Video recordings of oral arguments heard in Nashville before the Tennessee Supreme Court beginning October 3, 2018 are available to view approximately 21 days after the oral argument. You may access the video by clicking on the case number listed below. When the window opens, click on the Play icon on the lower left corner (it will say Opening, but click on the Play icon and the video will begin).
Cases were live-streamed to the TNCourts YouTube page.
November 3, 2021
Tommie Phillips v. State of Tennessee - W2019-01927-SC-R11-PC
In 2011, Petitioner Tommie Phillips was convicted of felony murder, reckless homicide, attempted first degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated sexual battery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary arising out of his attack on an acquaintance and multiple members of the acquaintance’s family. Petitioner fled the scene but was later identified as a suspect and turned himself in to police. During initial discussions, Petitioner admitted to stabbing two of the victims but maintained he was acting in self-defense. He then invoked his right to counsel, and the interview stopped. Believing they had probable cause, the police obtained a 48-hour hold order and booked Petitioner into jail. While incarcerated, Petitioner asked to speak with detectives, was given his Miranda warnings, and gave a more complete statement admitting to his crimes. Following his statement, Petitioner was formally charged and convicted of several offenses. After his conviction, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging various grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, including counsel’s failure to challenge the admission of his statement to police on Fourth Amendment grounds. He argued that his probable cause determination was “unreasonably delayed” due to Shelby County’s 48-hour hold policy in place at the time of his detention and ultimate arrest. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal particularly to consider the applicable standard of review, including the petitioner’s burden to establish prejudice when the petitioner alleges counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress or, as here, for failing to include a particular ground in the motion to suppress.
State of Tennessee v. Douglas E. Linville - W2019-02180-SC-R11-CD
October 6, 2021
State of Tennessee v. William Eugene Moon - M2019-01865-SC-R11-CD
Defendant William Eugene Moon was convicted of attempted second degree murder and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The charges stemmed from an altercation with an officer of the Tullahoma Police Department. The officer was on patrol and became suspicious after two persons left a vehicle and walked over to a trailer park. The officer noticed one of the men, later identified as Defendant, behaving strangely, and the officer knew the man had outstanding “aggravated assault warrants.” The officer spoke with Defendant just outside a trailer and noticed a plastic bag that appeared to contain methamphetamine in Defendant’s mouth. A tussle ensued, and according to the officer, Defendant pulled a gun and was prepared to use deadly force against the officer. The officer shot Defendant multiple times. Defendant denied fighting the officer or attempting to use a gun. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a violation of his right to a speedy trial and claiming that he suffered prejudice in the form of pretrial anxiety and pretrial incarceration. Following a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied the motion. A jury convicted Defendant, and he appealed arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that he was denied the right to a speedy trial, and that the trial court erred by allowing the improper impeachment of a defense witness based on alleged prior bad acts. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Notably, the intermediate court, employing the abuse of discretion standard of review, determined that Defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. It also concluded the trial court erred by allowing certain impeachment evidence of a defense witness, but it found any error to be harmless. On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Defendant renews his arguments from the Court of Criminal Appeals but also requests that the Court resolve a conflict among panels of the Court of Criminal Appeals about the standard of review an appellate court should apply when reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for speedy trial. Some have applied the “abuse of discretion” standard, whole others have applied the “de novo” standard of review.
Donna Cooper Et Al. v. Dr. Mason Wesley Mandy Et Al. - M2019-01798-SC-R11-CV
This interlocutory appeal raises the issue of whether alleged intentional misrepresentations made by a health care provider to induce a prospective patient to engage the provider’s heath care services falls within the purview of the Tennessee Heath Care Liability Act (the “Act”). Donna Cooper and her husband (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Dr. Mason Wesley Mandy and Rachelle Norris of NuBody Concepts, LLC (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants intentionally misrepresented that Dr. Mandy was a board-certified plastic surgeon. According to Plaintiffs, they relied on this misrepresentation and Mrs. Cooper gave Dr. Mandy consent to perform surgery that led to “painful, disastrous results.” Plaintiffs asserted claims of intentional misrepresentation, medical battery, civil conspiracy, and loss of consortium. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, contending in relevant part that Plaintiffs were alleging health care liability claims governed by the Act and that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of the Act found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court denied Defendants’ motions, concluding that the Act did not apply, but it granted Defendants’ motions for an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects, holding that none of Plaintiffs’ claims fell within the Act. The Tennessee Supreme Court accepted Defendants’ applications for permission to appeal to determine whether the alleged intentional misrepresentations made by Defendants are governed by the Act.
