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| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | 10/23/96 | ||
| Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Insurance Company and Schering-Plough Health Care Products, Inc. v. Willie Gwen Smith
02S01-9511-CV-00110
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the special worker's compensation appeals panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a determination that defendant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. They appeal from the trial court's finding that she is entitled to benefits.
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. D'Army Bailey, |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/23/96 | |
| Neva Jewel Milam v. Hca Health Systems, Inc. d/b/a Centennial Medical Center
01S01-9601-CH-00004
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant contends (1) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is inadequate and (2) the chancellor "erred as a matter of law by deciding, before any evidence had been heard or any witnesses testified, that the on-the-job accident had only a tangential relationship with" her injury. The employer seeks dismissal of the appeal because the claimant did not file a statement of the evidence and was not entitled to a copy of the transcript of the evidence. Because a transcript is part of the record on appeal, the issue raised by the employer must necessarily be considered first. Unlike some other jurisdictions, Tennessee does not provide official court stenographers for civil trials. Instead, it is customary in this state that the parties to civil litigation will engage a stenographer and pay a per diem for stenographic services. Those parties who participate in the per diem may, for an additional fee, order from the stenographer a transcript of the evidence for use on appeal in case of an adverse decision in the trial court. The stenographer does not customarily make the transcript available to a party who did not participate in payment of the per diem. It is a matter of contract among the parties to the litigation and the non-party stenographer; and a party who does not join in the engagement and payment of a stenographer has no contract right to require the stenographer to transcribe the record which is therefore unavailable until made available on terms satisfactory to both the stenographer and the party or parties who engaged the stenographer. See Beef N' Bird of America, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 83 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. App. 199). Instead, a non-participating party may prepare a narrative statement of the evidence for use on appeal. The procedure for including a statement of the evidence in the record on appeal is provided by Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). We find no statement of the evidence in the record. In this case, the employer engaged the services of a stenographer - or court reporter - in the trial court and paid the full per diem. The claimant did not participate. When the chancellor issued his decision, however, she was dissatisfied with the outcome and decided to appeal. Instead of preparing a statement of the evidence, she applied to the trial court for an order requiring the employer to make a transcript available to her. The trial court granted the motion. Appellate rules do not require that a party who has assumed the burden of providing a court reporter at trial make available that reporter's work for a party who did not join in providing the reporter; and, in the absence of unusual circumstances, the rules do not permit a party to see how his case comes out before deciding whether to share in the reporter's fees. One who follows that course runs the risk of not having a verbatim record available. See Estate of 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert S. Brandt, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/23/96 | |
| 01S01-9610-CH-00211
01S01-9610-CH-00211
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Supreme Court | 10/23/96 | ||
| Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Insurance Company and Schering-Plough Health Care Products, Inc. v. Willie Gwen Smith
02S01-9511-CV-00110
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the special worker's compensation appeals panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a determination that defendant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. They appeal from the trial court's finding that she is entitled to benefits.
