APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Keion Lamonte Jemison, appeals from his convictions for reckless homicide, aggravated assault resulting in death, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony crime of violence, for which he is serving an effective twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him for Class B felony possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence, arguing that aggravated assault by recklessness is not included in the statutory definition of a “crime of violence.” We affirm.

Because the Shelby County Probate Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over this breach of contract case, we vacate the probate court’s order and remand with instruction to transfer the matter to the Shelby County Chancery Court.

This appeal concerns third-party claims for breach of contract filed by a real estate developer against several real estate investment companies. The trial court entered an agreed order extending the time for the third-party defendants to file a “responsive pleading.” Then, prior to the deadline for filing their responsive pleadings, the third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. But the developer argued that the third-party defendants waived their right to file a Rule 12 motion because the agreed order only extended the deadline for “responsive pleadings.” During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the third-party defendants asked for an award of their attorney’s fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c)(1), which requires courts to “award the party or parties against whom the dismissed claims were pending at the time the successful motion to dismiss was granted the costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in the proceedings as a consequence of the dismissed claims by that party or parties.” The trial court granted the motion to dismiss but held that the third-party defendants could not recover their attorney’s fees and costs under § 20-12-119(c)(1) because “the written motion to dismiss did not include a request for an award of fees or cite to the statute.” This appeal followed. We conclude that the agreed order did not constitute a waiver of the third-party defendants’ right to file a motion to dismiss and affirm the dismissal of the claims at issue. However, we conclude that the third-party defendants are entitled to an award of their costs and attorney’s fees under § 20-12-119(c)(1). Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions to award the third-party defendants their reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs.

The appellee sustained severe injuries after falling off of a ladder at his job. The appellee was performing work on a building owned by the appellant when the accident occurred, and he claims the ladder was owned by the appellant. The appellant’s workers’ compensation policy had lapsed and was not in effect at the time of the accident. The appellee filed a common law tort action against the appellant. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the appellee a judgment of $471,038.36. We conclude that the trial court erred in calculating the appellee’s damages for lost wages and future lost earning capacity and modify the trial court’s judgment to correct such error. We also remand this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the appellee is entitled to an award of noneconomic damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Billy Jack Reprogal, Defendant, admitted to violating the terms of his community-based alternative to incarceration (“community corrections”) sentence. Following a hearing, the court ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Defendant claims the trial court erred because it failed to properly consider the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and Defendant when it sentenced him. Discerning no error, we affir

Appellant, Shamika Sykes, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Probate Court that was entered on March 13, 2025. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Defendant, Frank E. Fankam, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of rape. A petit jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years with one year to be served in confinement and nine years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) it was plain error for the trial court to allow into evidence text messages between Defendant and the victim; 2) the State impermissibly delayed in bringing an indictment against him in order to gain a tactical advantage at trial; 3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its cross-examination of Defendant and during closing argument; 4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; and 5) cumulative error requires reversal. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellants filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for parental relocation and its entry of a modified permanent parenting plan naming Father/Appellee the child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court magistrate entered a plan that modified the residential parenting schedule and gave the mother sole decision-making authority over all educational and non-emergency health care decisions. The father argues that the magistrate did not maximize his participation in the children’s lives as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) and that there was no basis for modifying the allocation of decision-making authority. We affirm the judgment in all respects. We have also determined that the mother, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

The Defendant, Charles Randolph Carter, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his
probationary sentence stemming from his guilty-pled convictions for attempted aggravated
assault and aggravated cruelty to animals. While on probation, the Defendant absconded
from supervision and committed new misdemeanor offenses, among other violations.
Following several revocation hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s three-year
and eight-month probationary sentence and ordered him to serve the balance in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion (1)
by determining that he violated his probation based upon disciplinary infractions
committed while in custody on this sentence and (2) by fully revoking his probation given
his contrition and need for additional drug treatment. Following our review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

After slipping and falling on accumulated snow and ice in the parking lot of a grocery store, a man filed a premises liability lawsuit against the store, the owner of the parking lot, and the company hired to perform snow and ice removal services for the parking lot. The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants because the court found that the proof at the summary judgment stage showed conclusively that reasonable minds could not differ that the man was at least fifty percent at fault for the injuries he alleged to have suffered. Discerning that the evidence shows that a dispute of material fact exists, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s modification of a permanent parenting plan in which the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and awarded the mother supervised visitation. We now affirm.