June 3, 2021
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Education, et al. – M2020-00683-SC-R11-CV
This interlocutory appeal involves a challenge to the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot (the “ESA Act” or “Act”), which was enacted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 2019. The ESA Act created a pilot program initially to be implemented in the 2020-2021 school year in which a limited number of eligible students in Davidson and Shelby counties could apply to use their per pupil education funding to attend a private school, meaning the student’s per pupil funding would not be given to the local education agency or public school. The ESA Act called for a gradual increase in the number of participating students over five years and provided for the State to reimburse local education agencies for the first three years for pupil funding allocated to participating students for use at private schools. Before the ESA Act became effective, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Shelby County Government, and the Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education (the “Board”) (collectively the “plaintiffs”), sued Governor Bill Lee, Tennessee Department of Education Commissioner Penny Schwinn, and the Tennessee Department of Education (collectively the “State”), arguing that the Act violated multiple provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court permitted several parties to join as intervenor defendants in the case, including parents of students in Davidson and Shelby counties and two private schools who desired to participate in the pilot program and/or uphold the constitutionality of the Act. Upon motions from the State and intervening defendants, the trial court determined that the Board lacked standing to bring suit and dismissed the Board as a party. However, the trial court determined that Davidson and Shelby counties had standing to challenge the Act because of their duty to provide public education with the local school systems to students in that county. The county plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Act violated the Home Rule Amendment to the Tennessee Constitution, which requires the local legislative body or electorate to approve a law that is local in form or effect, applicable to a particular county, and relating to the county’s governmental capacity. The trial court granted the motion and reasoned that the ESA Act, by its own terms, will only ever apply to Davidson and Shelby counties in their governmental capacity operating their respective school systems. Therefore, the Act required local approval regardless of whether the Act applied to one or more counties. The trial court enjoined the State from implementing the ESA Act and granted the parties the right to seek an interlocutory appeal. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal. The State and some intervening defendants sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals, which the court granted, challenging the trial court’s conclusions as to the counties’ standing and the Home Rule Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the counties had standing to challenge the Act and that the Act violated the Home Rule Amendment of the Tennessee Constitution. The court reasoned that the fiscal effect of the Act on the counties’ budgets was an injury sufficient to confer standing on the counties. Additionally, the court held that the Act violated the Home Rule Amendment because it was local in effect, applied only to Davidson and Shelby counties, and applied to those counties in their governmental capacity of operating the local school systems. On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the State renews its argument that the plaintiffs do not have standing. Additionally, it argues that the Act is not subject to the Home Rule Amendment because it could potentially apply throughout the State and not just to Davidson and Shelby counties, that it applies to local education agencies not the counties themselves, and that it does not affect any county in its governmental capacity. The intervening defendants argue that the fiscal effects of the Act are not enough to confer standing on the plaintiffs or bring the Act within the Home Rule Amendment and that the plaintiffs’ county charters prohibit the counties from exercising governmental power over education. In response, the plaintiffs argue that they have standing because the Act inflicts specific injury to their finances, operations, and on the school districts within the county. Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the Home Rule Amendment applies because the language of the Act is such that it will only apply to Davidson and Shelby counties and that education is a governmental function. More than ten parties have submitted amicus curiae briefs in this matter including the Metropolitan Nashville Education Association, the Tennessee NAACP, and The Alliance for School Choice.
State of Tennessee v. Urshawn E. Miller – W2019-00197-SC-DDT-DD
Defendant Urshawn Miller was convicted in 2018 by a Madison County jury of first-degree murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, resisting arrest, and evading arrest. Mr. Miller’s convictions for first-degree murder and felony murder were merged, and a jury sentenced him to death for that conviction. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty years for the other non-capital offenses to be served concurrent to the death sentence. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Miller did not challenge his convictions for evading or resisting arrest but raised numerous issues including sufficiency of the evidence, error during jury selection, and improper use of his prior conviction for aggravated robbery during the penalty phase of trial. Mr. Miller also challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty, as well as its proportionality in this case, and argued that any aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr. Miller’s convictions and sentence. The court concluded the evidence at trial was sufficient to support his convictions, any error that may have occurred during jury selection was harmless, and the use of his prior conviction during the penalty phase was not an abuse of discretion. Additionally, after conducting its statutorily mandated review of Mr. Miller’s death sentence, the court concluded Mr. Miller’s death sentence was not arbitrary, was supported by the jury’s finding of an aggravating factor that outweighed any mitigating factors, and was proportional compared to the death penalty imposed in similar cases. The court declined to address Mr. Miller’s constitutional challenge to the death penalty, as it was controlled by prior Tennessee precedent. Ultimately, the court remanded the case to the trial court to correct two clerical errors. On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Mr. Miller has renewed his arguments from below. Along with consideration of those issues, the Court will conduct the mandatory review of Mr. Miller’s death sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206.
