APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff appeals the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court judge, which raised allegations of bias related to, inter alia, the treatment of her pro se status and her lack of personal notice of court filings, the lack of response to her ex parte communication, the failure to report alleged attorney misconduct, and the entry of certain court orders. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Appellant brought suit against his psychiatrist and the psychiatrist’s clinic, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. After appellate briefing and oral argument but prior to the filing of the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court, the psychiatrist died. The Appellant became aware of the death after the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application for permission to appeal. He, subsequently, filed numerous motions for relief in the trial court. The trial court denied relief under Rule 60
and denied the other motions. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, which affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims awarding death benefits. On
June 22, 2023, Employee, a professional truck driver, was stopped by a deputy sheriff after
the officer observed pieces of metal falling out of Employee's trailer. During this stop,
Employee suffered a heart attack and died on scene. Employee's wife filed a petition for
benefit determination, and the case ultimately proceeded to a hearing where the parties
disputed causation. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("Trial Court") awarded
benefits, finding that Employee's wife had shown to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the June 22, 2023 work incident contributed more than fifty percent to
Employee's heart attack and death when considering all causes. The Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") affirmed. Employer has appealed and
the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant
to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Defendant, Elliot Arnaz Price, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for one count of burglary. After trial, a petit jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court classified Defendant as a career offender and sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for burglary;(2) the trial court committed reversible error in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 by admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior charge for burglary and of Defendant’s conduct underlying the burglary charge;(3)the trial court committed reversible error by classifying him as a career offender; (4)the trial court committed plain error in violation of Defendant’s confrontation rights by admitting the arresting officer’s affidavit from a prior theft case; and (5) the trial court committed plain error by improperly instructing the jury that the “without the consent of the property owner” element of burglary applied to Defendant’s “actions” rather than Defendant’s “entry” onto the victim’s property.2 After review, we conclude there are instances of error made by the trial court, but determine such errors were harmless and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal addresses sealing judicial records. Three filings were sealed without a written order. The presiding judge later recused herself and the matter was transferred. Then The Nashville Banner intervened to unseal the records. The trial court denied the motion to unseal. The appellate court denied the Rule 10 appeal and then denied the petition for writ of certiorari. We reverse. Rule 10 interlocutory review is available to media intervenors when judicial proceedings are closed or documents are sealed. Sealing judicial records protected by the First Amendment right of access requires entry of a written order after finding that a compelling interest necessitates sealing. Any such order mustbe narrowly tailored and seal only those judicial records, or the portions thereof, necessary to protect the identified interest. After conducting a de novo review, we do not find a compelling interest necessitating sealing. The documents shall be made available to the public.

An employee suffered severe injuries while working for a subcontractor and sought workers’ compensation benefits from the logistics company that had retained the subcontractor. In response, the logistics company filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that it was exempt from liability as a “common carrier.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the logistics company, concluding that the company’s federal operating authority established its common carrier status as a matter of law. The injured employee appeals, arguing that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the logistics company’s status because it exclusively served a single customer rather than the general public. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court entered a parenting plan setting parenting time and child support between Mother and Father. Mother appealed. Mother raises a due process challenge to the trial extending into the late evening of the last day. She also challenges the trial court’s analysis of the best interest factors, its allocation of parenting time, its designation of Father as the primary residential parent, its awarding to Father sole decision-making authority, and its denial of Mother’s motion to alter or amend. Father seeks attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling and award attorney’s fees.

I agree with many of the holdings in the majority’s good opinion, but I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s adoption of a new compelling interest standard for sealing documents.

This appeal arises from a general claim of negligence stemming from a dog bite. The plaintiffs adopted a dog from an animal shelter owned and operated by the defendant, a governmental entity. The dog bit one of the plaintiffs shortly after adoption. The plaintiffs sued, claiming that the shelter had a duty to warn them of the dog’s dangerous propensities but failed to do so. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the foreseeability of the incident, and therefore, the plaintiffs could not establish the defendant owed them a duty to warn. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

I join in Justice Kirby’s separate opinion. I briefly write separately to emphasize my specific concern with the majority’s unnecessary adoption of the compelling interest standard in this case.

The Defendant, Shay Tyler Little, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated burglary, for which he received a suspended sentence of six years’ supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tony Von Carruthers, a death-row inmate scheduled for execution on May 21, 2026, filed a motion requesting last-minute DNA testing of fingernail scrapings and bindings from the murder victims.1 Mr. Carruthers sought an expedited ruling on the motion without an evidentiary hearing. After analyzing the request under the mandatory and discretionary provisions of the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (DNA Act), the post-conviction court denied the motion. Mr. Carruthers appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon motion of Mr. Carruthers, this Court assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d). Because Mr. Carruthers has failed to establish the statutory criteria for ordering analysis under the DNA Act, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Kelley Gambill, appeals her Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated cruelty to animals, for which she received a sentence of two years’ supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court misconstrued the statute's “no justifiable purpose” language and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, J.P. Burrow, Jr., appeals his convictions for two counts of rape of a child,
two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of sexual battery by an authority
figure. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions because the proof consisted solely of the victims’ testimony with “no other
corroborating evidence.” Additionally, as to his conviction for sexual battery by an
authority figure, he argues that the evidence failed to show that he qualified as an authority
figure, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-527, at the time the offense
took place. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After pleading guilty in federal court, the Petitioner, Robert Kerry Pickle, pled guilty in 2014 to eight additional offenses in the Coffee County Circuit Court. The circuit court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. Eleven years later, and while still serving his federal sentence, the Petitioner filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus. He asserted that his state sentences had expired and that the trial court lacked authority to impose consecutive sentences. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that the Petitioner’s state sentences were aligned consecutively to his federal sentence and therefore had not expired. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Shaun Poole, pled guilty in the Henry County General Sessions Court to violating a no-contact order, and the court imposed a fully suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court and subsequently sought correction of his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The circuit court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a Rule 36.1 challenge to a judgment entered in the general sessions court and dismissed the claim. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment dismissing the Defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion. However, because the appellate record does not clearly establish the status of the Defendant’s remaining post-conviction claims, we remand the case for the circuit court to clarify the status of those claims and to conduct any further proceedings required by law.

