APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Cody Ricky Cofer, was convicted in the Cumberland County Criminal
Court of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of attempted especially
aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of two consecutive life terms. The
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence,
and the coram nobis court denied the petition without a hearing because the petition was
untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the coram nobis court erred by summarily
denying the petition without first considering whether the statute of limitations should be
tolled on due process grounds. The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal because
the Petitioner’s notice of appeal also was untimely. Based upon the oral arguments, the
record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and conclude that the appeal should
be dismissed.

A Madison County jury found the Defendant, Montreal Portis Robinson, guilty of felony
murder in the perpetration of a theft, especially aggravated kidnapping, robbery, and theft
of property. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
his convictions. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s
convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and robbery. However, we also conclude
that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for theft and felony
murder in the perpetration of a theft. Accordingly, we dismiss the theft charge, and we
modify the Defendant’s conviction for felony murder to that of second degree murder as a
lesser-included offense. We respectfully remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, including the entry of a modified judgment and a sentencing
hearing on the conviction for second degree murder.

Defendant, Lester Tolliver, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated rape,
for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant contends that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by (1)
admitting hearsay statements, specifically the victim’s reporting the rape to a friend and
the victim’s statement to a police officer; (2) admitting the victim’s testimony that she had
been sexually assaulted previously; (3) admitting testimony from an expert witness
regarding why a victim might lie about having had sexual activity in the days preceding a
sexual assault; and (4) denying Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction.
Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Tyler D. Bolton, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, unlawful possession of a firearm, and two counts of aggravated burglary.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude jail call recordings from the post-conviction hearing.  The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by trial counsel’s failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history and request a mental health evaluation prior to advising him to accept a plea offer.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and
to allow the petitioners to adopt the child, the trial court determined that one statutory
ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, the
trial court further determined that the petitioners had failed to establish clear and
convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s
best interest. The trial court accordingly dismissed the petition and remanded to the
juvenile court’s protective jurisdiction. The petitioners have appealed the best interest
determination, and the mother has raised an issue regarding the statutory ground. We
affirm the trial court’s finding as to the statutory ground of failure to support. However,
having determined that under the facts of this case the trial court erred in applying the
statutory best interest factors applicable to the initial termination petition rather than
those applicable to the amended petition, we reverse the trial court’s best interest finding
and remand for reconsideration applying the amended best interest factors contained in
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2022).

This appeal arises from a suit to rescind a contract for the sale of a home due to fraud. The
trial court found clear and convincing evidence of fraud justifying rescission. It ordered
the buyer to convey the property back to the sellers, with the sellers returning the purchase
price, minus the fair rental value of the property, with a credit to the buyer for various
expenses he had incurred. However, the trial court declined to award any offset to the
buyer for improvements he had made to the property. It also declined to award punitive
damages but did award the buyer attorney fees. Taken together, the parties present twentyfive issues for review on appeal. We vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.

Plaintiff alleges she was injured from a fall at a skilled nursing facility while using a defective shower chair with a broken lock and torn netting. The circuit court concluded the Plaintiff did not need to file a certificate of good faith under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act because the common knowledge exception is applicable and the complaint’s negligence allegations do not require expert testimony. The nursing facility appeals, arguing expert testimony is required to establish both the standard of care and proximate causation; therefore, a certificate of good faith must be filed. Because the allegations set forth in the complaint do not require expert testimony to maintain the Plaintiff’s claim, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Antwain Tapaige Sales, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order dismissing his claim that his judgments of conviction for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder are fraudulent and void. After review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

The plaintiffs, Martina and Eddie Smith (“Buyers”), filed suit in the Madison County
Circuit Court (“Trial Court”) regarding their purchase of a piece of real property from the
defendant, Donna Jean Walker (“Seller”). Buyers alleged intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and failure to disclose the presence of mold within the home.
The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of Seller. Buyers previously filed an
appeal to this Court regarding the grant of summary judgment. During that appeal, this
Court held that the Trial Court had not provided a sufficient basis for granting Seller’s
motion for summary judgment and remanded for entry of a new order explaining its
reasoning. Thereafter, the Trial Court entered a revised order providing detailed reasoning
for its grant of summary judgment in favor of Seller on each of Buyers’ claims against her.
Buyers timely appealed the revised order to this Court. During this second appeal, Buyers
filed essentially the same brief as in the previous appeal despite entry of the Trial Court’s
revised order following remand. Because Buyers failed to address the revised order in their
appellate brief and failed to cite to the record submitted to this Court in this appeal, Buyers
waived their issues for appeal by failing to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27 and Tenn. Ct.
App. R. 6. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

The Defendant, Frank M. Green, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4 and was acquitted of the charge of aggravated kidnapping in Count 5. The Defendant filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal as to the rape conviction in Count 3 and the assault conviction in Count 4. The trial court denied this motion but merged Count 3 with Count 1 and merged Count 4 with Count 2. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years for each of the rape convictions and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions and ordered the rape and assault convictions served concurrently, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the State’s faulty election of offenses led the trial court to provide erroneous and misleading jury instructions, which undermined the integrity of the jury’s verdict; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions in count 3 for rape and count 4 for assault; and (3) the convictions in Counts 2 and 4 reflect the incorrect offense class and sentence. Because the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that errors regarding the election, the charge, and the supplemental jury instructions were harmless, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial on the offenses of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and the offenses of assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the State’s election of the offenses was flawed and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to the State’s faulty election. Cf. State v. Ellis, 89 S.W.3d 584, 596 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (“[B]ecause the election requirement is ‘fundamental, immediately touching the constitutional rights of an accused,’ a trial court has a duty even absent a request by the defendant to ensure the timely election of offenses by the State and to properly instruct the jury concerning the requirement of a unanimous verdict.” (quoting Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tenn. 1973)). I part ways with the majority regarding the remedy to which the Defendant is entitled for the double jeopardy issue which resulted from the State’s flawed election and the court’s reliance upon the election in its jury instructions.

