APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jay Walker, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction to the jury during their deliberations. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A contractor purchased construction materials from a supplier and then failed to pay for the materials. The supplier brought suit to recover payment and later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the supplier’s motion. Finding no error, we affirm and remand the matter to calculate the supplier’s appellate attorney’s fees.

Defendant, Jeremiah Devon Cohill, was convicted by a jury of carjacking (count one), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and conspiracy to commit carjacking (count four). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years as a Range I offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instruction for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) his sentence is excessive; and (4) the judgment for count one contains a clerical error. Following our review of the entire record, the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we reverse, vacate and dismiss Defendant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two). In all other aspects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Gary Dyquanne Cross, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal
Court jury of facilitation of first-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in the
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) cellphone record evidence that was presented to
the jury was unreliable; (3) the trial court erred in allowing prejudicial photographs into
evidence; (4) the trial court erred in not allowing the jury to “rehear” the testimony of a
State’s witness during its deliberations; (5) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial
after an individual communicated to a member of the jury; and (6) the cumulative effect of
the errors warranted a new trial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tristan Weatherspoon, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial.

In this parental termination case, the father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, Emory S. The trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Based on these findings, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. We affirm.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Christopher Glenn Clark, of first-degree premeditated murder, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1); first-degree murder in perpetration of a felony, id. § 39-13-202(a)(2); burglary of a building other than a habitation, id. § 39-13-1002(a)(1); theft under $1000, id. § 39-14-103; unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior violent felony, id. § 39-17- 1307(b)(1)(A); and unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior felony drug offense, id. § 39-13-1307(b)(1)(B). After a sentencing hearing, the defendant received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, murder in perpetration of a felony, and burglary. Additionally, he contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we also conclude the trial court failed to make the required findings in support of its sentencing determinations, and therefore, vacate the defendant’s consecutive terms and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing to determine the appropriateness of consecutive terms.

A Haywood County jury convicted the Defendant, Tondre Dupress Ragland, of attempted second degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Defendant’s convictions, but we reversed the imposition of consecutive sentences and remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Wilkerson factors. State v. Ragland, W2022-01303-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 3947501, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 12, 2023), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On remand, the trial court found that the Defendant was a dangerous offender and again imposed consecutive sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it found that he was a dangerous offender for purposes of consecutive sentencing. After conducting a de novo review, we conclude that the Defendant’s sentences should be served concurrently, rather than consecutively.

In the Juvenile Court for Shelby County ("the Juvenile Court"), the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Rickey J. ("Father") and Anionetta J. ("Mother") to their child, Rinyah J. ("the Child"), who was born drug-exposed. After trial, the Juvenile Court found that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody 9f the Child and that Mother had committed severe child abuse. It further found that termination of their parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Mother and Father appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Donald James Robinson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Tobarus Burton, pleaded guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504. He received an agreed eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f), which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Christ M. Christopher, guilty of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences imposed. He argues that the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors and imposed an effective sentence greater than necessary to achieve the purposes and principles of sentencing. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Mother, brought suit against Father for retroactive and prospective child support. The trial court deviated from the Child Support Guidelines in setting Father’s retroactive child support, and he appeals. Because the trial court failed to make necessary findings of facts and conclusions of law to support its deviation from the guidelines, we cannot conduct a meaningful review. The trial court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Woodie Jeanette Arendall, pled guilty to one count of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to serve fifteen years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the plea process. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Marcus Dejuan Perkins, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying an enhancement factor and denying an alternative sentence to incarceration. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeffery Lynn Sanders, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, he alleges that (1) various procedural errors attended his revocation hearing, (2) no substantial evidence existed to support the finding of a violation of probation, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.1 After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Billy Norman Forte, appeals from his jury conviction for second degree murder and his resulting twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s Ferguson remedy due to the State’s destruction of the recording of the Defendant’s 911 call; (2) the trial court’s ruling allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s 1996 conviction for domestic assault against his ex-wife because the Defendant had opened the door to such evidence during his direct examination testimony; and (3) the trial court’s ruling prohibiting the Defendant from introducing certain evidence of the victim’s criminal history. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Willie E. Spencer, appeals as of right from his guilty-pleaded convictions for three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a maximum in-range sentence. Following our review, we affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's reversal of the trial court's judgment dismissing Ms. Buckner's health care liability claims. Ms. Buckner failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) because she filed noncompliant medical authorizations and failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the defendants were not prejudiced thereby.

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The mother appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to properly apply the statutory best interest factors when making its parenting plan determination. Because of the lack of findings in the final decree, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This is an action for abuse or neglect, exploitation, or theft of money or property of Christine Joy Koczwara during her life, as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 71- 6-120(b) of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The complaint seeks to recover assets as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant failed to file a timely responsive pleading to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment on the issue of liability. Prior to the trial on damages, the defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. The claimed excuse was based on the contention that the defendant was the named executor and sole beneficiary under a purported 2020 will. The trial court rejected that argument because there was no pending will contest and the defendant had not filed a petition to admit the purported will to probate. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside upon the finding that the defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading was willful. After a trial on damages, the court invalidated a quitclaim deed, ordered the return of personal property, and awarded $48,500 in compensatory damages and $97,000 in punitive damages against the defendant. The court also ordered the sale of the decedent’s real property. This appeal followed. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

This healthcare liability case comes before the court on appeal from the trial court’s granting of a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, part of Tennessee’s Health Care Liability Act. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that unsigned medical authorizations attached to the complaint were sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirements of section 29-26-121 and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed. Upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I write separately to concur with and in support of the majority opinion of the Court.
Although both the majority and dissenting opinions are correct that Plaintiff bore the initial
burden of establishing compliance with Section 121, I concur with the majority’s decision
to remand for an evidentiary hearing, given one defense counsel’s admission that his client
received a signed medical authorization. Martin v. Rolling Hills Hosp., LLC, 600 S.W.3d
322, 334 (Tenn. 2020).

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights for abandonment by an incarcerated parent, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of his child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A crime victim filed a tort action against a city under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging police misconduct. Arguing that it was immune from liability for the alleged misconduct, the city moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the city is immune from liability for the asserted negligence under the public duty doctrine and that the allegations in the complaint do not support application of the special duty exception. So we affirm the dismissal.