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. D'Army Bailey, |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/23/96 | |
| Geneva Hicks v. Emerson Motor Company
02S01-9602-CH-00022
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court with respect to causation and permanency. The panel finds the preponderance of the evidence to be contrary to the finding of the trial court with respect to causation. The employee or claimant, Geneva Hicks, is 45 with an eleventh grade education. She has worked at a day care center, caring for small children, in a clothing factory and as a fruit packer. She has worked in various jobs for the employer, Emerson, since 198. She has suffered from hoarseness and shortness of breath at work since about 1992, for which she has seen numerous doctors. In the course of her work for Emerson, she was exposed to various fumes. The employer has attempted to accommodate her by transfer to different departments and by the use of fans. She finally commenced this action for workers' compensation benefits for a claimed occupational disease, which she labeled allergic bronchitis. She was referred by her attorney to Dr. A. Clyde Heflin, Jr., who saw her on several occasions and opined in his deposition testimony that she was possibly having asthmatic attacks at work. The doctor was given a list of chemicals and asked and answered as follows: Q. ...(A)t this point in time, do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to what connection this lady's job place has as to her asthmatic condition? A. The list of substances that I've been supplied have numerous items which are -- and maybe we need to regress a second. The workplace environment, as far as causing asthma, you have to understand that asthma we now consider to be this hyper-reactive or irritable state of the lungs; and that is caused or generated by someone or a substance causing what we call an inflammatory condition or direct irritation of the lungs. So there is a long list of substances now known in the workplace that actually can induce asthma; and the classic one of these are TDI's, or diasocyanates, which are used in the plastics industry, for instance. The epoxy resins, which I don't see here specifically listed, but are often used in electrical manufacturing, can cause this as well. 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. George R. Ellis, |
Gibson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/23/96 | |
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | 10/23/96 | ||
| Geneva Hicks v. Emerson Motor Company
02S01-9602-CH-00022
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court with respect to causation and permanency. The panel finds the preponderance of the evidence to be contrary to the finding of the trial court with respect to causation. The employee or claimant, Geneva Hicks, is 45 with an eleventh grade education. She has worked at a day care center, caring for small children, in a clothing factory and as a fruit packer. She has worked in various jobs for the employer, Emerson, since 198. She has suffered from hoarseness and shortness of breath at work since about 1992, for which she has seen numerous doctors. In the course of her work for Emerson, she was exposed to various fumes. The employer has attempted to accommodate her by transfer to different departments and by the use of fans. She finally commenced this action for workers' compensation benefits for a claimed occupational disease, which she labeled allergic bronchitis. She was referred by her attorney to Dr. A. Clyde Heflin, Jr., who saw her on several occasions and opined in his deposition testimony that she was possibly having asthmatic attacks at work. The doctor was given a list of chemicals and asked and answered as follows: Q. ...(A)t this point in time, do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to what connection this lady's job place has as to her asthmatic condition? A. The list of substances that I've been supplied have numerous items which are -- and maybe we need to regress a second. The workplace environment, as far as causing asthma, you have to understand that asthma we now consider to be this hyper-reactive or irritable state of the lungs; and that is caused or generated by someone or a substance causing what we call an inflammatory condition or direct irritation of the lungs. So there is a long list of substances now known in the workplace that actually can induce asthma; and the classic one of these are TDI's, or diasocyanates, which are used in the plastics industry, for instance. The epoxy resins, which I don't see here specifically listed, but are often used in electrical manufacturing, can cause this as well. 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. George R. Ellis, |
Gibson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/23/96 | |
| Habeas Corpus Proceeding. See Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2D 186, 187 (Tenn. Crim.
02C01-9610-CC-00345
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Lake County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 10/22/96 | |
| State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996),
02C01-9610-CC-00338
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Lake County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 10/22/96 | |
| Pamela D. Millsap-Fann v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
03S01-9605-CH-00052
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The job-related accident from which the injury and disability arose occurred April 11, 1992. The case was heard January 12, 1996 resulting in a judgment that the plaintiff had sustained a 6 percent disability to her whole body. The employer appeals and presents for review the issue of whether the award is excessive. Our standard of review is de novo on the record accompanied with a presumption of the correctness of the judgment unless the evidence otherwise preponderates. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d); T.C.A. _ 5-6-225. The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The plaintiff was involved in a traffic accident during the course of her employment as a family counselor. Her most serious injury was a broken hip which required a prosthetic replacement by Dr. Thomas L. Huddleston, an orthopedic surgeon, who testified by deposition that the plaintiff had a 37_ percent permanent partial impairment to her left leg, extrapolated to 15 percent for the whole body. The plaintiff was 42 years old at the time of trial. She has a Master's Degree in her area of discipline. She was employed by the First Tennessee Human Resources Agency in November 199 as a HomeTies specialist and, following her surgery, she returned to work with no prescribed limitations or restrictions. The proof shows a litany of physical activities in which she may engage by way of demonstrating the extent and range of her recovery and present condition, which include but are not limited to driving a car, hiking, backpacking, playing tennis and performing all normal household functions. Her discharge summary was, "Her hip was free of pain . . . . the range of motion of her hip was excellent . . . ." Her immediate supervisor testified that she was able to perform all of her duties, and the
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. G. Richard Johnson |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/22/96 | |
| Anthony Neal Bates v. Cooper Industries, et al.