April 28, 2021
Steven Kampmeyer et al. v. State of Tennessee – M2019-01196-SC-R11-CV
This appeal involves interpretation of the Claims Commission Act (the “Act”), which authorizes certain suits against the State of Tennessee, and the procedures associated with the Act. On December 11, 2017, Steven Kampmeyer sustained serious injuries in a car accident involving employees of the Tennessee Department of Transportation and their vehicles. In August of 2018, Mr. Kampmeyer filed notice of a claim for damages against the State in the Division of Claims Administration (“DCA”) related to his personal injuries. Approximately four months later, on December 5, 2018, Mr. Kampmeyer and his wife, Melissa Kampmeyer (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed a joint complaint against the State in the Tennessee Claims Commission related to the accident. In the complaint, Mrs. Kampmeyer asserted a claim for loss of consortium, which was not included in the husband’s August 2018 notice to the DCA. The State moved to dismiss the loss of consortium claim on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to file notice of that claim in the DCA within the one-year statute of limitations from the date of the accident, as required by the Act. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion and dismissed the loss of consortium claim with prejudice. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs argued that, so long as the filing is within the one-year statute of limitations, Tennessee law allows for a claim, first mistakenly filed as a complaint in the Claims Commission, to serve as notice and be transferred to the Board of Claims for processing rather than be dismissed. Therefore, Plaintiffs argued that because their complaint was timely filed it should have been transferred that same day and counts as sufficient notice under the Act. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The court reasoned that the wife’s loss of consortium claim is a separate action, apart from the husband’s claim for personal injury damages, which required separate notice in the DCA. The court concluded that the plain language of the Act meant the loss of consortium claim was barred. On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Plaintiffs renew their arguments from below and contend that allowing the loss of consortium claim to be transferred rather than dismissed promotes the Court’s policy to decide controversies between parties on the merits. The State argues that Plaintiffs did not adhere to the notice requirement, that the husband’s notice to the DCA cannot serve as notice of a separate claim for loss of consortium, and that no exception should be granted because the Act demands strict compliance.
March 31, 2021
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Reynolds - E2018-01732-SC-R11-CD
A jury convicted Defendant Jeremy Reynolds of first-degree premeditated murder for shooting and killing a Hamilton County man. Mr. Reynolds appealed his conviction raising several arguments, including that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of gang-related activities. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed the evidence was insufficient to prove premeditated murder but determined the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree murder. Rather than modifying his conviction to second-degree murder, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded for a new trial on that charge. The intermediate court decided a new trial was necessary because the trial court committed reversible error by admitting testimony of Mr. Reynolds’ gang activities, including evidence about the gang’s background and the actions of Mr. Reynolds’ gang associates. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in which the State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals applied an incorrect standard of appellate review to Mr. Reynolds’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and that this error resulted in the intermediate appellate court erroneously concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Reynolds’ conviction for first-degree murder. Additionally, the State argued that Mr. Reynolds failed to preserve his claim that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his gang activities. Therefore, according to the State, the appellate court should have applied plain-error review not plenary review when considering those arguments. The State claimed that when the standards for plain-error review are applied, Mr. Reynolds is not entitled to relief on any of his evidentiary claims. In response, Mr. Reynolds argues that the State failed to prove premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt, a necessary element of his first-degree murder conviction, and that he properly raised and preserved his objection to the use of any gang-related evidence at trial; therefore, he is entitled to relief on this issue.
Februry 24, 2021 - Only the Booker Case was live-streamed to the TNCourts YouTube page.
