APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Craig Kitt, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce the amount of his pretrial bond. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes.

The Defendant, Caprice Lashon Peete, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by not excusing a juror who failed to disclose that she knew one of the State’s primary witnesses, by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine another State’s witness about the underlying facts of the witness’s 2023 conviction for convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and by allowing the prosecutor to make inappropriate comments in closing argument without an adequate curative instruction by the trial court or the trial court’s enforcing its order that the prosecutor retract the inappropriate comment. The Defendant further argues that he is entitled to a new trial under the doctrine of cumulative error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A property developer purchased a portion of a two-story building without having fully examined the property prior to acquiring it. The only existing means of accessing the second floor of his property was via a staircase owned by his neighbor. The developer did not have an express easement to use the staircase, and disagreements arose between the developer and his neighbor over the developer’s use of his neighbor’s staircase. In response, the developer filed suit. The developer claimed an easement implied by prior use, an easement by necessity, and/or a prescriptive easement. At trial, the neighbor sought, in effect, an involuntary dismissal at the close of the developer’s proof. The trial court granted that motion, reasoning that the developer failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to all three of his easement theories. The developer appeals. We affirm.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, James Andrew DiDomenico, of four counts of rape, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant raises several issues. First, he contends that the trial court committed the following trial errors: (1) excluding evidence that the victim was dating a former client; (2) admitting cumulative testimony that repeated the victim’s account; (3) admitting testimony concerning letters sent by the Defendant’s divorce attorneys to the victim; and (4) refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact. He further argues that, even if these alleged errors are individually insufficient to warrant reversal, their cumulative effect deprived him of a fair trial. The Defendant also challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial based on purportedly newly discovered evidence, as well as the trial court’s sentencing determinations. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because the order appealed lacks finality based on the failure to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and no good cause exists to waive the procedural deficiency, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that two statutory grounds existed to terminate mother’s parental rights to the two minor children: abandonment by failure to visit or support and persistence of conditions. The trial court found that three statutory grounds existed to terminate father’s parental rights to the minor children: abandonment by failure to visit or support, persistence of conditions, and abandonment due to father’s confinement of ten or more years. The trial court then concluded that termination was in the children’s best interests. We reverse the trial court’s findings on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit or support. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Ray Gene Elliott, III, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of three counts of rape, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, three
counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and
one count of sexual activity involving a minor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an
effective term of thirty years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The
sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his
convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to significant failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This case involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA” ) in which the father was obligated to establish an irrevocable life insurance trust for his youngest child in an amount equal to the average of the after-tax funds received by his other children from four other trusts. He did not establish the trust before his death in 2021. Before he died, his youngest child sued to force him to create the trust. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the father’s estate and another trust he established, holding that the MDA trust was too vague and indefinite to enforce and that the father’s failure to establish the trust constituted a non-arbitrary disinheritance of the youngest child pursuant to the MDA. This Court, in Dunavant v. The William B. Dunavant, Jr. Revocable Living Trust, No. W2023-01213, 2024 WL 4211156 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2024), affirmed the trial court. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Rule 11 application for the Living Trust and the Estate, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals “for further consideration in light of Pharma Conference Education v. State, 703 S.W.3d 305 (Tenn. 2024).” We reverse the trial court.

A property owner granted a friend permission to live on his property while the friend was renovating the owner’s house. Five years later, the owner filed a successful detainer action against the friend in general sessions court. The friend appealed the adverse judgment to circuit court and, in that forum, filed a counterclaim asserting multiple causes of action including breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a bench trial, the trial court granted the property owner a detainer and dismissed the friend’s counterclaims. We affirm.

