law firm that prepared a will on behalf of her fiancé for professional negligence after an out-of-state will contest resulted in the invalidation of the will. The trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim accrued when she was forced to respond to the will contest and not when the will was actually held to be invalid. Thus, Appellant’s action was filed after the one-year limitations period had expired, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the purchase of a residential home. The plaintiff homebuyers asserted claims against the defendant sellers for intentional or negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act (“TRPDA”). The plaintiffs’ claims were based solely on the defendants’ TRPDA disclosure statement, which said there were no known defects in the home’s floor structure. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims on the basis that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the alleged defects because the plaintiffs had every opportunity to discover the defects and were made aware of the defects by their own observations and inspection reports. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they reasonably relied on the defendants’ misrepresentation. But the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment to establish that they actually or reasonably relied on the disclosure statement. For this reason, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case is about mootness. Ms. Sokolosky appealed a probation revocation order and the denial of her motion to dismiss a violation arrest warrant. During the pendency of that appeal, Ms. Sokolosky’s probation was fully revoked, she served her sentence, and she was released. The Court of Criminal Appeals then dismissed her appeal as moot because no active controversy existed for resolution. We respectfully disagree. Because Ms. Sokolosky’s probation violation “may have adverse consequences after the completion of [her] term of commitment, the doctrine of mootness does not apply.” State v. Rodgers, 235 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Tenn. 2007). We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for consideration of Ms. Sokolosky’s appeal.

The Petitioner, Robert Jason Burdick, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order denying his three post-conviction petitions, seeking relief from his convictions of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary and his effective sentence of forty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance warrants new trials and sentencing hearings, and that the consecutive sentencing statute is void for vagueness. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Victor Valle, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was entitled to and did not receive juvenile proceedings before the trial court admitted evidence of prior bad acts committed while Petitioner was a minor; the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts; he received ineffective assistance of counsel; his indictment was insufficient to provide the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction; the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Professor appeals from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s Rule 41.02(2) involuntary dismissal of his breach of contract action against Tennessee State University. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Fred Beal, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate a witness and to properly communicate with Petitioner, and that cumulative error prejudiced Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Currently before the Court is the Petitioner’s pro se application for an extraordinary appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10. It is not entirely clear what the Petitioner is seeking to appeal, but he failed to attach to his application a copy of any trial court order appealable under Rule 10. An extraordinary appeal may be granted from an interlocutory order of a trial court if the appellate court determines the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review or if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). Thus, Rule 10 is utilized to gain interlocutory appellate review of a trial court order. Again, the Petitioner failed to attach a copy of any trial court order which demonstrates how the trial court has acted in an “arbitrary fashion” necessary to warrant an extraordinary appeal at this juncture of the trial court proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 10, Advisory Commission Comment (“[t]he circumstances in which review is available . . . are very narrowly circumscribed to those situations in which the trial court . . . has acted in an arbitrary fashion, or as may be necessary to permit complete appellate review on a later appeal”). 

Accordingly, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied. Because it appears the incarcerated Petitioner remains indigent, costs are taxed to the State. However, the State has the authority to recoup the costs associated with this appeal from the Petitioner’s trust fund account, if appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143.

In this unlawful detainer action, the landlord obtained judgment in the general sessions court against a tenant for failure to pay rent. The tenant, who remained in possession of the subject property, appealed the judgment to the circuit court without posting a bond for possession as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-130(b)(2)(A). In the absence of a bond, the landlord sought immediate possession of the property. The tenant moved to proceed on appeal without a bond, arguing that the affidavit of indigency she had filed with the general sessions court sufficed in lieu of a surety bond for her appeal. The circuit court ordered the tenant to either surrender possession of the property or post a possession bond. After the tenant failed to surrender possession or post a bond, the circuit court issued a writ of possession in favor of the landlord, which the landlord executed shortly thereafter. Having regained possession of the property, the landlord filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The trial court accordingly entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The tenant has appealed the dismissal to this Court, arguing that because she had filed an affidavit of indigency in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-103, she should have been permitted to retain possession of the property pending resolution of her appeal to the circuit court without posting a bond. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 9, seeking review of the trial court’s September 23, 2024 order and November 6, 2024 amended order denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment and granting the State’s motion to have the Defendant involuntarily judicially committed pursuant to the Tennessee Disability and Aging Act of 2024 (“the Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 52-5- 404 (specifically regarding involuntary commitment for intellectually disabled defendants). The Defendant argues that interlocutory review of the trial court’s orders is required to prevent irreparable injury, to prevent needless and protracted litigation, and to develop a uniform body of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1), (2), and (3). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application, arguing that three of the issues certified by the trial court ask for advisory opinions and that the three remaining issues do not satisfy the criteria for interlocutory appeal. Following our review, we grant the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal, in part, and deny the application, in part.

Pro se Petitioner, Asata Lowe, filed a “Petition for Delayed Appeal,” which was treated as a motion for a delayed appeal and summarily dismissed by the Blount County Circuit Court. In this appeal, Lowe argues that the post-conviction court erred when it “failed to consider whether [he] was denied ‘the right to an appeal from the original conviction’ and that the court made ‘erroneous findings of fact and legal conclusions.’” After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.