01S01-9604-CV-00065
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer and its insurer contend the evidence preponderates against the award of permanent partial disability benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Bates, is thirty-six years old and a high school graduate. He has done nursery, construction, farming, factory and supervisory work. On September, 4, 1992, while lifting a thirty to forty pound box of coil springs to fill a customer's order, he strained his upper back. After a brief period of recuperation, during which he was treated conservatively by a neurological surgeon, he returned to work with weight lifting restrictions. On May 26, 1994, he strained his lower back in another lifting accident at work and was treated by the same doctor. The doctor again treated the claimant conservatively and returned him to work. The treating doctor and two others to whom he was referred, one an orthopedist and one a pain management specialist, assigned zero percent permanent impairment, using appropriate guidelines. The claimant was referred by his attorney or his family physician to another orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed cervical and lumbar sprain and assigned a five to ten percent permanent whole person impairment. The disagreement is over whether the injury is in "category one" or "category two," as defined by the guidelines, which involves "a judgment call." The claimant has been terminated because the employer was unwilling to offer him a job within his lifting restrictions. A vocational expert has estimated the claimant's industrial disability at fifty-five to sixty percent. The claimant's own testimony is that he is able to work at a job not requiring repetitive or heavy lifting. The trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on forty-five percent to the body as a whole. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the evidence to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Anthony Bates, |
DeKalb County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/22/96 | |
| Insurance Company of North America v. Ronnie Storie
01S01-9602-CV-00037
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was proximately caused by intoxication. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for an award of benefits. The claimant or employee, Storie, is forty-five years old and has an eighth grade education. On March 18, 1993, he reported to work at 6:3 p.m. at Kentucky Apparel to perform his usual duties as a maintenance mechanic. During the course of the shift, he needed to obtain some copper tubing and light bulbs to perform his duties. Those supplies were stored above a dropped ceiling above the maintenance office and accessible by a ladder and some loose boards. The claimant negotiated the ladder without a problem, but slipped and fell when one of the loose boards moved. He fell through the ceiling and onto a concrete floor in the men's rest room below, frightening a user, who beat a hasty exit and reported the accident. The claimant suffered multiple injuries, including a broken arm and back injury. We find in the record no direct evidence the claimant was intoxicated at the time. In fact, he had apparently performed his duties satisfactorily until the accident occurred. The injurious accident occurred shortly before 2:45 a. m. on March 19th. After some delay, he was driven to the Fentress County Hospital by a co-worker, arriving at about 3: a. m. When no doctor was available to treat his arm injury, he was transported to the Putnam County Hospital. When he arrived there at about 6:3 a. m., he smelled of alcohol and a blood alcohol test revealed an alcohol content of approximately .2 percent. The claimant insists he consumed the alcohol, retrieved from his own vehicle at the plant and provided by a friend while waiting for medical attention, after the accident, to help relieve pain associated with his injuries. The trial court disallowed the claim as being proximately caused by intoxication. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Conrad E. Troutman, |
Fentress County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/22/96 | |
| Robert Lively v. Textron, Inc.
