APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the Chancery Court for McMinn County which, pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 60.02(5), modified a judgment that was previously entered in accord with a
settlement agreement between the parties. The appellants appealed and contended that the trial court improperly modified the judgment and reduced the benefits they were to receive according to the agreement. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the appellants filed a motion for full review by this Court to determine whether a party can seek modification of a workers’ compensation judgment for a fixed sum to be paid periodically almost two years after entry of judgment. We hold that where a party agrees to settle a workers’ compensation claim, and the trial court approves the settlement, the settling party is generally not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5). Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals panel and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

We granted the appeal in this case to decide (1) whether fists and feet are deadly weapons
under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B); and (2) whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on criminal responsibility for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery was reversible error. We conclude that fists and feet are not deadly weapons under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B). In addition, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed
 

I concur with the results reached by the majority in this case. With respect to the issue of counseling, I agree with the majority that the statute has become inapplicable in the present case due to the child having reached majority. I write separately because of my concern that the majority
opinion might be interpreted as limiting a trial court’s discretion to order counseling to that specifically set forth in T.C.A. § 36-6-101(e)(1), the text of which is set forth in the majority opinion. I interpret the statute to be permissive rather than prohibitive. For example, I can envision a trial court ordering a non-custodial parent to undergo counseling for anger management as a condition of exercising visitation rights. I do not believe the aforementioned statute prohibits this.

The appellant owned an undivided one-third interest in a residence prior to his marriage to the appellee. They occupied the residence for about two years, during which time the evidence reveals that the appellee engaged herself in constant repairs, thereby increasing the liveability and value of the residence. She was awarded 75% of the increase in the value of this residence during the marriage, of which the appellant complains.