APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Stephen Cobb (“petitioner”) filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court of Lake County against Joseph Vinson, Chairman of the Lake County Regional Correctional Facility disciplinary board (“LCRCF”); Billy Compton, warden of LCRCF; and Donal Campbell (“commissioner”), commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (collectively “respondents”) seeking court review of actions taken by the prison disciplinary board, prison warden, and department commissioner. Due process violations resulting therefrom were also alleged. The trial court granted respondents’ motion for dismissal for improper venue and petitioner has appealed. On appeal, a single issue was presented for our review: whether the trial court erred in granting respondents’ motion to dismiss for improper venue. For reasons state hereinafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This is a will contest case involving a succession of wills, disputes as to the testamentary capacity of the testator at the time of the making of each of the wills, and the standing of the contestants. At the present stage of the proceedings, the contestants are in the position of plaintiffs, because they initiated the contest.

This is an appeal of two cases consolidated for trial. Both cases originated in the General Sessions Court of Maury County, Tennessee and are styled as follows:

Ken Hopkins and wife Pam Hopkins,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Jim Bonner, Individually and d/b/a
EZA Aquaglass Pools,
Defendant.
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Kerry Garland,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Jim Bonner, individually and d/b/a
EZA Aquaglass Pools,
Defendant.

The appellant, Bonnie Stillwell, appeals as of right the Blount County Circuit Court’s order to revoke her probation. She contends that the trial court’s order was improper in light of her efforts to comply with the terms of probation. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a suit to establish a resulting trust and to recover for the breach thereof. Plaintiff/Appellee Rovene Lowe (Lowe) brought suit alleging a resulting trust and seeking damages arising from an alleged breach by Defendants/Appellants Winnie Sue Sanders Cannon  (Mrs. Cannon) and Robert Cannon (Mr. Cannon).  Charles Sanders died in 1990. The trial court found that Lowe had proven the existence of a resulting trust and that the Cannons had breached the trust. Consequently, the trial court awarded Lowe $15,840 in damages. The Cannons appeal.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Plaintiff, The Oak Ridge Boys, Inc., appeals the order of the trial court which affirmed the decision of the Board of Review of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security to award benefits to Steve Sanders.
 

Plaintiff Carver Plumbing Company, Inc. (Carver Plumbing), appeals the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of Carver Plumbing’s former attorney, Defendant/Appellee Martha Cone Beck (Beck). We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Carver Plumbing’s action against Beck is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions.

This is an appeal from a divorce decree in which the only issue is which parent should have principal custody of Luke, the minor child of the parties who was born July 13, 1993. The divorce decree of the Trial Court granted principal custody to the father, and the mother appealed to this Court. Her sole issue on appeal is: The Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiff/Appellant primary custody of the minor child of this marriage.

This is a breach of contract case involving the enforcement of an arbitration clause. We find the arbitration clause applicable, reverse the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for
arbitration.

The Rutherford County grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant, Mark F. Maybrey, with three (3) counts of telephone harassment. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion, which was denied by the District Attorney General. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Rutherford County Circuit Court, seeking to overturn the District Attorney’s denial of diversion. After a hearing, the trial court found that the District Attorney had not abused his discretion. Pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9, defendant brings this interlocutory appeal, claiming the trial court erred in finding that the District Attorney General had not abused his discretion in denying diversion. We find no error; therefore, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

The defendant, James Ray Bartlett, was indicted for DUI, driving on a revoked license, five counts of reckless driving, resisting arrest, evading arrest and reckless endangerment. At the close of the state's proof, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for acquittal as to the charge of resisting arrest. The jury rendered guilty verdicts as to the remaining counts. After setting aside the conviction for reckless endangerment, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten months for the DUI; four months and fifteen days for driving on a revoked license; five months for the reckless driving convictions, all of which were merged as one offense; and ten months for evading arrest. The transcript of the trial indicates sentences were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-nine months fifteen days with the minimum service at seventy-five percent. The judgment form indicates concurrent sentencing for all new convictions. The trial court revoked the defendant's community corrections sentence for prior convictions; these new  sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to the prior offenses according to the judgment form.

This is a post-divorce child custody suit. Joseph Weibel III (“father”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against Jacqueline Brewer (“mother”) seeking to have custody of the parties’ minor child, Joseph Weibel IV, (“Joey”) changed from mother to father. Mother had primary  physical custody of the parties’ child pursuant to a consent order calling for joint custody. Following a hearing, the chancellor awarded father sole custody, with mother having extensive visitation. The court also ordered father to pay mother’s attorney fees and expenses in connection with the litigation. Mother has raised two issues by this appeal. First, whether the evidence preponderates against the finding of the chancellor that it was in the best interest of the parties’ child to award custody to father. And  second, although father was directed to pay mother’s attorney fees and litigation expenses in connection with the trial below, mother as appellant herein raises the issue of whether the chancellor abused his discretion in directing father to pay mother’s attorney fees. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the award of custody to father and reverse the award of  attorney fees to mother.

This appeal is from the action by the trial court on a contempt citation by the Appellant, hereinafter “Wife,” and a Petition to Modify the original Divorce Decree and a motion under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., brought by the Appellee, hereinafter “Husband.”

The defendant, Jessee C. Gudger, III, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Sullivan County Circuit Court for robbery, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years in the custody of the Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to a sentence imposed in an unrelated case. The defendant contends that:

(1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction;
(2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a statement given to the police;
(3) the trial court erred by denying his special request to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; and
(4) the trial court erred by sentencing him to five years in the Department of Correction.

We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals that a debtor cannot collateraliy attack in state court an adjudication made in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding regarding the balance due on a deb owed by the debtor-bankrupt. The judgment of the Court of appeals is affirmed as modified.

This is a premises liability case under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant governmental entity. We affirm.