APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Plaintiff filed a retaliatory discharge action based on dismissal from employment for filing a worker's compensation claim. The Trial Judge held the record established the dismissal was not retaliatory. We affirm.

The defendant, James David Alder, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced as a Range III Persistent Offender to twenty (20) years for the attempted second degree murder, eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for assault, and three (3) years for reckless endangerment. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the sentence ordered in a case for which the defendant was on bail at the time he committed the present offenses. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear expert testimony concerning the extent of the victim's injuries, the length of her hospital stay and the number of surgeries she had; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless endangerment; and (3) the trial court failed to follow the sentencing guidelines and improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a review of the law and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury found Donald Lee Reid guilty of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, suspended after service of 15 days confinement, and a fine of $500.00. Reid challenges his conviction, his sentence, and his fine. He raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in not conducting a jury-out hearing on the defendant's motion in limine regarding the admissibility of the defendant's BAC test results; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the results of the BAC test into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence; (4) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive; and (5) whether the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a fine of $500.00 since the defendant did not waive his right for the jury to assess the fine. After a careful review of the record, we remand for a jury to assess the fine but affirm in all other respects.

The defendant, Kenneth Chambly, appeals his convictions for three charges of aggravated sexual battery for which he received an effective sentence of ten years without parole. He raises various issues on appeal. We reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial because of the failure of the state to elect offenses and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the need for offense unanimity in the verdict. We also conclude that the trial court imposed an improper sentence of ten years for one of the convictions.

The defendant appeals his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, but under $10,000. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a showup identification of him at the crime scene. He further contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After pleading guilty to felony theft of identity, a Class D felony, and to violating her probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve one year confinement and one year probation with rehabilitation as a result of violating her probation. In addition, the trial court ordered her to serve an additional three years of probation for the felony theft of identity conviction, to run consecutive to the sentence resulting from the probation violation. The defendant appeals and asserts that the trial court erred in sentencing her on the probation violation, erred in sentencing her to three years of probation for the felony theft of identity, and erred in ordering the two sentences to be served consecutively. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Grundy County jury convicted the defendant, James Larry Cox, for the attempted second degree murder of Jimmy Sweeton. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to ten (10) years of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant questions whether he was denied a fair trial due to the trial court's exclusion of evidence relating to the victim's reputation for violence, and whether he was improperly denied the right to question the victim about a prior conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard L. Thompson, was accused by the Wilson County grand jury of incest of his stepdaughter, in three counts, all occurring between May and August 1999. On January 13, 2000, defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of incest for a sentence of six (6) years in the Department of Correction. As part of the plea agreement, defendant requested a sentencing hearing for the trial court to consider an alternative sentence and probation. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant's request for an alternative sentence and probation and confined Defendant in the Department of Correction for six (6) years. On direct appeal, defendant raises five (5) issues: (1) Whether the trial court improperly considered a 1989 Pennsylvania conviction for an undetermined offense in finding defendant was not an appropriate candidate for full probation or split confinement; (2) Whether the trial court erred by finding certain statutory enhancement factors applicable to the determination of how the sentence should be served, where length of sentence was determined in the guilty plea; (3) Whether the trial court erred in finding that the sentence of confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; (4) Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider whether measures less restrictive than confinement had been applied to this offender; and (5) Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider defendant's special needs into consideration as a factor that made alternative sentencing (community corrections) particularly appropriate in this case. Upon a review of the record, legal arguments, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we find no error. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Steven Lee Whitehead, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of three counts of rape. Pursuant to the appellant's convictions, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding at the appellant's trial evidence of other sexual behavior by the victim; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of prior false testimony by the victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to either exclude DNA evidence or, in the alternative, grant the appellant a continuance of the trial date; (4) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence concerning the appellant's character; (5) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the appellant's convictions of rape; and (6) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of each count of rape. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court due to the court's failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery, and we remand these cases for a new trial.

We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court erred in finding Timothy L. Crabtree permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental and physical injuries sustained while working for Cutler-Hammer. Crabtree injured his back while working on a production line; then, during treatment for the back injury, he developed severe depression. The trial court found that Crabtree was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combined effect of his mental and physical injuries. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel rejected this finding, concluding instead that Crabtree's mental disorder was not compensable because it was not connected to his back injury, which was compensable. On review, we conclude that Crabtree's mental disorder resulted from his physical injury. We hold, therefore, that Crabtree's mental disorder is compensable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Freddy Allen Perry, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to four counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of full probation and judicial diversion. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to state on the record its reasons for denying full probation and judicial diversion; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal. After review, we hold that appellate counsel's decision on direct appeal not to raise potentially improper closing arguments at trial by the prosecutor was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial to the petitioner. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petitioner's petition.