The Defendant, David Patrick Lauderdale, was convicted by a jury of domestic assault, interfering with an emergency call, robbery, resisting arrest, felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, leaving the scene of an accident, violating the financial responsibility law, and driving with a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. On appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the robbery conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Romeaka Evans, Defendant, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury for second degree murder. After a jury trial, she was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty-five years in incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied a mistrial, that the evidence was insufficient, and that the trial court imposed an improper sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement with a company to make certain improvements to
his existing home. According to the plaintiff, the construction done at the house was only
partially completed and that work was improperly and negligently performed. In his
complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, breach of contract, negligence, fraud and
intentional misrepresentation, and conversion. The plaintiff averred that the acts of the
home improvement company should be imputed to the defendant under the doctrine of
respondeat superior; in the alternative, he alleged that the defendant was in a partnership
or joint venture with the home improvement company. The trial court entered an order of
default against the defendant after she was served but failed to appear or file a responsive
pleading until after a default judgment had been entered. The trial court denied the
defendant’s motion seeking to set aside the default judgment. The defendant appeals. After
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The guardian ad litem filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her child. After the mother failed to respond, the guardian ad litem moved for entry of a default judgment against her. The mother appeared pro se at the default judgment hearing and requested a continuance to allow for court appointed counsel. The court found the mother was entitled to appointed counsel but denied the continuance. After hearing the petitioner’s proof, the court found clear and convincing evidence of multiple grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the court erred in denying the mother a continuance to consult with counsel. So we vacate the termination of the mother’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother’s parental rights to the minor child on two statutory grounds: severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother’s parental rights to the minor child on two statutory grounds: severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Brian Lee Fisk, appeals his Dyer County Circuit Court jury conviction of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within a Drug-Free Zone, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-432 (2014), challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentencing decision of the trial court. Because the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and because the trial court did not commit plain error by sentencing Defendant under the terms of the Drug-Free Zone Act in effect at the time of the offense, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, John David Cunningham, as charged of seven counts of rape of a child and six counts of aggravated sexual battery against his minor daughter, and the trial court imposed an effective 100-year sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2013), -504(a)(4). On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the child’s forensic interview; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his alleged prior bad acts; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentencing; (5) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to stop taking depositions in the divorce case and to turn over existing deposition transcripts to the State; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to utilize an unauthenticated excerpt of a transcript lacking the court reporter’s certification. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 through 13 to reflect the Defendant’s effective 100-year sentence.

The Defendant, Enoch Zarceno Turner, was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child abuse, aggravated arson, and especially aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective sentence of life without parole. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the State established the identity of the Defendant as the perpetrator of each of the offenses. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The family of a child bitten by a dog appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit at the summary judgment stage. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that the defendant owners knew or should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413(c)(1). The plaintiffs argue that (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment without a hearing; and (2) they presented sufficient evidence to create a dispute of genuine material fact as to whether the defendant owners should have known of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Following a trial, a jury found Defendant, Matthew Richard Herron, guilty of felony
reckless endangerment with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm having been
convicted previously of a felony drug offense, for which he received a total effective
sentence of ten years’ incarceration. Defendant represented himself at trial and now
represents himself on appeal. Upon review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the
applicable law, we conclude that Defendant has failed to prepare a sufficient brief in
compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) and Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b) and that, therefore, his claims are waived. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgments of the criminal court.

Defendant, Robert Vernon Johnson a/k/a Robert Vernon Griffin, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He received an effective sentence of thirty-one years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation for the firearm conviction and ordering consecutive sentences. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Josue O. (“Father”) to his daughter Neyra S. (“the Child”), finding multiple grounds applicable to a putative father, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9), and the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14).  Father does not contest the Juvenile Court’s findings of statutory grounds for termination but appeals the Juvenile Court’s determination that termination of his parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.   

The Defendant, Mikal B. Morrow, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective six-year probationary sentence for aggravated assault by strangulation, false imprisonment, and interference with a 911 call. On appeal, he alleges that (1) the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the terms of his probation and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation after finding the Defendant had absconded. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Although I agree that Father did sufficiently raise in his answer the affirmative defense of lack of willfulness regarding the statutory ground of failure to pay child support, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding and instead believe that Father’s failure to pay support was willful according to Tennessee law. As the majority points out, the proof was “undisputed that Father paid no child support during the relevant four-month period despite having the ability to pay.” Father argued that such failure was not willful because he had relied on the January 2021 agreed order of paternity entered by the juvenile court, which stated that “any and all issues related to . . . child support are reserved and referred to the Custody Magistrate,” and the fact that no further orders concerning child support had been entered.