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110. The plaintiff-respondents, Jayesh Patel, Devesh Patel, and Vimal Patel (“Plaintiffs”),filed suit in Tennessee asserting claims for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and abuse of process against the defendants-petitioners, Shailesh Patel, BMGPC, LLC, Parul N. Patel, Dharmesh Patel, Ujval Patel, and Jyoti Patel (collectively, “Defendants”),who had initiated a related action against Plaintiffs in California state court. In response to the Tennessee action, Defendants filed a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA, asserting that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in response to Defendants’ exercise of their rights to petition and of free speech. Plaintiffs responded to the TPPA Petition and sought to amend their complaint to add claims that predated the filing of the California lawsuit. At a joint hearing on both the TPPA Petition and the Motion to Amend, the trial court granted the Motion to Amend and instructed Defendants that, if they proceeded on the TPPA Petition, the court would apply it to the First Amended Complaint. Defendants decided to press forward with the TPPA Petition. After considering the evidence produced by the parties, the trial court denied the TPPA Petition, concluding that the statute did not apply because Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the action was based on, related to, or in response to their exercise of the rights to petition or of free speech. This appeal followed. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s decision. We conclude that Defendants established a prima facie case that Plaintiffs initiated this action in response to Defendants’ exercise of both their right to petition and their right to free speech. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Joe Patrick, of two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court ordered an effective sentence of sixty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. Patrick, M2019-02026-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2102914, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2021), perm. app. denied. (Tenn. Feb. 10, 2022). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

To resolve Employee’s workers’ compensation claim, Employee and Employer entered
into a “doubtful and disputed” settlement agreement under the Tennessee Workers’
Compensation Law, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-240(e). Employee then
brought a tort action against Employer in relation to the same injuries. Employee moved
for partial summary judgment that the exclusive remedy provision did not bar her tort
claim, relying on the agreement’s silence as to the issue of compensability. The trial court
granted the motion, finding the injuries to not be compensable, such that Employee was
not limited to workers’ compensation remedies. Because such settlements are clearly
provided for by statute, we conclude that the parties’ agreement amounts to a workers’
compensation remedy. Thus, we determine that Employee’s tort action is barred by the
exclusive remedy provision and the trial court’s judgment must be reversed.

This appeal requires us to determine whether the Tennessee Public Participation Act mandates dismissal of Appellants/Builders’ slander claim and whether the trial court properly awarded attorney’s fees. After Appellants filed a construction lien against Appellees/Homeowners’ property, Appellees filed a complaint against Appellants with the Tennessee Board of Licensing Contractors, wherein they asserted that Appellants did not have a valid Tennessee contractor’s license. After Appellees filed the instant lawsuit, Appellants filed a counter-complaint, asserting, as relevant here, a claim for defamation based on allegedly false statements made to the Board regarding Appellants’ licensure. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Appellants’ slander claim. Appellees’ motion, which was predicated on the dismissal provision contained in the Tennessee Public Participation Act, asserted that Appellants’ defamation claim was filed in response to Appellees’ exercise of their constitutional right to free speech on a matter of public concern. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for partial dismissal and awarded attorney’s fees. Appellants appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Victor Gordon, appeals from his convictions for rape of a child and
aggravated sexual battery. Specifically, he argues the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for rape of a child because the State failed to present evidence of sexual
penetration. He further contends that he is entitled to plain error relief as to both
convictions on the basis that the trial court failed to make the required statutory findings
for the admission of the victims’ forensic interviews pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 24-7-123. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ricky Burnette, was convicted by a Knox County jury of theft between $2,500 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender. In this direct appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred when it determined that his convictions from 1991were admissible for impeachment purposes; (2) the trial court improperly limited the testimony of a witness concerning an ongoing investigation, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony regarding the contents of a stolen vehicle, (4) the trial court erred in failing to give a curative instruction after a witness referred to Defendant’s “classification,” (5) the trial court improperly bolstered the State’s expert witness by asking a hypothetical question, (6) the trial court improperly sustained an objection to the cross-examination of a State’s witness, (7) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight, and (8) the cumulative effect of these alleged errors entitles him to relief. Upon a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Scott Bradley Price, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000 and was sentenced
by the trial court as a Range II offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of
Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues
that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on unauthorized use of a vehicle as a
lesser-included offense. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s
verdict. We further conclude that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the
unauthorized use of a vehicle as a lesser-included offense, but that the failure to charge the
lesser-included offense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no reasonable
jury would have convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense under the facts of
this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A dispute over the construction of a custom home went to arbitration. After the arbitrator found in favor of the builder, the builder applied for confirmation of the arbitration award. The homeowners responded by moving to vacate. The trial court vacated the award and sent the case back to arbitration. In the court’s view, the arbitrator exceeded his powers by deciding the case based on a defense the builder did not raise and by failing to postpone the hearing. Because the homeowners failed to establish a basis to vacate the award under the Uniform Arbitration Act, we reverse.

The pro se Petitioner, Anthony Cartwright, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the Petitioner’s challenge to the amendment of his indictment does not state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.