The petitioner, Lawrence A. Strickland, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, which challenged his 1997 guilty-plea-based, Roane County conviction of aggravated sexual battery. Based upon our de novo review of matters of law, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the conviction court was void, although we reject the petitioner’s claim that the indictment is invalid. We reverse the judgment of the lower court and grant habeas corpus relief in the form of declaring the petitioner’s Roane County sentence void.  Because the conviction rests upon a guilty plea that, in turn, was premised upon the agreed sentence being valid, we vacate the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The conviction court shall afford the petitioner the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(4).

The defendant, Barry Marable, appeals from his convictions for aggravated burglary, felony reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, and misdemeanor theft, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of conviction except for the one for the evading arrest. We modify that conviction from a Class D felony to a Class E felony and remand the case for sentencing.

A Dickson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for rape, and the defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of sexual battery. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was subsequently withdrawn. Almost two months later, the defendant filed a pro se motion alleging his motion for new trial was unilaterally and improperly withdrawn by counsel. Eventually, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion for new trial since the defendant's original motion had been withdrawn, and no timely motion was pending. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's jury charge authorized the jury to convict based on lack of consent, when "force or coercion" was alleged in the indictment. We conclude the motion for new trial was not properly before the trial court, thereby waiving this issue. Nevertheless, we have examined the issue for plain error and conclude defendant's allegation of error is totally without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Lincoln County jury of criminal responsibility for first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

The appellants sued the appellees for claims connected with the death of the appellants' twin fetuses. The jury found in favor of the appellees, and, in addition, after the jury verdict, the trial court granted appellee Dr. Caldwell's motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations had run before he was sued. The appellants argue that this court should reverse the trial court's order dismissing Dr. Caldwell and overturn the jury's verdict. We reverse the trial court's order dismissing Dr. Caldwell, but affirm the jury verdict in his favor and in favor of the other appellee.

As the result of an altercation with the manager of a fast food restaurant, the defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; assault, a Class A misdemeanor; unlawful possession of a handgun while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; and the unlawful possession of a weapon with the intent to go armed, as a Class C misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of four and one-half years, with 150 days in confinement, and the remainder of his time on intensive probation. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court, raising the issues of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions of possession of a weapon with the intent to go armed and possession of a handgun while under the influence, and whether the trial court erred in enhancing his aggravated assault sentence to four and one-half years and sentencing him to intensive probation. Based on a careful review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions, and that the trial court did not err in enhancing the defendant's sentence for aggravated assault. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Tenn. R. App. P. 54.02 does not provide this court
with jurisdiction in this case for the reasons set out in the majority opinion. I would, however, treat
this appeal as an interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. Bayberry would allow us to waive
the finality requirement of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a) if we found good reason to suspend that
requirement.

This case involves the termination of parental rights of the mother of four children who were removed from the mother's home by the Department of Children's Services in 1998 and placed in foster care. DCS devised a Plan of Care for the mother, which, among other things, required her to address her drug and alcohol addictions. During the two and one-half years between the removal of the children from the home and the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights, the mother made token efforts to improve her situation, but her substance abuse continued. The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights on multiple grounds, including the ground that the conditions that led to the children's removal continued to persist with little likelihood of remedy. Because DCS has established grounds for termination and has established that termination is in the best interest of the children, we affirm.

Petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief which alleged that the charges against him were untrue, that the statutes of limitations as to the charges had expired before he was charged, and that his counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court determined that the allegations contained in the petitioner's pro se petition did not entitle him to habeas corpus relief. After careful review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Following a police search of their home pursuant to a warrant, the defendants, mother and son, were each indicted on one count of possession of marijuana with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class E felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. At the conclusion of their joint trial, the son was found guilty of both counts as charged in the indictment. The jury found the mother guilty of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court denied their motions for new trials, and the defendants filed timely appeals to this court. On appeal, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of their respective convictions. The State raises the additional issue of whether the defendants may properly be represented by the same appellate counsel when the record is silent concerning whether the trial court addressed the possible conflict created by the joint representation. After a careful review of the record and an analysis of applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.