Michael Mosley, Defendant, claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempted aggravated assault, that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election as to the precise definition of serious bodily injury for which a conviction was being sought, and that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s request for two special jury instructions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a conservatorship action initiated by University of Tennessee Medical Center with
respect to one of its patients. The trial court granted the hospital’s petition for
conservatorship based in part on a physician’s affidavit and medical examination report
attached to its petition. The respondent has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by
considering the physician’s affidavit and report, by denying her motion for a continuance,
and by finding clear and convincing evidence that she was disabled and in need of a
conservator. Given that no party introduced the physician’s affidavit and report into
evidence, we conclude that the trial court erred by considering these documents as
evidence. We further conclude that the trial court’s final judgment is deficient due to its
dearth of factual findings. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment appointing a
conservator for the respondent and remand for a new hearing on the petition.

This appeal concerns a father’s continued failure to remit payment for his child support
obligation. Following the mother’s contempt petitions, the trial court determined the
father’s current child support obligation and arrearage amount and awarded the mother her
attorney fees. The father appeals arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, erred in awarding the mother attorney fees, and erred in setting the arrearage
payment amount. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on these issues.

A Sumner County jury convicted the defendant, Steven Lamont Anderson, of unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving violence and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an agreed-upon sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marlon Jackson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his three-year
probationary sentence for attempted possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell
or deliver. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation after determining that he
materially violated his probation sentence for engaging in criminal activity and being
charged with new offenses. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation because the evidence to support the violation was
“inconclusive, contradictory, and based upon unreliable hearsay.” After review, we
conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the Defendant violated the
terms of his probation sentence.

Fredrick Munn, Defendant, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original three-year sentence in
confinement. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a
new revocation hearing.

This appeal arises from a health care liability action. The plaintiffs filed their complaint
against a physician and a surgical practice after the expiration of the statute of limitations,
relying on the 120-day extension under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c).
However, the physician was not employed by the surgical practice during the treatment at
issue but was employed by a governmental entity that was not named as a defendant. Both
the physician and the surgical practice filed motions to dismiss, which were ultimately
treated as motions for summary judgment due to consideration of matters outside the
pleadings. Afterward, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint to
substitute parties. Pursuant to section 29-20-310(b) of the Tennessee Governmental Tort
Liability Act, the trial court found that the plaintiffs had to sue the governmental entity in
order to sue the physician individually. The court found that the motion for leave to amend
the complaint was futile because the statute of limitations had run as to any claim against
the governmental entity. The court explained that any claim against the governmental
entity would be time-barred even if it related back to the date of the filing of the complaint.
The court further explained that the plaintiffs relied on the 120-day extension contained in
section 29-26-121(c) when they filed their complaint and that the extension did not apply
to any potential claim against the governmental entity because they failed to provide presuit
notice to it. The court also noted that the plaintiffs unduly delayed seeking to amend
their complaint despite being explicitly informed before filing their complaint who the
physician did and did not work for. Additionally, the court found that the surgical practice
was not involved in the treatment at issue and did not employ the physician or any of the
medical providers involved. Thus, the court found that the surgical practice negated an
essential element of the plaintiffs’ claim against it and demonstrated the evidence was
insufficient to establish such a claim. Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’
motions and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint to substitute
parties. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Property owner sued owners of an adjacent property for damages allegedly caused by the installation of a pipe culvert. The plaintiff alleged that, due to improper installation, the pipe culvert obstructed the downstream flow of water and caused the plaintiff’s property to flood. Both sides filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the adjacent property owners based on the statute of repose for defective improvements to real property. We conclude that the statute of repose could not be asserted by the adjacent property owners. So we reverse the grant of summary judgment.

Defendant, Mark Eric Howard, was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder, a
Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree
murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, filed by Agness McCurry (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the judge
in this case involving post-divorce parenting issues. Having reviewed the petition for
recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner’s original and untimely petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed on the merits because all his claims were either waived or previously determined. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a second petition alleging that the statute of limitations for his first petition should have been tolled due to his then mental incompetency. The post-conviction court dismissed the second petition, finding that the Petitioner was not mentally incompetent. On appeal, we conclude that, because the Petitioner’s first petition was resolved on the merits, any second or subsequent petition is barred, and any issue regarding the timely filing of the first petition is immaterial. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This action concerns the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against his former attorney for breach of contract, malpractice, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm.

The issue presented is whether a civil service merit board acts arbitrarily or capriciously
by not allowing an employee to ask questions in a termination hearing about more lenient
discipline imposed on other civil service employees. A Shelby County Fire Department
employee was fired based on his participation in an altercation involving a firearm at a
political rally and his dishonesty during the subsequent investigation. He appealed his
termination to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. During the hearing, the Board
did not allow the employee’s counsel to ask questions about discipline imposed on other
Fire Department employees. The Board affirmed the employee’s termination for just cause.
The employee appealed, and the trial court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Board’s decision to exclude the questions about other discipline was
arbitrary and unreasonable, and remanded the case for consideration of such evidence.
Under the narrow standard of review provided in the Uniform Administrative Procedures
Act, we hold that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by declining to consider
evidence of discipline imposed on other employees. We reverse the Court of Appeals’
judgment and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves an issue of arbitration. The trial court entered an order declining to
approve for entry the defendants’ proposed notice of intent to arbitrate and order to compel
arbitration. The defendants appeal. We dismiss the appeal.