APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Michael A. Thompson, a prisoner in the custody of Tennessee Department of Correction has appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his petition for certiorari for judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Board of Paroles denying parole.

The defendant, Eric M. Florence, entered pleas of guilt in the General Sessions Court of Benton County to possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of alcohol. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail; all but two days were suspended on each count. The sentences were to be concurrently served. The defendant incurred additional charges and his probation was revoked. He served a portion of his general sessions sentence and then moved the court to suspend the remainder. The general sessions court denied the motion. The defendant appealed to the circuit court. That court affirmed the decision of the general sessions court.

The appellant, Lemont E. Blair, appeals as of right the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, William Waylon Jackson, was convicted by a Decatur County jury of three (3) counts of the sale of marijuana over one-half (½) ounce, Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to concurrent terms of three (3) years for each count and denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment as it violated the mandatory joinder provision of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a). He further argues that the trial court imposed excessive sentences and improperly denied alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an automobile personal injury case. The defendant, David Shorter, Jr., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court in a bench trial awarding plaintiff, Sylvia Hudson, $9,000.00
damages. Shorter’s responsibility for the accident was stipulated, and the trial concerned only
the issue of damages.

This is a libel suit brought by a physician against a health maintenance organization and related health insurance entities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on the statute of limitations. The lawsuit involves allegedly false information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank. In an issue of first impression, we hold that each dissemination of the allegedly defamatory information by the Data Bank gives rise to a separate cause of action. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.

This is a suit brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act. It was brought by Plaintiff Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Charles D. Hand, against his employer, Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of $3,250,000. The Defendant appeals, raising nine separate issues. Although many do not merit a protracted discussion, others raise substantial questions.

Plaintiff  Raymond Mitchell sues Defendant Camelot Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee. He alleges that Camelot, in acquiring a quit claim deed from him conveying two tracts of land, one that contains an artesian well and the other equipment in connection with distribution of water to the adjacent area.  He contends that as a consideration for the quit claim deed, John Valetta, President of Camelot, represented to him that Camelot would provide water taps for two of his lots free of charge and, upon acquisition of an alternate water source, would re-convey the quit claimed lots to him.

In this workers’ compensation action the Second Injury Fund, defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Knox County which found the employee, Robert Bomely, plaintiff-appellee, to be totally and permanently disabled. The award was apportioned 65 percent to the employer, Mid- America Corporation, d/b/a Burger King, defendant-appellee, and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). The trial court assessed
the employer’s liability based on 400 weeks of benefits and held the Second Injury Fund liable for the remaining 938 weeks of benefits (until the employee reached the age of 651). Thus, the employer’s liability was limited to 65 percent of 400 weeks rather than 65 percent of the total number of weeks to age 65. We transferred this case from the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel to decide whether it was proper to have limited the employer’s liability in this fashion. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we conclude that the award should be apportioned between the employer and the Second Injury
Fund based on the total number of weeks to age 65 rather than limiting the employer’s liability to a percentage of 400 weeks. Accordingly, that portion of the trial court’s judgment is reversed. We shall also address (1) whether an award of permanent total disability is subject to the monetary cap imposed by the 400 week maximum total benefit provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6) and (2) whether the apportionment of benefits between the employer and the Second Injury Fund in this case is controlled by subsection (a) or (b) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208.

In this cause, the insuror refused to pay a claim under a policy of insurance. The insured contends that such refusal constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” in violation
of the Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101, et seq.1 In contrast, the insuror insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56- 7-105,2 commonly known as the “bad faith statute,” is the exclusive remedy for the bad faith denial of an insurance claim. Because Title 56, Chapters 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Code comprehensively regulates the insurance industry, the insuror insists that the acts and practices of an insurance company are never subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

This case presents for review the appeal by the petitioner, James J. Benson, from the judgment of the Cour tof Criminal Appeals affirming the trila court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge because the judge who presided over his criminal trial solicitated a bribe from him. The judment denying the petition is reversed, and the petioner is granted a new trial.

In this cause, the insuror refused to pay a claim under a policy of insurance. The insured contends that such refusal constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101, et seq.1 In contrast, the insuror insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56- 7-105,2 commonly known as the “bad faith statute,” is the exclusive remedy for the bad faith denial of an insurance claim. Because Title 56, Chapters 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Code comprehensively regulates the insurance industry, the insuror insists that the acts and practices of an insurance company are never subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

This case presents for review the Court of Appeals' decision that the classificatin as industrial and commercial of two or more condominiums units rented by the owners to others for their use as residences does not violate Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Nor does the statute violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. That decision is affirmed.

This Court has accepted from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, certified question of law regarding the effect of the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. §
467 - 5 - 1512 ( b ) ( 2 ) on the calculation of interest on property tax paymens and refunds. 

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Patricia Love, plaintiff-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County awarding her permanent total disability benefits to age 65 or until the payment of such benefits reached the maximum total benefit. The trial court apportioned the award 67.5 percent to the Second Injury Fund and 32.5 percent to the employer, American Olean Tile Company, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, defendants-appellees. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employee filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision. We granted the motion for review to determine (1) whether it was error not to have awarded benefits payable to age 65 notwithstanding the maximum total benefit, and (2) whether the apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund was correct. After examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we reverse the decision of the lower courts to subject the employee’s award to the maximum total benefit. However, we affirm the apportionment of the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a).

I rely on my concurring and dissenting opinion in Bomely v. Mid-American Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998). While I agree with the majority's conclusion that awards of permanent and total disability are payable to age sixtyfive, I continue to disagree, as voiced in my Bomely dissent, with the majority's analysis of apportionment which discourages employers from hiring the handicapped and is contrary to the stated legislative purpose behind the Second Injury Fund legislation. An employer's liability should be limited to the first 400 weeks of benefits unless the subsequent injury would have in and of itself caused permanent and total disability in the absence of any prior injuries or disabilities. In such cases, the employer should bear responsibility for the entire award to age sixty-five.