APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, William Riley Gaul, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury
of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, stalking, tampering
with evidence, and theft of property valued over $500. After merging the felony murder
conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant
to an effective term of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The
Defendant raises twelve issues on appeal, which we have condensed and reordered as
follows: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
especially aggravated stalking count of the presentment; (2) whether the trial court erred
by not sequestering the jury and by allowing the trial to be livestreamed by the media outlet
Law and Crime; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a Snapchat message between
the Defendant and the victim; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to
present character evidence in the form of testimony that the Defendant was controlling,
manipulative, and possessive in his relationship with the victim; (5) whether the Defendant
was denied his right to a fair trial by the State’s introduction of his use of the video game
“Call of Duty” and the related evidence that the game included “wall banging,” or killing
individuals by shooting through the walls of a building; (6) whether the trial court erred in
allowing Bobby Jones, Jr., to testify as an expert and to offer trajectory evidence; (7)
whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s
uncharged criminal conduct relating to the theft charge; (8) whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain the convictions for first degree murder, felony murder, stalking,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and theft of property
valued over $500; (9) whether the jury returned mutually exclusive and patchwork verdicts;
and (10) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors deprived the Defendant
of his right to a fair trial. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s felony
theft conviction in count three must be modified to a Class A misdemeanor and a sentence
of eleven months, twenty-nine days pursuant to the savings statute. The Defendant’s
remaining convictions are affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for an amended
judgment in count three.

Defendant, Kayla Nicole Pauze was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide and
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective ten-year sentence
in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length,
range, and manner of her sentences. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs
and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court
found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established
that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother
has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Jeff A. Willis (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the judge in this suit to collect a judgment. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves application of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). Plaintiff filed multiple causes of action against the City of Shelbyville, the Bedford County Listening Project, and several individuals – one of whom is a member of the Shelbyville City Council. Defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.06, and two of the non-governmental Defendants also filed petitions for dismissal and relief under the TPPA. The non-governmental Defendants also moved the trial court to stay its discovery order with respect to Plaintiff’s action against the City. The trial court denied the motion. The non-governmental Defendants filed applications for permission for extraordinary appeal to this Court and to the Tennessee Supreme Court; those applications were denied. Upon remand to the trial court, Plaintiff voluntarily non-suited his action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The non-governmental Defendants filed motions to hear their TPPA petitions notwithstanding Plaintiff’s nonsuit. The trial court determined that Defendants’ TPPA petitions to dismiss were not justiciable following Plaintiff’s nonsuit under Rule 41.01. The Bedford County Listening Project and one individual Defendant, who is also a member of the Shelbyville City Council, appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract action brought by two tenured university professors for
wrongful termination in violation of their respective contracts of employment and the
university’s tenure policy. The university denied breaching the contracts or its tenure
policy. It insists the elimination of the tenured faculty appointments was based on two
permissible grounds, “financial distress” and the “bona fide reduction or discontinuance of
a program or department of instruction.” The trial court found the university proved both
grounds and dismissed the complaints. It also found the university complied with other
relevant provisions of the tenure policy. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for
Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Andrea
A. (“Mother”) to her minor children Serenity M., Alfred M. (“Alfie”), Chloe M., and Zoey
M. (“the Children,” collectively).1 The Children’s father, A.M. (“Father”), surrendered his
parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered
an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children on four grounds. Mother
appeals. DCS concedes the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home.
We vacate that ground. However, we find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the other three
grounds found—substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody—were
proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and
convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights
is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified, resulting in affirmance of the
termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

The issues on appeal involve the assessment of state business taxes against a pharmaceutical company that stored and sold its products from a warehouse in Memphis, Tennessee. The trial court granted summary judgment to the taxpayer, Eisai, Inc. (“Eisai”), on the ground that its pharmaceutical sales were not subject to business tax because the pharmaceuticals did not constitute “tangible personal property” as the term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-4-702(a)(23), which exempts products that are “inserted or affixed to the human body” by physicians or “dispensed . . . in the treatment of patients by physicians.” The Department of Revenue (“the Department”) appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but also rule in favor of Eisai on a different ground raised in the trial court and on appeal. In order to prevail in this case, the Department must establish that Eisai made “wholesale sales” to “retailers,” as distinguished from “wholesaler-towholesaler” sales, the latter of which are exempt from business tax. The undisputed facts reveal that Eisai’s sales were “wholesaler-to-wholesaler” sales. Accordingly, Eisai’s sales were not subject to business tax. As such, Eisai need not establish that the exception in § 67-4-702(a)(23) applies. Nevertheless, if Eisai’s sales to its distributors are within the scope of the business tax, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Eisai’s sales are exempt under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-4-702(a)(23). For these reasons, we affirm.

A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The judgment debtor opposed the petition claiming that the doctrine of laches prevented the judgment creditor from enforcing its judgment. Alternatively, the judgment debtor claimed that equitable estoppel prevented the judgment creditor from collecting the full amount remaining on the judgment. The trial court enrolled the judgment but agreed that equitable estoppel applied. We conclude that equitable estoppel does not apply. So we affirm the enrollment of the foreign judgment and vacate the trial court’s decision as to enforceability.

