APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant entered a best-interest guilty plea in the Cocke County Criminal Court to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and one count of criminal exposure to HIV. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the criminal exposure to HIV conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for one of the aggravated rape convictions, and as a multiple rapist to 24 years incarceration for the other aggravated rape conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the sentences for an effective sentence of 78 years incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the length of the sentences and the consecutive service imposed. Based upon our review, we affirm the sentences imposed.

On April 29, 1999, the petitioner's status on community corrections was revoked and he was resentenced. On May 15, 2000, he filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition. The issue is whether the petition is time-barred by the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202. Because the revocation and resentencing became final thirty days after its entry, which was May 29, 1999, as the State concedes, and we agree, the petition was timely filed. We reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence and was sentenced as a multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the defendant alleges that (1) the trial court erred in finding that he was a third offender for purposes of sentencing, and (2) the DUI sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it is vague and has an ex post facto effect. After careful review, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

The defendant, Jon Goodale, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. The first conviction was merged into the felony murder conviction and the defendant was sentenced to life. The trial court then conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed a twenty-five year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery to be served consecutive to the life sentence. In his appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury concerning accessory after the fact as a lesser-included offense to all charges, and (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery and sentence of eight years and six months, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay into evidence under the excited utterance exception; (3) the trial court erroneously failed to charge the jury on lesser-included offenses; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Adrian S. Lennox, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, vandalism, felony evading arrest and driving on a revoked license. The defendant was then sentenced as a Range II offender to nine years on the aggravated burglary conviction, three years on the vandalism conviction, five years on the felony evading arrest conviction, and six months on the conviction for driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered that the aggravated burglary and the felony evading sentences run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant's convictions, (2) the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion for the preparation of trial transcripts prior to his motion for new trial hearing, and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner appeals the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court held that the petition was time-barred by the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petition was filed timely, and reverse the decision of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Quincy Bledsoe, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Fayette County Circuit Court. In 1997, Bledsoe pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping and attempted felony escape and received an effective nine-year Department of Correction sentence as a violent offender. On appeal, Bledsoe seeks to set aside his convictions upon grounds that his pleas were "based upon an uncounseled statement that was not knowingly and voluntarily given." Finding this issue without merit, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

In July of 1999, a Fayette County Grand Jury indicted the appellant, Eric Terrell Glover, for the following offenses: (1) first-degree premeditated murder; (2) first-degree felony murder; (3) especially aggravated kidnapping; and (4) especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Glover was convicted on all charges and, in accordance with the jury's verdict, was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree premeditated murder. For his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery, Glover was sentenced, as a violent offender, to concurrent twenty year sentences on each charge, with these sentences running concurrently to his life sentence. On appeal, Glover challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions as a principal offender under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. He argues that the proof, at best, supports only the subordinate criminal responsibility of "facilitating." After review, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee from an order granting the defendant judicial diversion for the offense of sexual battery. This order was the result of a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to reduce a previously ordered sentence of one year in the county jail with all time suspended and supervised probation for one year. Although the Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35 motion was timely filed, the trial court did not act upon the motion until after the original probated sentence had been fully served and expired. Two issues of first impression are presented in this appeal. We conclude that (1) judicial diversion is not a “sentence” and, therefore, may not be granted as Rule 35 relief; and (2) a trial court may not modify a sentence under Rule 35 after the sentence has been fully served and expired. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I join with the majority in concluding that the trial court was without authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after the sentence had expired. I write separately because I also find that the trial court was without authority to grant judicial diversion in this case even if the sentence had not expired. Absent appropriate legislation, the trial court is without authority to invent its own sentencing programs.