State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker – E2018-01439-SC-R11-CD
Tyshon Booker was charged with two counts of first-degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery following the 2015 shooting death of a Knoxville man. Mr. Booker was sixteen-years-old at the time of the shooting but was tried as an adult. Mr. Booker was convicted of the charges and received a life sentence for his first-degree murder conviction. Tennessee law requires a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment to serve fifty-one years in prison before becoming eligible for release. Mr. Booker appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and argued, among other issues, that automatically sentencing him to life imprisonment as a juvenile and requiring him to serve fifty-one years in confinement before becoming eligible for release amounted to excessive, cruel, and unusual punishment that violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr. Booker’s convictions and his life sentence. As for his constitutional challenge to the life sentence, the intermediate appellate court concluded that it was bound by Tennessee precedent holding that a mandatory, fifty-one-year life sentence for a juvenile does not violate the federal and state constitutions. The Tennessee Supreme Court accepted Mr. Booker’s application for permission to appeal and limited the issues to: (1) whether the sentence of life imprisonment, as applied to Mr. Booker as a juvenile, violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article 1, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution; and (2) what sentencing options may be available under Tennessee law if the Court determines that the sentence of life imprisonment is improper. Over fifty amici curiae have filed briefs in this matter including the ACLU Foundation of Tennessee, the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, and Cyntoia Brown Long.
Affordable Care Construction Services, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company et al. –This matter comes to the Supreme Court as a certified question of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Affordable Care Construction Services, Inc. (“Affordable Construction”) initially filed this lawsuit against Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Owners”) in a Tennessee trial court, but Owners removed the case to federal court. Affordable Construction is seeking payment for work it completed as a general contractor repairing insured property damage for Grand Valley Lakes Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Grand Valley”). Grand Valley allegedly promised to pay Affordable Construction for the work from insurance proceeds it expected to receive under its property and casualty insurance policy with Owners. However, when Owners and Grand Valley settled a separate lawsuit involving Grand Valley’s insurance claim, Owners paid the settlement directly to Grand Valley and did not name Affordable Construction as a joint payee on the check. In the pending lawsuit, Affordable Construction contends that Tennessee law required Owners to make the settlement check jointly payable to Affordable Construction and Grand Valley, as general contractor and insured respectively, and that Tennessee law provides Affordable Construction with an implied private right of action to enforce its claim. Owners argues that it had no statutory obligation to make the check jointly payable because Affordable Construction had no enforceable contract with Grand Valley, and, even if there were, the construction contract was not “uncomplete” as required by the statute. Affordable Construction argues that Tennessee law does not require an enforceable contract between the general contractor and the insured, but rather applies if a general contractor undertakes any work on a project for the insured. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, the federal court certified, and the Tennessee Supreme Court accepted, the following three questions for review: (1) Does Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-111 provide for a private right of action? (2) In order for an insurance company to be obligated to name a general contractor as a payee on the check that it writes to its insured under Tennessee Code Annotate section 56-7-111, must there have been a contract between the general contractor and the insured? (3) If a contract between the general contractor and the insured is required in order for the statute to apply, must that contract be uncompleted at the time the check is written?
In re Larry E. Parrish – In this appeal, attorney Larry E. Parrish challenges the procedure the Board of Professional Responsibility (the “Board”) used to assess the costs it incurred during the litigation of his 2013 attorney-discipline matter. Attorney disciplinary proceedings and related matters are largely governed by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, which underwent extensive revision effective January 1, 2014. The underlying complaint against Mr. Parrish was initiated in 2013, and, after appeal, resulted in a six-month suspension of Mr. Parrish’s law license in 2018. The Board assessed its costs pursuant to the pre-2014 version of Rule 9 and sent a statement directly to Mr. Parrish. Mr. Parrish made one payment on a monthly installment plan and then filed a petition to revoke imposition of costs with a hearing panel of the Board. Mr. Parrish argued that the revised 2014 version of Rule 9 governed the assessment of costs in his case, even though the pre-2014 version of Rule 9 governed his disciplinary proceeding. According to Mr. Parrish, the payment and assessment of costs was part of his reinstatement proceeding, and the 2014 version of Rule 9 governs reinstatement proceedings, regardless of when the disciplinary proceeding resulting in the suspension occurred. Therefore, Mr. Parrish argued, according to the 2014 version of Rule 9, the Board should have sent its claim for costs to the hearing panel for approval, and by not doing so, the Board waived its claim for costs. The Board filed a motion for summary judgment, which the hearing panel granted. The hearing panel acknowledged that the revised 2014 version of Rule 9 applied to Mr. Parrish’s reinstatement proceedings; however, it held that the assessment of costs was part of the initial disciplinary proceeding that was still governed by the pre-2014 version of the rule. The hearing panel denied Mr. Parrish’s motion to alter or amend, and he appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, raising the same issues. In response, the Board reiterates that the pre-2014 version of Rule 9 governs the assessment of costs in Mr. Parrish’s disciplinary proceeding and that his disciplinary proceeding is separate from his reinstatement proceeding, which is governed by the 2014 version of Rule 9. Additionally, the Board argues that its assessment of costs was reasonable and that Mr. Parrish has provided no justification to avoid paying the costs incurred during the five years of litigation.
