APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a medical malpractice suit in which the plaintiffs have appealed from a summary
judgment in favor of all defendants.

Ronnie D. Boyd, the Assessor of Property of Montgomery County, Tennessee, appeals the trial court’s judgment which ruled that eighty-nine percent (89%) of a parcel of real property owned by Petitioner/Appellee Batson East-Land Company, Inc., was entitled to “Greenbelt” status for the tax year 1991. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling and, thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s order. In my view, it is simply a case of statutory application. In the “Open Parole Hearings Act” of 1993 the legislature provided that the Parole Board shall receive and consider victim impact statements, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-504(a); that notice be given to the victim or the victim’s representative and to the trial judge and district attorney involved in the original criminal prosecution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(b)(1), (2) and (4); and that on a failure to provide the required notices, the Board may schedule a new hearing if the Board receives a written victim impact statement within fifteen days of the time the parole decision is finalized, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(d)(2).

This suit was filed in General Sessions Court to collect a dishonored check, but was appealed to the Circuit Court where a complaint was filed stating more details of transactions involving the transfer of ownership of two automobiles, a Honda and a Chevrolet.

The plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed in the Trial Court a petition for the writ of certiorari from the action of the Board of Paroles on April 18, 1996, rescinding its order of April 9, 1994, granting the prisoner a parole. At the time of the rescission, the prisoner had not been released from custody.

 The appellants have filed a petition to rehear based on the Western Section’s opinion in Sims v. Stewart, No. 02A01-9706-CV-00123 (Jackson, Jan. 21, 1998). In Sims the court relied on an earlier case of Dwight v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 701 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. App. 1985), and decided that the policy in question “provides that reduction for worker’s compensation benefits applies to damages and in no way affects the coverage available.” We think that Dwight stated the opposite; it stated that coverage was reduced by any worker’s compensation benefits paid or payable. We respectfully overrule the petition to rehear.

The captioned plaintiffs’ have appealed from a summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ actions against the corporate defendant for the value of their stock as dissenting minority shareholders and their action against the individual defendants for breach of fiduciary duty as corporate directors.

This is yet another chapter in the administration of the estate of Harold L. Jenkins, a popular entertainer whose stage name was “Conway Twitty.” The executors initiated the present proceeding to resolve disputed rights of three devises in respect to the collection from them of certain charges appearing on the records of the deceased. The Probate Court resolved the issues in favor of the executors, and two of the devises appealed.

I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s order. In my view, it is simply a case of statutory application. In the “Open Parole Hearings Act” of 1993 the legislature provided that the Parole Board shall receive and consider victim impact statements, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-504(a); that notice be given to the victim or the victim’s representative and to the trial judge and district attorney involved in the original criminal prosecution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(b)(1), (2) and (4); and that on a failure to provide the required notices, the Board may schedule a new hearing if the Board receives a written victim impact statement within fifteen days of the time the parole decision is finalized, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(d)(2).

The appellant, a nonlawyer, was elected to the office of General Sessions Judge of Hancock County in the August 1990 general election.

The plaintiff, ContourMedical Technology, Inc., has appealed from a partial summary judgment dismissing that part of plaintiff’s claim against the defendant, Flexcon Company, Inc., which seeks consequential damages resulting from defects in material purchased by plaintiff from defendant. The Trial Judge directed entry of final judgment as provided by TRCP Rule 54.02.

On Septem ber 12, 1996, a Shelby County jury found Appellant, Darrell E. Braddock, guilty of first degree felony m urder, criminal attem pt: to wit especially aggravated robbery, criminal attempt: to wit murder in the first degree, and two counts of aggravated assault. Appellant appeals from his convictions, raising two issues:

1) whether the evidence presented at trial was leg ally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict; and
2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State, because of the victim ’s family’s feelings, to withdraw its offer of a plea bargain.

After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The plaintiff describes himself as a whistle blower, as that term has come to be used, and seeks damages for his termination from employment because he allegedly refused to participate in and keep silent about certain allegedly illegal corporate activities. The allegations were denied by the defendants whose motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appeals and presents for review the issues of (1) whether he was terminated for time card abuse and sexual harassment or whether these reasons were pretextual, (2) whether a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge remains viable in this jurisdiction, and (3) whether his termination constituted outrageous conduct by the defendants. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is denovo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of thecorrectness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d). See, Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). We will refer to the plaintiff as Hubrig, or as the appellant, or as the plaintiff. This record is unusually prolix; prima facie, it appeared to reflect a trial by affidavit, an impermissible use of RULE 56, see: Womack v. Blue Cross- Blue Shield, 593 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. 1980), but an in-depth analysis reveals that the trial court correctly held that the totality of the evidence demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact or law. We therefore affirm the judgment.

The appellant, William Robert Diaz, appeals as of right the convictions and sentences he received in the Criminal Court of Anderson County. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder and was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to twenty-two (22) years for the murder and to twelve (12) years for attempted murder.1 The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.