APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this slip and fall case in which a child slipped on some ice cubes in the vestibule of a large department store, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but attributed 70 % of the fault to the unknown person who placed or dropped the ice on the floor. Ruling on a post-trial motion, the trial judge held that the store’s fault was 100% because the plaintiff could not sue the unknown tortfeasor. On appeal, the defendant asserts that there is no evidence to support the verdict and that the trial judge erred in modifying the jury’s verdict with respect to the degree of fault. We find that there is evidence from which the jury could have found that the store was negligent and that the store cannot attribute part of the fault to the unknown tortfeasor. We, therefore, affirm the lower court’s judgment.

Charles Ray O’Quinn, the petitioner, appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On July 27, 1989, the petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated rape. The offenses occurred in April or May, and in June, 1988. He received Range II sentences of 35 years in the aggregate. The petitioner contends that his convictions for aggravated rape are void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea for that offense. See State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 20, 1996), rev'd, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997).

The State of Tennessee filed a petition to rehear in the above styled case on November 24, 1997. The State contends this court should rehear the case pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, it contends our decision 1) conflicts with existing case law, 2) conflicts with a principle of law, and 3) overlooks a material fact upon which the parties were not heard. It is the opinion of this court that the motion is not well taken and, therefore, should be denied.

This appeal involves a suit filed by plaintiffs, Gina (“Mrs. Franklin”) and Barnee Franklin (“the Franklins”), against defendant, Allied Signal, Inc. (“Allied”), for personal injuries sustained when Mrs. Franklin tripped and fell on Allied’s premises on a metal loading ramp which protruded above the dock floor by one to two inches. The trial court granted Allied’s motion for summary judgment. The Franklins appeal and pose the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court committed error in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) whether the “open and obvious rule” bars plaintiff’s recovery or is only a factor to be considered in assessing comparative negligence. For reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

Rickye D. Anderson (the Father) appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition to reduce his child support payments to his ex-wife, L. Lois Anderson (the Mother), and ordering him to pay a portion of the Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This appeal involves the construction of a home. Plaintiffs engaged one of the defendants, Donald Van Hise, (hereafter, the defendant) to construct a home on their property. On May 24, 1994, defendant signed a proposal to construct the house, reserving the right to withdraw the proposal within 30 days, if not accepted by plaintiff. One of the plaintiffs signed an acceptance of the proposal. The other did not. On June 25, 1994, defendant tendered another proposal on different terms, which proposal was accepted by both plaintiffs. The second proposal contained an estimated time of completion of 3-1/2 - 4-1/2 months. Both proposals contained a base contract price subject to revision for changes during construction. Both contracts refer to “plans and specifications” but the record contains no plan and only a partial set of specifications. The plans and specifications were not specifically prepared for plaintiffs, but were “generic,” that is, sold on the general market, to be altered as desired; and alterations were made, producing part of the present controversy. Promptly after the second proposal was accepted.

This is a divorce case. Following a bench trial, the court awarded Delores Jean Streun (“Wife”) an absolute divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the parties’ property, and ordered John Edmund Streun (“Husband”) to pay periodic alimony in futuro of $350 per month.  Husband appealed, arguing, in effect, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that Wife was entitled to periodic alimony in futuro. Wife contends that the alimony award is appropriate. She submits an additional issue -- that, in her words, “the trial court erred in not enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement of November 7, 1995.”

In this action, the appellant (plaintiff) sought a recovery for damages sustained to his pickup truck, lost earnings and related expenses caused by a collision between his vehicle and a horse belonging to the defendant, Rodney McCroskey. The accident occurred in the plaintiff's lane of travel on a public road, generally referred to as the Governor John Sevier HIghway. The defendant, Rodney McCroskey, filed a cross-claim against the defendant, Governor John Sevier Memorial Association. He, owever, was permitted to take a voluntary non-suit. The case was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict for the appelles (defendants) in the original action. Judgment for the defendants was duly entered on the verdict. The plaintiff filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or in the alternative for a new trial. The motion was overruled and this appeal resulted. We affimr the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal questions the adequacy of a jury’s verdict. The plaintiff, John L. Miller (“Miller”)1, alleged in his complaint that he sustained physical and emotional injuries and medical expenses when his automobile was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by the defendant, Scott D. Williams (“Williams”).2 After Williams admitted liability at trial, the jury awarded Miller damages of $45,000. Miller then filed a motion for an additur or a new trial. The trial court denied his motion, and this appeal followed. The sole issue3 on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to suggest an additur or grant a new trial due to the alleged inadequacy of the jury’s award.

