APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, James Tyrone Harbison, was convicted in 1997 of aggravated assault and sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102. In this appeal, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of “serious bodily injury” as an aggravating factor of the defendant’s convicted offense; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony that the defendant had been released from prison immediately preceeding the instant offense; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless endangerment as a lesser offense; (4) whether the defendant’s sentence is excessive; and (5) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a Range III persistent offender. We AFFIRM the judgment from the trial court.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of delivery of one-half ounce or more of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to a term of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This sentence was suspended and the defendant was to serve four years on supervised probation and a term of ninety days in the county jail. The defendant’s subsequent motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court. The defendant now appeals and contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record and applicable law, we find no merit to the defendant’s contentions and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Steven Cobb appeals from the dismissal of his pro se complaint against Charles Wilson, Evelyn Scallions, and Steve Vaughn. The complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged violations of Cobb’s rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Defendant Vanderbilt Industrial Contracting Corporation (VICC) appeals the trial court’s judgments which awarded attorney’s fees to two of VICC’s co-defendants in this lawsuit, Kajima International, Inc., and Titan Contracting and Leasing Company. We reverse the trial court’s judgments based upon our conclusion that the relief awarded exceeds the scope of the relief requested by the parties’ pleadings.

Defendants Jimmy C. Grisham, d/b/a Germantown Pest Control, Germantown Termite and Pest Control, Inc., and Christopher D. Alexander appeal the trial court’s judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of  Plaintiff/Appellee Catherine Edmundson in the amount of $50,000. We  affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Donald Ray Stacey (Husband) appeals an order modifying the terms of the parties’ final decree of divorce. After almost twenty-eight years of marriage, the parties were divorced on July 6, 1995. The final decree was subsequently amended on July 14, 1995, to require Husband to pay attorney’s fees to Kevin Kathleen Stacey (Wife). Three children were born during the course of the marriage, but only one child, Zachary, was still a minor at the time of the couple’s divorce. Pursuant to the Amended Final Decree of Divorce (amended final decree), Wife was granted sole custody of the minor child with Husband having reasonable visitation. Husband was ordered to pay $1,300.00 in child support per month plus the Child Support Guidelines amount of 21% of his annual bonus up to a total gross income of $9,900.00 (bonus and base salary).

The Mixes and the Millers are owners of adjacent pieces of real property. In this boundary line dispute, the trial court (1) determined the boundary line that divides the parties’ properties, (2) awarded damages to the Millers for certain timber that had been removed from the disputed property by the Mixes, (3) denied the parties’ motions to alter, modify, or amend its judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial, (4) denied the Millers’ motion for discretionary costs, and (5) denied the Mixes’ motion to re-open the proof. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

The defendant, Ruth Stanford, stands convicted of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance and delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (1991) (amended 1996, 1997) (proscriptive statute); § 39-17-410 (1991) (amended 1996) (scheduled drugs). Stanford received her convictions at a jury trial in the Henderson County Circuit Court. She was sentenced to serve concurrent two-year sentences1 for these Class D felonies, with the first 90 days to be served in the county facility and the balance to be served on probation. In this  appeal, she raises three issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the
witness who purchased drugs from Stanford without qualifying
the basis of knowledge and reliability of the witness's
testimony.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying a continuance of the
hearing on the motion for new trial and ruling on the merits of
the motion.
3. Whether the trial court properly sentenced the defendant.
Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law, we find no
reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Johnny Leach, appeals the order of the Criminal Court of Campbell County denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual battery. On July 2, 1998, the defendant entered his plea and received two ten-year sentences to be served concurrently. Because the defendant’s plea became final on the date of entry of the plea pursuant to the plea agreement, we conclude that his motion to withdraw was untimely.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

Sherrod Jackson, Robert Williams, Nathaniel Williams, Mike Williams, Shirley Blalock, and Steven Craig Cooper (collectively “Appellants”) appeal from the Chancery Court of Shelby County, which granted a temporary injunction, enjoining the Appellants from permitting “lap dancing” and from permitting employees or independent contractors from engaging in “lewd and obscene exhibition of genitals.”

A jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated child abuse and neglect, and he received an eighteen year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals, raising the following issues:

I. Whether the convicting evidence is sufficient;
II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a Department of Child Services investigator that the victim cried at the mention of the defendant’s name;
III. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statements to the police on the basis his mental incompetence prevented a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights; and
IV. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing educators to testify about the defendant’s mental abilities unless the defendant first testified.

Finding no merit to the defendant’s arguments, we affirm his conviction.

The petitioner, Jacques B. Bennett, appeals the summary dismissal of his “Motion to Vacate/Set Aside Judgment/Plea: and, to Declare Said Judgment/Plea Void” by the Hamilton County Criminal Court on January 9, 1998. Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that this is an appropriate case for affirmance pursuant to Ct. of Crim. App. Rule 20.

This litigation originated when the Town of Huntsville (“Huntsville”) and Stanlodge, LLC (“Stanlodge”), filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 1101 of the Public Acts of 1998. The plaintiffs specifically contest Section 9(f)(3)1 of Chapter 1101, which permits certain territoriesto hold incorporation elections even though these territories do not satisfy the minimum requirements for such elections as set forth in the general law. See T.C.A. § 6-1-201 (1998). On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Section 9(f)(3) is constitutional. Huntsville and Stanlodge appeal, raising   five issues:

This case concerns the termination of appellant Harry Swanson’s parental rights over his biological child, Brittany Swanson, who is now nine years old and in the custody of the appellee Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, Inc. (Baptist Children’s Home). Although Mr. Swanson’s parental rights were originally terminated by the Tipton County Juvenile Court, the circuit court of Tipton County denied the petition to terminate parental rights on an appeal by Mr. Swanson. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and found that Mr. Swanson had “abandoned” Brittany because he had “willfully failed to support” her or “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward [her] support” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(D) (1996). We hold that the statutory definition of “willfully failed to support” and “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child’s support” is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the failure to provide monetary support for the four months preceding the petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment, irrespective of whether that failure was intentional. This presumption violated Mr. Swanson’s federal and state constitutional right to the care and custody of his daughter. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order returning custody to Mr. Swanson.