01S01-9604-CH-00070
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's finding that the permanent impairment did not result from 1992 injuries at Textron Aerostructures. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, we affirm. Dr. Wesley Coker started treating the plaintiff in March 1994 for herniated discs that were causing nerve root pressure. The plaintiff was in bad shape when he first saw him, according to Coker, as he had to be helped into the doctor's office and told the doctor about two months of excruciating pain. After switching to the care of a chiropractor, the plaintiff returned to Coker who performed surgery in June 1994. Dr. Coker testified that the plaintiff suffers a 13% whole body impairment. But Dr. Coker did not offer any testimony about what caused the plaintiff's back trouble. The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence that his impairment resulted from two injuries at Textron, one on March 5, 1992 and another on October 3, 1992. The trial court decided that the plaintiff did not prove his case, and there is ample evidence to support the decision. The plaintiff and his wife were injured in a car wreck on the way to work on the morning of February 1, 1994. The plaintiff had worked regularly before the accident, but did not work any after it. This tends to suggest that the car wreck, not the injuries years earlier, caused the back trouble Dr. Coker treated. The plaintiff called Textron following the wreck to report that he was not coming to work. The reason, he said, was that he slipped a disc in his back while -2-
Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/22/96 | |
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | 10/22/96 | ||
| Stephen Baxendale v. Universal Underwriters Insurance
01S01-9605-CH-00097
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant, Baxendale, contends (1) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is inadequate and (2) the trial court erred in computing his compensation rate. The employer and its insurer contend the trial court erred in finding the employee suffered a compensable injury by accident on June 6, 1994. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be modified and the judgment otherwise affirmed. The claimant is a thirty-five year old laborer with a ninth grade education. He failed a test for a GED. At the time of the claimed injury, he was earning $6.39 per hour. Beginning in October of 1992, he suffered back pain at work, but continued working while being conservatively treated for pain. At one time the treating physician assigned to him a four percent permanent whole person impairment rating. He was awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on ten percent to the body as a whole and returned to work as a laborer at the same wage rate he was earning before the injury. On June 6, 1994, he became disabled to work because of severe back pain and was diagnosed as having suffereda gradually developing ruptured disc. The doctor surgically removed the ruptured disc and estimated his permanent whole person impairment at nine percent, from appropriate guidelines. After recovering from the surgery, the claimant again returned to work at the same wage as before the disabling injury, but with significant lifting, bending, stooping and twisting restrictions. Another orthopedic surgeon evaluated the claimant and assigned a whole person impairment rating of ten percent, using different but equally appropriate guidelines. The claimant continued to suffer back pain while working as a warehouseman. Upon consideration of the above facts, the chancellor awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of ten percent to the body as a whole for the June 6, 1994 injury, and fixed the claimant's compensation rate at $159.47 per week. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/22/96 | |
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Hawkins County | Court of Appeals | 10/22/96 | |
| MC-CH-CV-RE-03-15
MC-CH-CV-RE-03-15
Originating Judge:John H. Gasaway, III |
Montgomery County | Court of Appeals | 10/22/96 | |
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | 10/22/96 | ||
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | 10/22/96 | ||
| 02A01-9510-CV-00213
02A01-9510-CV-00213
Originating Judge:Kay S. Robilio |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 10/22/96 | |
| Rita Baker v. Ckr Industries, Inc.
01S01-9604-CV-00074
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff is employed by CKR Industries, a Winchester company that makes rubber windshield and door sealers for Nissan. A piece of plywood fell on her on January 4, 1993, and she filed suit alleging that as a result, she is totally, permanently disabled. The trial court found otherwise and ruled that she has no permanent disability. Because the trial court's finding is fully supported by the evidence, we affirm the decision. The minor nature of the accident is one factor supporting the trial court's decision. The four foot-by-eight foot single sheet of plywood surrounded by a metal frame was being used as a bulletin board and was standing next to where the plaintiff worked. It only fell one or two feet onto her shoulder. The plaintiff did not seek any medical treatment for several days. She never missed any work on account of the accident that she alleges left her totally and permanently disabled. She now works ten-to-twelve hours a day, five days a week. The most reliable medical evidence does not support her claim of permanent disability. He primary treating physician was Dr. Ray Fambrough, an orthopedic surgeon in Huntsville, Alabama. He diagnosed the plaintiff as having "subacromial impingement" which is nothing more than bursitis of the shoulder. Dr. Fambrough concluded that the blow to the plaintiff's shoulder did not in itself cause the bursitis, but that it exacerbated it. He testified that any impairment from the blow to the shoulder would be negligible. -2-
Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Thomas W. Graham, |
Franklin County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/22/96 | |
| 03A01-9607-CV-00227
03A01-9607-CV-00227
Originating Judge:Inman |
Court of Appeals | 10/21/96 | ||
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 10/21/96 | |
| X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | 10/21/96 |