Petitioner, Gabriel Dotson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by conceding guilt during closing argument against Petitioner’s wishes. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Before the court is the petition of the Defendant, Erwin Tyrone Halfacre, for an
accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2, seeking
review of the trial court’s December 30, 2025 order denying the Defendant’s motion for
recusal. The Defendant also seeks a stay of the trial proceedings, which are scheduled to
begin on January 6, 2026. On January 5, 2026, this court denied the Defendant’s request
for a stay. Following our de novo review, we now affirm the trial court’s order denying
the Defendant’s motion for recusal.

The Defendant, Billy J. Coffelt, was convicted in March 2000 by a Davidson County jury of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he is serving an effective ninety-year sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence and that his consecutive sentencing was not consistent with other similarly situated defendants. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Dewayne Stinnett, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner is serving an effective eighteen-year sentence following his jury trial convictions for multiple drug-related offenses. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel’s failures to: (1) move for a dismissal for one count of the indictment, (2) object to the State’s introduction of evidence, and (3) request a jury instruction. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Kwame D. Chihombori-Quao, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of statutory rape, for which he was sentenced to two years in confinement and six years on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to register as a sex offender. Following our review, we affirm.

Defendant, William Roger Campbell, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive life sentences. In his direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but reversed the imposition of consecutive sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing, during which the trial court was to address the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). State v. Campbell, No. M2023-00779-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3888342, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2024). Following a hearing in which no new proof was presented, the court again aligned the sentences consecutively. Defendant now asserts that the trial court erred in doing so. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action involves the proper use and zoning of a parcel of real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, determining that the owner’s use of the property as a quarry was not prohibited because the subject property was unzoned. The trial court based its ruling on the municipality’s inability to produce a validly enacted zoning ordinance that applied to the specific parcel. The municipality and its planning commission have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We also find that the property owner’s motions to consider post-judgment facts and to dismiss the appeal are not well taken, and we deny those motions.

The petitioner, Marcus Willingham, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee’s petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of a petition to extend an order of protection for ten years after finding that the respondent violated the original order of protection multiple times and failed to appear for hearings throughout the litigation. Because none of the issues the appellant raises were raised in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-617(a)(1), we award the appellee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal and remand for calculation of the amount.

A Williamson County jury convicted Jeremy Michael Fowler (“Defendant”) in Case No. W-CR22-213-A (“the Waffle House Case”) of seven counts of Class A misdemeanor reckless endangerment (Counts 1-7), two counts Class C felony aggravated assault (Counts 8 and 9), and one count of Class A misdemeanor unlawful possession of a weapon after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (Count 11). At the outset of the sentencing hearing in the Waffle House Case, Defendant entered guilty pleas in Case No. W-CR230286 (“the Jail Case”) to two counts of Class A misdemeanor assault, which stemmed from incidents that occurred while Defendant was incarcerated awaiting trial in the Waffle House Case. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant in the Waffle House Case to two consecutive terms of six years on the aggravated assault convictions, six consecutive terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the reckless endangerment convictions, and a consecutive term of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the weapons charge. The court merged the reckless endangerment conviction in Count 7 with Count 6. Additionally, pursuant to his plea agreement in the Jail Case, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days on the assault convictions and ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the sentence in the Waffle House Case. On appeal, Defendant claims the court erred by (1) failing to merge all the reckless endangerment convictions in the Waffle House Case, (2) misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors resulting in an excessive sentence, and (3) imposing consecutive sentences. Based upon the proof presented at trial, the indictment, and the jury verdicts in the reckless endangerment offenses, we reverse the court’s merger of Count 7 into Count 6 and remand for the trial court to enter an amended judgment omitting the merger language in Count 7 and aligning the sentence in Count 7 concurrently with Count 6. In all other regards, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.