The trial court’s judgment terminated the parental rights of Anna Patricia Malone (“Mother”) in and to her children, Willard Fillmore Rednower (DOB: October 1, 1983) and Jessie Mae Rednower (DOB: September 15, 1985).¹ She appealed, arguing, in her words, that the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) “failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family as required by T.C.A. [§] 37-1-166"; that the court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s “substantial noncompliance” with a plan of
care formulated by DCS pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-2-403; and that the court  erred in finding clear and convincing evidence of a basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights under T.C.A. § 37-1-147.²

Steve Payne (“Payne”), a stockholder and former employee of CSJ Travel, Inc. (“CSJ”), sued CSJ and the corporation’s other stockholders, Jan Savell (“Savell”) and Carleen Stephens (“Stephens”)1, seeking damages for the defendants’ alleged breach of a contract to repurchase Payne’s CSJ stock. Payne’s action was filed in the Blount County General Sessions Court at a time when earlier litigation between Payne and CSJ in the Blount County Chancery Court was pending on appeal to this court. In the instant action, the defendants allowed a default judgment to be taken against them and thereafter appealed to the Blount County Circuit Court for a de novo trial. The Circuit Court denied the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment, and instead granted summary judgment in favor of Payne and against CSJ for $6,666.64. Payne then filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of his suit against Savell and Stephens. The defendants appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Circuit Court erred in failing to grant them summary judgment, and erred in granting Payne a money judgment against CSJ.

The defendants, Stephen J. Udzinski and Donna Stokes a/k/a Donna Story, present a certified question of law following Udzinski’s conditional guilty plea to a Class E felony of possession of marijuana for resale and Stokes’s guilty plea to a Class A misdemeanor for possession of marijuana. Udzinski entered judicial diversion, and Stokes received a conviction and a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Both defendants attempted to reserve the right to pursue a certified question of law of whether the search warrant under which Udzinski's house was searched was supported by probable cause. In this appeal, the defendants present that question, and the state raises the issue of whether the defendants have properly preserved the question for our review. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the suppression issue raised by the defendants’ certified question.

In this post-divorce case, John D. Lockridge (husband) appeals the trial court's judgment ordering him to pay $16, 021.70 in educational expenses incurred by his former wife, Janet Wise Lockridge (wife), pursuant to a contractual agreement between them made shortly before the divorce. The husband also appeals the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife in the amount of $20, 552.57. We affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse in part.

The appellant (plaintiff) instituted this action against the appelles (defendants) in an attempt to gain access to copies of police reports of automobile accidens investigated by the Chattanooga Police Department. The plaintiff had requested by letter to inspect "[a]ll traffic accident reports maintained by your department which relate to any accident occuring with in seven days preceding the date of this letter. "The defendants had refused access to the plaintiff on the theory that such accident reports are made confidential under the provisions of T.C.A. § § 5 5 -10 - 108 , ets eq . The action was brought pursuant to the provisions of the Tennessee Public Records Act codified in  T.C. A . § § 10 -7-503 , et seq.  The trial court denied relief and this appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Michael G. Rose (defendant), was convicted of driving while under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, by a jury of his peers. The trial court sentenced the defendant to pay a $1,500 fine and serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Williamson County Jail. The trial court suspended all but 180 days of the sentence, and required the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence on probation. The court also revoked the defendant’s license for two years. In this court, two issues are presented for review. The defendant contends (a) the evidence contained in the record will not support a finding by a rational trier of fact that he is guilty of driving while under the influence, and (b) the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by denying his motion to suppress certain statements he made to a law enforcement officer. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

In this action the plaintiff-appellant (plaintiff) challenges the validity of an ordinance of the City of Knoxville which prohibits the practice of "brown bagging" (bringing your own alcoholic beverage) into restaurants, clubs, and businesses between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., Monday through Saturday and 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Sundays. It further makes it unlawful for businesses of any kind to permit or allow any customer to "bring in, carry, or possess, or consume beer or alcoholic beverages" during specified times as set out above. The proprietors of the designated places are also prohibited from selling any non-intoxicating beverabe to be mixed with and/or consumed with alcoholic beverages between the designated times. The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance. We reverse the trial court.

This appeal attempts to present certified questions of law pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The certified questions primarily involve the legality of a stop of a motor vehicle and a subsequent search and seizure resulting therefrom. Because we conclude that this matter is not properly before us, we dismiss this appeal.

This is a suit by a stockholder of an insolvent corporation, against another stockholder, his wife and an employee, seeking judgment against them for  dissipation of assets of the corporation, recovery of money due from  debtors of the corporation and liquidation of the corporation for the benefit  of creditors. Although not designated such in the complaint, the suit appears to be a suit for a receivership. Matter of Liquidation of United American Bank in Knoxville. Tenn. 1987, 743 S.W.2d 911.