APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant First Capital Home Improvements appeals the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Sara J. Malone and Jerry H. Malone in this breach of contract action. We affirm.

The petitioner, Anthony P. Jones, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and received consecutive sentences of ten years for each count for a total effective sentence of thirty years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court denied his petition. Consequently, the petitioner presents the following issue for our review: whether the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff, Sheila Faye Hagen McCall Barnett (Wife), and defendant, Ronald Edward Barnett, Sr. (Husband), were divorced by decree entered January 9, 1997. Husband appeals and presents issues concerning property division, alimony, and attorney’s fees.

This is a post-divorce custody proceeding. Jean Kelly Fisher Wallace (“mother”) was
granted a divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County from Richard Edward Wallace
(“father”) in May, 1992. Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ minor child, Caroline. In
April, 1995, father filed a petition to change legal custody from mother to father. Following a
bench trial, the court denied the relief sought by father and permitted custody to remain with
mother. The court delayed its decision for six months, principally to allow mother the
opportunity to make changes in two aspects of her life: (1) the neighborhood in which she and
the minor child had been living for slightly over a year and (2) her ongoing association and
relationship with her boyfriend. The trial court felt both aspects were detrimental to the welfare
of the parties’ child.

Brian Bottoms, Sr., and Amy Bottoms have appealed from the judgment of the Juvenile
Court, terminating their parental rights in respect to Brian Scott Bottoms, aged 7, Israel Vaughn
Bottoms, aged 5, and Elijah Keane Bottoms, aged 2, and placing them in the legal guardianship
of AGAPE with the right to place them for adoption.

The captioned executors filed this suit to recover damages for the wrongful death of 88
year old Leslie H. Little, deceased, who lost his life in a motor vehicle collision at the
intersection of North Main Street and Colloredo Boulevard in Shelbyville, Bedford County,
Tennessee. Movement of traffic through the intersection was controlled by the multicolored
lights of an ordinary traffic control signal.
Several

This appeal involves the forfeiture under the Tennessee Drug Control Act of $4,710.75 in cash, twenty-two pistols, rifles and shotguns, a video camera, silver bars, and assorted gold and silver coins during a search of a residence in Waynesboro. The Commissioner of Safety ordered the currency and personal property forfeited despite the family’s contention that an initial search of their home and property without a warrant was illegal. The family filed a petition for judicial review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The trial court found the personal property was lawfully seized after the officers obtained a search warrant and affirmed the forfeiture order. The family perfected this appeal. We have determined that there is substantial and material evidence to support the commissioner’s decision.

We concur with the results of the presiding judge’s opinion because we believe that the holding of Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956) controls the outcome of this case. The Harpeth Valley Utility District has been operating since 1959 under the aegis of the Utilities Law of 1937 [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-82-101, -804 (1992 & Supp. 1997)] providing water and sewerage disposal services to areas of Davidson, Williamson, and Cheatham Counties. As such, it is a governmental entity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-82-301(a)(1) (Supp. 1997); First
Suburban Util. Dist. v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 128, 132-34, 146 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1941). Unless specifically provided otherwise, a city’s zoning power does not extend to state government instrumentalities located within its borders. See Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. at 583-84, 292 S.W.2d at 780-81.

The appellant, Douglas C. Carr, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of driving while an habitual motor vehicle offender. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to eighteen months incarceration in the Shelby County Correction Center with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the appellant alternative sentencing, and, on appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals, via certified question of law, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine seized as a result of a warrantless search of the defendant's pockets. Because the officer made a lawful full custodial arrest of the defendant and searched the defendant incident to this lawful full custodial arrest, we affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

The Defendant was indicted by the Carroll County Grand Jury for one count of introduction of drugs into a penal institution. The Defendant moved for pretrial diversion, but the request was denied by the District Attorney General. The Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court to review the denial. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the District Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying the Defendant's request for pretrial diversion. The Defendant then pled guilty to one count of introduction of drugs into a penal institution and requested judicial diversion. The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended after sixty days confinement. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her pretrial diversion, judicial diversion or full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kathleen Malley, entered a guilty plea to theft of over $60,000, a Class B felony, in exchange for an agreed sentence of eight years incarceration. Following a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of that sentence, the Defendant was ordered to serve six months in jail followed by twelve years of probation. She was also ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant her full probation. We find no error. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, James Richard Bishop, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. Following a sentencing hearing, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder and concurrent sentences of twenty years and five years respectively for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. James Richard Bishop, No. 03C01-9308-CR-00268, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536, at *1, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, August 18, 1994), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1994). Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Knox County Criminal Court, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. He challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issue: whether the trial court erred in dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, based upon a ruling that Petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Laverne Long, entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide, a Class D felony, in exchange for a two year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Following an evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's motion to suspend her sentence, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. The Defendant now appeals as of right from the denial of alternative sentencing. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.