January 6, 2021
Regions Bank v. Nathan I. Prager – W2019-00782-SC-R11-CV
Regions Bank (“Regions”) instituted a breach of contract action against Nathan Prager in May of 2014 (“suit one”). On August 11, 2016, the trial court dismissed suit one for failure to prosecute. According to Regions, neither party received notice of the dismissal until June 29, 2017. Once received, the parties agreed that the trial court’s August 2016 dismissal order did not state whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Regions filed motions to set aside and to reconsider the dismissal. The trial court denied the motions. In an August 4, 2017 order memorializing its oral ruling, the trial court explained that, unless the August 2016 dismissal order designated that it was “with prejudice,” the dismissal was “neither with nor without prejudice” and Regions was “welcome to refile” the suit. As a result of that language, Regions claimed that it refiled suit (“suit two”) against Mr. Prager because it believed that suit one was dismissed without prejudice. Mr. Prager filed a motion to dismiss suit two, arguing that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the same claim in suit one was dismissed on the merits. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Regions filed a motion to reconsider. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider and clarified that its comment directing Regions to refile suit was merely a “side bar comment,” not meant to be interpreted as a ruling on whether res judicata would bar a second suit. Regions appealed the dismissal of suit two, and a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The majority held that the August 2016 order constituted a dismissal of suit one on the merits. Therefore, despite the trial court’s statements in its August 2017 order, Tennessee’s procedural rules dictated that the doctrine of res judicata barred litigating the same claim against Mr. Prager in suit two. The dissenting judge reasoned that the final judgment in suit one was the August 2017 order denying Regions’ first motion to reconsider, not the August 2016 dismissal order. Therefore, although the language in the August 2017 order was imprecise, it indicated that the dismissal was without prejudice and res judicata should not apply. On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Regions argues that the trial court’s August 2017 order should be considered the “operative order” for purposes of the res judicata analysis. Additionally, Regions contends that, because a party should be able to rely on statements made by the trial court in its own orders, the trial court should be bound by the language in the August 2017 order that Regions’ second suit is not barred. In response, Mr. Prager argues that the August 2016 order is controlling and because that order failed to specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, Tennessee’s procedural rules require that the dismissal be interpreted as a dismissal with prejudice.
Cynthia E. Yebuah et al. v. Center for Urological Treatment, PLC. – M2018-01652-SC-R11-CV
This healthcare liability action arose after Cynthia Yebuah discovered that part of a medical device had been left inside her body in error after she underwent surgery to remove a cancerous kidney. Mrs. Yebuah and her husband (the “plaintiffs”) brought suit against two doctors and their respective employers, Center for Urological Treatment, PLC (“Center”) and Radiology Alliance, P.C. The doctors were dropped from the suit, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury determined Center was liable and awarded a total of $4.5 million dollars in noneconomic damages to the plaintiffs, $4 million dollars to Mrs. Yebuah for physical pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and $500,000 to Mr. Yebuah for loss of consortium. The trial court applied Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages to the total damages award and revised the amount to $750,000 in favor of both plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the statutory cap was unconstitutional or, in the alternative, that the statutory cap should be applied to each plaintiff’s award separately. Center moved for a new trial or for remittitur. The trial court denied Center’s motion for a new trial and declined to order a remittitur. Ultimately, the trial court revised the total damages award to $1.25 million, $750,000 to Mrs. Yebuah and $500,000 to Mr. Yebuah, applying the statutory cap separately to each plaintiff’s award. The trial court deemed the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges waived and declined to address them. Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that, while the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiffs waived their constitutional challenges, the court was bound by recent Tennessee law that determined the statutory cap is constitutional. The court rejected Center’s argument that the statutory cap should be applied to the total damages award rather than each plaintiff’s award separately as incongruous with the language and meaning of the statute as a whole. Additionally, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Center’s motion for new trial or remittitur, determined that the jury award was reasonable, and concluded that there were no other reversible errors at trial. The Tennessee Supreme Court accepted Center’s application for permission to appeal to address whether Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages should be applied to the total damages award, aggregating the plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff’s derivative consortium claim, or whether it should be applied to each of those claims separately.