Appellant was found guilty of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-199 for
alleged use of a handheld wireless telecommunication device while driving. The trial court
later dismissed the judgment against Appellant. Appellee City of Covington reached a
settlement with Appellant, Appellant’s driver’s license was reinstated, and the violation
was removed from his record. Accordingly, the legal controversy at the center of this case
has been extinguished, and this Court can offer no meaningful relief to the Appellant. As
such, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard; (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal; (4) incarceration for a 10-year sentence; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support the grounds of: (1) failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights on those grounds. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

The mother of the parties’ only child filed a pro se appeal of the trial court’s order granting
the father’s Petition to Allow Relocation and for Modification of the Parties’ Permanent
Parenting Plan. The final order was entered on January 25, 2019, and the mother filed a
timely Notice of Appeal; however, the technical record was not filed with this court until
three years later, on June 7, 2022. While the mother’s pro se appellate brief was timely
filed, her brief is profoundly deficient for it fails to comply with Rule 27(a) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
of Tennessee in many material respects. Specifically, her Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts are littered with a series of assertions unrelated to the merits of this
appeal, and she fails to provide the requisite citations to the record as required by Rule
27(a)(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Further, her brief fails to set forth
relevant arguments with respect to the issues presented as required by Rule 27(a) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the few citations to legal authorities she
provides are not on point. Based on her failure to comply with Rule 27(a)(7) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
of Tennessee, Mother has waived her right to an appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is
dismissed.

The Defendant, Tedrick Dawne Hughes, was convicted of possession of more than onehalf
gram of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of more than one-half gram of
marijuana with intent to deliver, tampering with evidence, and simple possession of
methamphetamine, for which he received an effective five-year sentence of confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions for possession of more than one-half gram of marijuana with intent to sell,
possession of more than one-half gram of marijuana with intent to deliver, and tampering
with evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

There is much in the Majority Opinion with which I agree. But on one significant
question I must respectfully dissent: whether this Court should excuse the City’s failure to
brief a threshold issue.

The Petitioner, Kelvin Dewayne Golden, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child. On
appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his
claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner
argues that counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to argue to the trial court that the
indictment was inconsistent with the charged jury instructions, (2) failing to utilize
impeachment evidence through the use of expert witnesses, (3) failing to properly
investigate the case, (4) failing to hire a private investigator and medical expert to review
physical or DNA evidence, and (5) failing to utilize the victim’s psychological records to
impeach the victim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, the developer of a senior living facility in Knoxville, appeals the trial court’s
determination that it breached a joint check agreement that included itself, an electrical
subcontractor, and an electrical supplier as signatories. Although the appellant had initially
denied executing the joint check agreement and had expressed a lack of awareness of the
electrical supplier’s involvement with the subcontractor and senior living project, it
ultimately acknowledged during litigation that its controller had signed the joint check
agreement and that the supplier’s materials were incorporated into the project. The proof
at trial revealed that, notwithstanding its execution of the joint check agreement, the
appellant never issued a joint check that would assure that the supplier received payment.
Instead, the appellant paid only the subcontractor who failed to pay the supplier. Herein,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding the supplier relief against the appellant.

Appellant City of Memphis appeals the dismissal of its petition for judicial review of the
ruling of an administrative law judge. The trial court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that the City failed to provide the entire administrative record. Despite profound
deficiencies in the City’s brief, the dispositive issue is one of law and involves only the
question of whether the trial court should have proceeded with its review on the partial
administrative record. Because our review is de novo on questions of law, we exercise our
discretion under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 2 and 13(b) to proceed with
adjudication of the appeal on the merits. We conclude that the trial court should have
proceeded with its review on the partial administrative record; as such, we reverse the trial
court’s dismissal of the appeal and remand for further hearing.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court
following the denial of a motion that sought the trial court judge’s recusal from the case.
Herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion.

Defendant, Kellye Rhea Crabtree, appeals from the trial court’s sentencing and restitution orders connected with her guilty-pleaded convictions for theft over $60,000, theft over $1,000, and official misconduct, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing; finding that she was a professional criminal; denying probation or an alternative sentence; ordering the maximum in-range sentence; and imposing restitution in an ex parte order filed after the sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court regarding consecutive sentencing and the manner of service. However, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand the case for a full restitution hearing.

Plaintiff filed an action against Lauderdale County under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-301 to -
303, more than one year after his cause of action accrued. The trial court examined the
gravamen of the complaint and determined a one-year statute of limitations applied rather
than the two or six-year limitations periods advocated for by the plaintiff. Discerning no
error in the court’s analysis of the issues, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marcus Thomas, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of
post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction to attempted first degree murder.
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on
his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his
guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children. The trial court concluded that the maternal aunt and uncle proved two statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

As relevant to this appeal, the Defendant, David Ray Duncan, was convicted by a jury of
the offense of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance while present in a penal
institution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. He also argues that the trial court should have excluded
evidence produced after the deadline established by the court’s scheduling order, and he
challenges the propriety of his effective twelve-year sentence. We affirm the Defendant’s
conviction, but we respectfully remand the case for resentencing in accordance with Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-11-211.

The Defendant, Katherine E. Pilley, pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a
Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), (c)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended)
(simple possession of methamphetamine). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to
eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after thirty days in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law, challenging the trial court’s
denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the
Defendant’s car. Because the certified question is overly broad as it fails to identify the
scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction
to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Brian Keith Medley, was found guilty of sexual battery and
domestic assault. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum of four years as a Range II,
multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and that the maximum sentence was excessive. We respectfully affirm the
judgments of the trial court.